# 博 士 学 位 論 文

## AN ANALYSIS OF ETHNIC CONFLICTS IN AFRICA

近 畿 大 学 大 学 院
法学研究科法律学専攻

**Jean Roger Edgard BAGAMBOULA**

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## CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION -OBJECTIVES AND METHODOLOGY-

1-1 Introduction

The end of the cold war has brought an illusion to many observers of international politics. Many people assumed that the international tensions would be reduced, but that stability would be retained- perhaps even extended to previously troubled parts of the world. [1] Francis Fukuyama, a respected scholar, spoke of `the end of history' in his famous book The End of History and the Last Man . [2]

Certainly, the end of the cold war has brought an era of ideological conflict to an end. But it has not, as forecast, brought an end to history. One set of hatreds gives way to the next. Lifting the lid of ideological repression in Eastern Europe releases ethnic antagonisms deeply rooted in history and in memory. The disappearance of ideological competition in the third world removes superpower restraints on national and ethnic confrontations. As the era of ideological conflict subsides, humanity enters, or more precisely re-enters, a possibly more dangerous era of ethnic and racial animosity. [3]

Inter-group ethnic hostility is among the most instinctive human reactions. Yet the history of our planet has been in great part the history of the mixing of peoples. Mass migrations have produced mass antagonisms from the beginning of time.

Today, as the twentieth century draws to an end, a number of factors, not just the evaporation of the cold war, but more profoundly, the development of swifter modes of communication and transport, the acceleration of population growth, the breakdown of traditional social structures, the

flight from tyranny and from want, and the dream of a better life somewhere else all converge to drive people as never before across national frontiers and thereby to make the mixing of peoples a major problem for the century that lies uncertainly ahead.

What happens when people of different ethnic origins, speaking different languages and professing different religions, settle in the same geographical locality and live under the same political sovereignty? Unless a common purpose binds them together, ethnic hostilities will drive them apart. Ethnic and racial conflict, it seems evident, will now replace the conflict of ideologies as the explosive issue of our times.

On every side today ethnicity is the cause of the breakup of nations. The Soviet Union, Yugoslavia, India and South Africa are all in crisis. Ethnic tensions disturb and divide Sri Lanka, Burma, Ethiopia, Indonesia, Iraq, Lebanon, Israel, Cyprus, Somalia, Nigeria, Liberia, Angola, Sudan, Zaire, Guyana, Trinidad -you name it. Even nations as stable and civilized as Britain and France, Belgium and Spain and Czechoslovakia face growing ethnic and racial troubles. "The virus of tribalism," says the Economist, "...risks becoming the AIDS of international politics -lying dormant for years, then flaring up to destory countries."[4]

In fact, if international relations in their conventional meaning are characterized by a relative peace because of a lack of major interstate wars, we have to say that this is only in appearence.

The legacy of the world political order which had been based on nation-states since the Westphalian system of 1648, had created multi-ethnic states by putting previously

separate nations or ethnic groups in the same political boundaries have undermined world peace and stability.

In Africa where the actual nation states order has been an artificial creation by colonial powers, self-determination was and still is an object of demand from some ethnic groups who are questioning the legitimacy of the state.

The illustration of this reality manifested itself early in Africa during the Congo rebellion of 1960. Since then, ethnic conflicts have appeared in country after country. The nation state-building process, instead of uniting people by creating a new identity, as it was stated by modernist theories, has, contrary to this, created conflicting situations expressed in demand for equality or demand for secession. In other cases, even the process of decolonisation, which in principle has united the colonized people, has been marked by deep divisions which, after independence, have led to acrimonious wars instead of peace and prosperity.

The effects of these conflicts have not only caused loss of many human lives but also undermined the socio-economic development and the regional peace.

During the Rwanda war in 1994, about 500,000 Tsutis were victim of genocide.[5] In reference to socio-economic development, ethnic conflicts have a very negative effect on African states. In his study of economic impact of Biafra civil war on Nigeria economy, Waine Nafrizer suggests that the civil war adversly affected Nigeria's development and that its economic position deteriorated.[6]

At the regional level, ethnic conflicts usually involve nations who are not direct combatants in the conflict. Ethnic conflicts, for example, are a source of refugees and

displaced persons who seek safety in non-involved nations or in nations with large ethnic confederate populations. [7]

Overall, some 250,000 refugees from Ethiopia, Somalia, and Sudan flooded into ill-prepared camps in northern Kenya in 1991 and 1992, creating a crisis in sanitation and health care. [8] In Mozambique, for example, there were nearly 2 million displaced persons by 1991, and many were taking shelter in makeshift camps. In Sudan, a million to a million and a half southern refugees were living in slums around the capital at Khartoum at the end of the 1980s.

