{"created":"2023-06-20T16:40:37.570194+00:00","id":10929,"links":{},"metadata":{"_buckets":{"deposit":"f1f62eea-5d63-4dd7-8294-a420ed99b4bf"},"_deposit":{"created_by":3,"id":"10929","owners":[3],"pid":{"revision_id":0,"type":"depid","value":"10929"},"status":"published"},"_oai":{"id":"oai:kindai.repo.nii.ac.jp:00010929","sets":["14:923:1023:1059","21:3039:3527:3540"]},"author_link":["21096"],"item_2_alternative_title_3":{"attribute_name":"その他（別言語等）のタイトル","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_alternative_title":"〈Articles〉Liquidity Management, Corporate Takeover, and Takeover Defense"}]},"item_2_biblio_info_21":{"attribute_name":"書誌情報","attribute_value_mlt":[{"bibliographicIssueDates":{"bibliographicIssueDate":"2008-07-01","bibliographicIssueDateType":"Issued"},"bibliographicIssueNumber":"1","bibliographicPageEnd":"29","bibliographicPageStart":"19","bibliographicVolumeNumber":"6","bibliographic_titles":[{"bibliographic_title":"生駒経済論叢"},{"bibliographic_title":"Ikoma Journal of Economics","bibliographic_titleLang":"en"}]}]},"item_2_description_33":{"attribute_name":"抄録","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_description":"[概要] 本論文は企業の手元流動性をめぐるエージェンシー問題について考察する。過剰な流動性を持つ経営者は, 再投資に必要な額を上回る投資をすることで私的便益を享受したい一方で, 流動資産を多くその支配下に保有し隠匿したい, といった相反するエージェンシー問題を孕む。ここでは投資家が最適な報酬とガバナンス強度を設定することでこれらの問題をコントロールできることを示した。また, 企業の留保現金をターゲットとした買収が企図される場合, 買収が投資家による企業統治に与える影響を考察する。買収の可能性がある場合, 投資家はガバナンス強度を下げる。さらに, 買収防衛が社会的厚生を下げるとしても, 投資家は防衛策を導入するインセンティブがあり, それは再投資に必要な額が小さいほど大きくなる。     [Abstracte]  This paper explores different kinds of agency problems associated with liquidity management. A manager with an excess liquidity faces the following two agency problems; he can pursue private benefits by investing more than the requirement level or he can, and has an incentive to, retain more liquidity and divert it. We show that investors can control these agency problems by setting an optimal wage contract and governance intensity. We also explore the case of a takeover which aims to confiscate excess cash, and see how the government system is affected. We show that the possibility of takeover reduces the governance intensity. Moreover, even though a takeover defense reduces social welfare, the less liquidity the reinvestment requires, the stronger the investors attempt a takeover defense.","subitem_description_type":"Abstract"}]},"item_2_description_36":{"attribute_name":"内容記述","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_description":"本研究は財団法人村田学術財団(平成19年度「企業買収防衛をめぐる内部留保現金と企業価値についての考察」)の助成を受けたものである。","subitem_description_type":"Other"}]},"item_2_description_41":{"attribute_name":"フォーマット","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_description":"application/pdf","subitem_description_type":"Other"}]},"item_2_publisher_14":{"attribute_name":"出版者 名前","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_publisher":"近畿大学経済学会"}]},"item_2_source_id_22":{"attribute_name":"ISSN","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_source_identifier":"13488686","subitem_source_identifier_type":"ISSN"}]},"item_2_text_7":{"attribute_name":"著者(英)","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_text_language":"en","subitem_text_value":"Kobayashi, Mami"}]},"item_2_text_8":{"attribute_name":"著者 所属","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_text_value":"近畿大学経済学部; 准教授"}]},"item_2_text_9":{"attribute_name":"著者所属(翻訳)","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_text_value":"Kinki University"}]},"item_2_version_type_12":{"attribute_name":"版","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_version_resource":"http://purl.org/coar/version/c_970fb48d4fbd8a85","subitem_version_type":"VoR"}]},"item_creator":{"attribute_name":"著者","attribute_type":"creator","attribute_value_mlt":[{"creatorNames":[{"creatorName":"小林,  磨美"},{"creatorName":"コバヤシ, マミ","creatorNameLang":"ja-Kana"}],"nameIdentifiers":[{}]}]},"item_files":{"attribute_name":"ファイル情報","attribute_type":"file","attribute_value_mlt":[{"accessrole":"open_date","date":[{"dateType":"Available","dateValue":"2016-02-19"}],"displaytype":"detail","filename":"AA1196034X-20080731-0019.pdf","filesize":[{"value":"571.0 kB"}],"format":"application/pdf","licensetype":"license_note","mimetype":"application/pdf","url":{"label":"AA1196034X-20080731-0019.pdf","url":"https://kindai.repo.nii.ac.jp/record/10929/files/AA1196034X-20080731-0019.pdf"},"version_id":"02ca5404-34de-48ae-a237-a7acfa8e5e99"}]},"item_keyword":{"attribute_name":"キーワード","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_subject":"手元流動性","subitem_subject_scheme":"Other"},{"subitem_subject":"フリーキャッシュフロー仮説","subitem_subject_scheme":"Other"},{"subitem_subject":"買収防衛","subitem_subject_scheme":"Other"},{"subitem_subject":"liquidity","subitem_subject_scheme":"Other"},{"subitem_subject":"free-cash-flow hypothesis","subitem_subject_scheme":"Other"},{"subitem_subject":"takeover defense","subitem_subject_scheme":"Other"}]},"item_language":{"attribute_name":"言語","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_language":"jpn"}]},"item_resource_type":{"attribute_name":"資源タイプ","attribute_value_mlt":[{"resourcetype":"departmental bulletin paper","resourceuri":"http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501"}]},"item_title":"〈論文〉企業の手元流動性にかかわるガバナンスと企業買収および買収防衛の考察","item_titles":{"attribute_name":"タイトル","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_title":"〈論文〉企業の手元流動性にかかわるガバナンスと企業買収および買収防衛の考察"}]},"item_type_id":"2","owner":"3","path":["1059","3540"],"pubdate":{"attribute_name":"公開日","attribute_value":"2013-06-22"},"publish_date":"2013-06-22","publish_status":"0","recid":"10929","relation_version_is_last":true,"title":["〈論文〉企業の手元流動性にかかわるガバナンスと企業買収および買収防衛の考察"],"weko_creator_id":"3","weko_shared_id":-1},"updated":"2023-06-20T23:36:46.272512+00:00"}