{"created":"2023-06-20T16:49:14.437417+00:00","id":21408,"links":{},"metadata":{"_buckets":{"deposit":"80a3fba3-e27f-47dc-a4c9-71e89a3b3913"},"_deposit":{"created_by":3,"id":"21408","owners":[3],"pid":{"revision_id":0,"type":"depid","value":"21408"},"status":"published"},"_oai":{"id":"oai:kindai.repo.nii.ac.jp:00021408","sets":["14:2667:4613"]},"author_link":["30612","43266"],"control_number":"21408","item_8_biblio_info_21":{"attribute_name":"書誌情報","attribute_value_mlt":[{"bibliographicIssueDates":{"bibliographicIssueDate":"2020","bibliographicIssueDateType":"Issued"},"bibliographicPageEnd":"5","bibliographicPageStart":"1","bibliographic_titles":[{"bibliographic_title":"科学研究費助成事業研究成果報告書 (2019)"}]}]},"item_8_description_25":{"attribute_name":"リンクURL","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_description":"https://kaken.nii.ac.jp/grant/KAKENHI-PROJECT-16K03569/","subitem_description_type":"Other"}]},"item_8_description_33":{"attribute_name":"抄録","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_description":"研究成果の概要（和文）：事後的な交渉の柔軟性と事前の投資インセンティブの関係について研究を行った。3人のプレーヤーの間の非協力交渉ゲームを採用し、提携の提案者は投資の決定後に等しい確率に選ばれるというモデルを構築した。提案者はすぐに全員で提携するか、2人でまず提携するかの選択肢が与えられている。このオプションが過少投資（ホールドアップ）問題にどのように影響を与えるのかを分析した。割引因子が十分大きい場合、均衡において逐次的に提携が形成され、インセンティブは改善する。割引因子が小さい場合には、全体提携がすぐに形成されインセンティブは改善しない。割引因子が中間の場合、全体提携がすぐに形成されるがインセンティブは改善する。研究成果の概要（英文）：I study the relationship between the dynamics of ex-post negotiations and incentives for ex-ante investments. I adopt three player noncooperative bargaining game where the proposer is selected with equal probability after the investment decision. The proposer can choose the group alliance immediately or individual alliances where the alliances are formed sequentially. When the discount factor is sufficiently high, the alliances are formed sequentially on the equilibrium and the option of individual alliances can provide incentives for cooperative investments. When the discount factor is not high, the group alliance is formed immediately but there are two cases about incentives. When the discount factor is sufficiently small, the option of individual alliance has no effect on incentives. On the other hand, the option of individual alliances plays a role of the threat for underinvestment under the intermediate discount factor and can provide incentives.","subitem_description_type":"Abstract"}]},"item_8_description_36":{"attribute_name":"内容記述","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_description":"研究種目：基盤研究(C);  研究期間：2016～2019;   課題番号：16K03569;   研究分野：理論経済学;   科研費の分科・細目：","subitem_description_type":"Other"}]},"item_8_description_37":{"attribute_name":"資源タイプ(WEKO2)","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_description":"Research Paper","subitem_description_type":"Other"}]},"item_8_description_41":{"attribute_name":"フォーマット","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_description":"application/pdf","subitem_description_type":"Other"}]},"item_8_publisher_14":{"attribute_name":"出版者 名前","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_publisher":"近畿大学"}]},"item_8_text_10":{"attribute_name":"著者 役割","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_text_value":"研究代表者"},{"subitem_text_value":"研究協力者"}]},"item_8_text_7":{"attribute_name":"著者(英)","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_text_language":"en","subitem_text_value":"Kiyotaki, Fumi"},{"subitem_text_language":"en","subitem_text_value":"Miyakawa, Toshiji"}]},"item_8_text_8":{"attribute_name":"著者 所属","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_text_value":"近畿大学経済学部; 教授"}]},"item_8_text_9":{"attribute_name":"著者所属(翻訳)","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_text_value":"Kindai University"}]},"item_8_version_type_12":{"attribute_name":"版","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_version_resource":"http://purl.org/coar/version/c_be7fb7dd8ff6fe43","subitem_version_type":"NA"}]},"item_creator":{"attribute_name":"著者","attribute_type":"creator","attribute_value_mlt":[{"creatorNames":[{"creatorName":"清滝, ふみ"},{"creatorName":"キヨタキ, フミ","creatorNameLang":"ja-Kana"}],"nameIdentifiers":[{},{}]},{"creatorNames":[{"creatorName":"宮川, 敏治"},{"creatorName":"ミヤガワ, トシジ","creatorNameLang":"ja-Kana"}],"nameIdentifiers":[{}]}]},"item_files":{"attribute_name":"ファイル情報","attribute_type":"file","attribute_value_mlt":[{"accessrole":"open_date","date":[{"dateType":"Available","dateValue":"2021-03-15"}],"displaytype":"detail","filename":"16K03569seika.pdf","filesize":[{"value":"207.2 kB"}],"format":"application/pdf","licensetype":"license_note","mimetype":"application/pdf","url":{"label":"16K03569seika.pdf","url":"https://kindai.repo.nii.ac.jp/record/21408/files/16K03569seika.pdf"},"version_id":"62b71684-2f4b-461f-a0a1-62ad5c19cecc"}]},"item_keyword":{"attribute_name":"キーワード","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_subject":"非協力交渉ゲーム","subitem_subject_scheme":"Other"},{"subitem_subject":"戦略的提携","subitem_subject_scheme":"Other"},{"subitem_subject":"ホールドアップ問題","subitem_subject_scheme":"Other"},{"subitem_subject":"不完備契約","subitem_subject_scheme":"Other"}]},"item_language":{"attribute_name":"言語","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_language":"jpn"}]},"item_resource_type":{"attribute_name":"資源タイプ","attribute_value_mlt":[{"resourcetype":"research report","resourceuri":"http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_18ws"}]},"item_title":"交渉と情報の透明性がインセンティブに与える影響の解明","item_titles":{"attribute_name":"タイトル","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_title":"交渉と情報の透明性がインセンティブに与える影響の解明","subitem_title_language":"ja"},{"subitem_title":"The study of effects of the transparency of the bargaining procedure and information on incentives","subitem_title_language":"en"}]},"item_type_id":"8","owner":"3","path":["4613"],"pubdate":{"attribute_name":"PubDate","attribute_value":"2021-03-15"},"publish_date":"2021-03-15","publish_status":"0","recid":"21408","relation_version_is_last":true,"title":["交渉と情報の透明性がインセンティブに与える影響の解明"],"weko_creator_id":"3","weko_shared_id":-1},"updated":"2023-09-13T00:19:14.933007+00:00"}