The U.S. Committee for Refugees, however, estimates that roughly 13 million were displaced by Africa's wars at the end of 1992 (see Table 1.1, p. 6), a number that, when added to the 5 million refugees, reveals the magnitude of Africa's suffering.    These 18 million refugees and displaced persons exceeded the population of Ghana and approximated the combined populations of New York City, Los Angeles, and Chicago. [9]

Such large ethnic refugee populations put heavy economic, social and political stress on the host nation and may lead to xenophobia and ethnic conflict within that country. The burden can also give the host nation a stake in seeing the external conflict quikly resolved.

In addition to accepting refugees, nations with an interest in the conflict or ties to one of the groups may choose to become directly involved. They can do this by assisting one ethnic group, as with the Zaire in Angola and Rwanda. [10]

The militarization and militarism have also been the features of post-colonial African states. Thus the UN Economic Commission for Africa has deplored `the military-

social imbalance' whereby public expenditures on defence in the Africa of the mid-1980s were allegedly greater than those on education, and more than three times as great as those on health. [11] In the first Human Development Report of the UN Development Programme (UNDP), it was reported that in Sub-Sahara Africa, the ratio of military spending of GNP as 3.3 with Angola alone spending about 12 per cent of its GNP militarily in 1986. [12]

This situation not only  worries the international community but also reinforces the image of Africa as a backward continent whose people, because of their ethnic bonds, dislike each other and tend to act irrationally when facing competition from other groups.

We argue that this view of a tribal, irrational and primordial Africa is an anachronistic and unhistorical one because it is based on racially biased views developed by Eurocentric philosophers and  pseudo anthropologists.  Thus, we think that any real or objective approach on ethnicity and the related ethnic conflicts in Africa should take a serious consideration of the historical evolution of Africa's political, social and cultural societies in order to make  a proper analysis.  This is so because the phenomenon of ethnic conflict is not only related to Africa alone, but also to different countries of the Third, Second as well as First World like the former Soviet Union, former Yugoslavia, Canada, Belgium, Sri-Lanka, India etc....

Recently ,with the increasing importance of ethnicity in the world, serious studies have begun to emerge and ethnicity has come to be analyzed with reference to objective factors. By considering this encouraging fact, we incline ourselves to follow this path, by focusing on a socio-historical evolution of African states.

According to Karl Marx, the mode of production in material life determines the general character of the social, political and spiritual process of life. It is not the consciousness of men that determines their existence but, on the contrary, their social existence determines their consciousness.' [13]

Thus the ethnic conflicts in Africa, being an aspect of social phenomena, can't be excepted from this rule.

Table 1.1
Africa's Wars as Sources of Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons, 1992

| War | Refugees | Displaced persons |
|---|---|---|
| Mozambique | 1,725,000(a) | 3,500,000 |
| Somalia | 864,800(a) | 2,000,000 |
| Ethiopia and Eritrea | 834,800 | 600,000 |
| Liberia | 599,200(a) | 600,000 |
| Angola | 404,200 | 900,000 |
| Sudan | 263,000 | 5,000,000 |
| Rwanda | 201,500(a) | 350,000 |
| Sierra Leone (destabilized by Liberia conflict) | 200,000(a) | 200,000 |
| Western Sahara | 165,000(b) | - |
| Chad | 24,000(a) | - |
| Totals | 5,281,500 | 13,150,000 |

Source: U.S Committee for Refugees, *World Refugee Survey,* 1993 (Washington, D.C. : U.S. Committee for Refugees, 1993), 52

(a) Indicates that sources may vary significantly in number reorted (World Refugee Survey).

(b) This is the number given by the Algerian government and used by relief agencies. (The U.S. government estimate has been 50,000.)

1-2 The Objectives

This thesis has two aims:

The first aim is to analyze the factors of ethnic conflicts in Africa. We think that the direct motive of ethnic conflicts in Africa is the competition within states for the control of the state and for the resources of the state. The modern state controls an increasing level of resource. When one group controls the mechanisms of state, it will distribute its resources in such a way as to "prefer itself". This will be evident in state policies.

However, three factors should be considered in an attempt to understand this situation. 1-the historical dimension related to the colonial legacy, 2-the nation state dimension which puts an accent on the process of nation state building in Africa, 3-the international dimension. Certainly, other dimensions may intervene as factors of ethnic conflict in Africa, but we consider that these three dimensions represent the most important ones.

In the first dimension, it will be maintained that in most cases, the roots of ethnic conflicts in Africa reside in the colonial legacy. Colonialists, because of their intention of absolute domination and exploitation of African people, created a policy of divide and rule by putting African groups in confrontation.

In the second dimension, it will be maintained that in certain instances, ethnic conflicts are directly attributable to the policies of the state, based on the European vision of nation state which affect ethnic group interests and to specific behaviors of the state which precipitate violent instances. Ethnic groups seek to maintain and to augment their absolute welfare as well as its welfare ranking

relative to other groups in order to ensure survival. Each has historically sought access to the political, social and economic resources for group benefit. It is generally agreed that in modern states, coexistent groups have historically structured and materially derived relationships and that these relationships are generally ranked along specific dimensions of interaction.

In the third dimension, we will attribute the cause of these conflicts to the international political and economic order for its lack of consideration of the real needs and aspirations of African peoples.

The second aim of this work is to formulate some prospects for ethnic conflicts resolution in Africa. Our assumption is that the question of conflict resolution has been mostly approached only in one aspect which is the role of regional and international organizations. We consider that this reveals a lack of vision or political courage from the people concerned who seem to give the impression that the nation state formula as it is presented in Africa is the best and the only way to save Africa from its actual predicament.

We argue in this work that this is a mistake. This is so because Africa, in the same way as other continents, has evolved after many years of progressive civilization. Thus the political traditions which have been conceived by its ancestors, if reevaluated in the modern context, may give us some prospects for resolution.

In this difficult enterprise, the experiences of conflict management which have been gained by other multi-ethnic states such as Switzerland, Belgium and others may be of great help when adapted to the realities of the African context.

Based on a synchronistic vision, we try to propose some prospects for conflict resolution which by also considering the role of regional and international organizations puts an accent on the national dimension.

1-3 The Methodology

The general strategy of this thesis will be to make a general analysis and specific one based on Nigeria and Angola.

Our focus on Nigeria and Angola can be explained by the fact that these two cases represent the most common types of ethnic conflicts found in Africa: The first type is based on demand of self-determination; the second type is based on the control of central government.

Nigeria represent the first type. Composed by different ethnic groups put together by British colonialist for their convenience, Nigeria is in reality a mozaic of ethnic groups of different political cultures.

The experiences of nation state construction have been undermined, since the independence by numerous political crises, which have led to the demand of Biafra right of self-determination. From the international political aspect, these exprinces reveal us how competing principles of international law such as self-determination and sovereignty have found a conflicting application in post-colonial Africa. Also, it shows how intervention of the third party into African' conflict has been problematic.

The Angolan conflict represents a good example of ethnic conflicts study found in Sub-Sahara Africa. Just as in Nigeria, Angola is a colonial creation which until 1975 had been under the Portuguese domination. However, the post

indepedence Angola have been marked by continual conflict between the main liberation groups which have failed to establish a government of national unity because of differences in the approach of nation state building policy. The Angola case illustrates well the interconnection between the African state system and the world political evolution.

More than anything else the continuation of Angolan conflict shows well us the negative characters of the nation states building policies adopted by the African nationalist leaders the day after their countries' independence in the name of national integration. This is so because like other African states, the Angolan government had installed the system of centralism and mono-partism, refusing to recognize other national liberation movements or political parties.

The Nigerian and Angolan conflicts demonstrate well to which extent the decision of Berlin conference of grouping different peoples in the same political jurisdiction was very negative for Africa because it brought the question of national identity and by consequence that of political legitimacy.

Through these cases, we can find out the real political motivations which have guided the foreign policies of superpowers as well as other states toward modern African states. This gives us the possibility to see how despite the existence of international and regional organizations which proclaimed themselve as guarantee of international peace and security, the war and foreign interventions could not be stopped for more than a decade. Thus, we will:

1-define and describe the general sources and factors of ethnic conflicts in Africa and draw conclusions in relation to our approach;

2-describe and analyze the colonial policies in each case, and establish their impact on ethnic conflicts;

3-describe the policies or issues which has dominated Angola and Nigeria in the post-colonial period and draw a conclusion in relation to ethnic conflicts in these two countries;

4-describe the international implication of foreign powers in each conflict, define their interests and see how it may have influenced these two conflicts;

5-describe and analyze the main policies of conflict resolution established by the African states and the international organizations, analyze their efficacy and propose some alternative solutions.

In general, this work is divided into ten chapters. Chapter 1 introduces the problem of ethnic conflicts in the modern world politics and specifies the objectives and the methodology of this thesis.

Chapter 2 is a brief general review of ethnic conflicts. This introductory chapter is important to us because it gives our readers an insight to what is going on in other countries and to understand why we are saying that the phenomenon of ethnic conflicts and its logic are not only related to Africa. As in Africa, it is a result of the contradictions between the political system and some ethnic group's needs and aspirations.

Chapter 3 is an analysis of conceptual issues. Here, we try to analyze some main political concepts which have an important impact on Africa's political evolution. The preliminary understanding of these concepts is very important for us because most of them have been formulated in Europe

and then, their applicability in the African context has been the subject of deep controversies. It is, therefore, for the purpose of understanding this ambiguity that we have done this related study.

Chapter 4 is an analytical review of some theories which try to explain the ethnic phenomenon not only in Africa but also in other parts of the world. This chapter is very important because it helps us understand how theoretically the question of ethnic conflict in Africa is approached. In connection with our study, we try to make some comments on these theories. However, by considering the complexity of ethnic problems in Africa, none of these related theories is presented as a main theory. For us, some theories contain important elements which may explain in part the ethnic conflicts in Africa but not its totality.

Chapter 5 deals mainly with the general factors and sources of ethnic conflicts in Africa. Our assumption is that it is theoretically difficult to explain the ethnic conflicts in Africa. This is so because none of these theories can claim a universal application in all the related ethnic conflicts in Africa. For that purpose, we have to analyze some main factors which we consider as the direct causes of ethnic conflicts in Africa. However, in order to evaluate properly our logic, we first analyze the African pre-colonial political institutions and then present the main factors which we have divided into three categories: 1-the colonial legacy, 2-nation state building, 3-the international political and economic order.

Chapter 6 and 7 are related to the study of Nigeria and Angola cases. Here we intend to demonstrate empirically what we have stated in Chapter Five. These chapters are very important because they helps us understand how and why ethnic conflicts have appeared in Africa. It is through the

observation of the real factors of conflict in these two cases that let us develop our logic and delete consider ethnicity in Africa as a political phenomenon. These chapters also helps us to formulate proper solutions toward the resolution of ethnic problems in Africa.

Chapter 8 is a comparative study which examines the similarities and the differences between the civil war in Nigeria and the civil war in Angola. It deals also with the causes of the OAU failure in the resolution of ethnic conflicts in Africa.

Chapter 9 is a review of policies pursued by African states and some European multi-ethnic states such as Belgium and Switzerland in order to solve the ethnic problem. It examines also the polices of international organizations such as the Organization of African Unity (OAU) and the UN

Chapter 10 proposes some alternative solutions. Based on an observation of African pre-colonial political institutions and modern political experiences, we try to formulate some prospects of conflict resolution mainly based on 4 levels: the national, regional, continental and international. We think that any prospect of ethnic conflict resolution in Africa should integrate these 4 levels because they are intimately related.

In conclusion, through a general study of the sources and factors of ethnic conflicts in Africa and detailed case studies on Nigeria and Angola civil wars, we will try to develop a multi-dimensional approach of ethnic conflicts in Africa and propose some prospects of resolution. What is particularly unique in this work, is that the approaches we are proposing on the analysis of the fators of ethnic conflicts and the formulation of solutions, are multi-dimensional.

Chapter 1

1. Michael E. Brown, <u>Ethnic Conflict and International Security</u>
   Princeton University Press, 1993. p. 3

2. Francis Fukuyama is an American Scholar of Japanese Origin
   in 1992 he wrote a book in which he talk about the World
   political philosophy . <u>THE END OF HISTORY AND THE LAST MAN</u>
   ( New York The Free Press) 1992

3. Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr`The Disuniting of America'
   Reflextions on a multicultural Society Norton edition 1993
   p. 9

4. Arthur M schlesinger Op. cit p. 10

5. Napoleon Abdulai(ed) <u>GENOCIDE IN RWANDA: Background and</u>
   <u>Current Situation</u> ( London Algate Press) 1994, p. 34.

6. Wayne Nafziger,`The economic impact of Nigeria Civil War,'
   Journal of Modern African Studies n 10 (1972):223-245

7. David Levinson `Ethnic Conflict' Peace Review , Vol6 n7
   Spring 1994 p. 4

8. Raymond W. Copson (ed), <u>AFRICAN WARS and PROSPECTS for PEACE.</u>
   (New York M. E. Sharpe, Inc) p. 8.

9. Raymond W. Copson. po. , cit. p. 9.

10. Since 1994, The Rwanda Neibogring States like Zaire, Tan-
    zania , Ounganda, have been receiving the Rwanda refugees.
    This situation has brought serious impacts on these states.

11. UN Economic Commission for Africa, <u>Africa Alternatives</u>
    <u>Framework to Structural Adjustment Programmes for Socio-</u>

<u>Economic Recorvery and Transformation</u> (Addis Ababa, 1989)
p. 35.

12. UN Development Programme, <u>Human Development Report</u> 1990
    (Oxford University Press, New York and Oxford, for the UNDP,
    1990), Table 18 pp. 162-3 and pp. 76-8.

13. Karl Max, <u>Critique of Political Economy</u>, in Feuer. ed. , Marx
    and Engels, p. 43.

## CHAPTER 2: THE GENERAL VIEW OF ETHNIC CONFLICT

### 2-1 Introduction

As we stated in our main introduction, ethnic conflicts are not only a drama of Africa, but other countries of third, second and first world have also been and are still experiencing ethnic groups mobilisation and conflicts. Certainly, the nature and the amplitude seem different, but there are a multitude of common backgrounds which characterise them.

As in the case of so many other social processes, inter-group relations have been conditioned by historical developments. Economic, social and political changes rarely(or never) leave relationships between dominant and subordinate groups undisturbed, and a fundamental change tends to take place in the context of the modern state based on the notion of equality of citizenship. [1]

Since the 1960s increasing numbers of ethnic groups have begun to demand more rights and recognition, demands that are now recognized as the major source of domestic and international conflicts in the post-Cold War world. The protagonists in the most intense ethnic conflicts want to establish their autonomy or independence, as is the case with the people of East Timor. [2] For that purpose, they are making a demand for secession, ranging from frontier adjustment to allow the minority to be incorporated in a neighbouring state to independence as a separate state.

However, sometimes they just want a semi-independence that is a demand for institutional political recognition, ranging from symbolic autonomy in local government or symbolic representation in state institutions to fully-fledged confederalism and consociationalism.

The other ethnic conflicts arise from the efforts by subordinate groups to improve their status within the existing boundaries of a state rather than secede from it. For example, most black South Africans want majority control of state power. [3]

In some countries, recent immigrants are worried about their security, seek greater economic opportunities, and hope to become citizens. For these reasons, they are making a demand for equality of citizenship, ranging from a call for formal equality before the law to demand for special measures to ensure economic and social equality, possibly extending to positive discrimination. [4]

Some native peoples in Americas want to protect what is left of their traditional lands and cultures from the corrosive influences of modern society. In relation to this situation, they are making a demand for cultural rights, ranging from symbolic use of the minority language in public(for example, in sign posting) and in the educational system to the right to transact business with all public institutions through the medium of the minority language and the right to receive an education at all levels through its medium. [5]

The distinction between these different cases is in principle categorical. In the first case the minority wants no dealings at all with the state (through the distinction between independence and membership in a loose confederation need not be clear-cut). [6] In the semi-independence case, however, members of the minority clearly require to be treated as a group for certain purposes, and desire that the

state should relate to them not just as a collection of individuals but also as members of a recognized group.

In the second case, the reaction of minority groups should be understood as a consequence of legally or illegally established discrimination between different groups of the same nation-state on the basis of their ethnic belonging.

In the third case, the basic civil rights being pursued are universal. It could be argued that this is also true of the fourth case, where what is being sought can be justified as an extension of the individual rights principle. For example, the `right to education' has now become the `right to education through one's mother tongue', and interaction with the state is now seen as carrying the requirement that state officials be capable of communicating in the minority language. [7]

It should be pointed out, in conclusion, that these demands are not, of course, mutually exclusive. Within any minority group the leadership may include some or all of these four demands in its political programme, but different sections of the leadership and different groups within the minority may attach different priorities to the demands. The minority is not, in other words, monolithic. In terms of their implications for the territorial structure of the state, the demands become more serious as one progresses from the first(which has no territorial implications) to the fourth .

After stating these common backgrounds, let us examine the situation in Yugoslavia, Former Soviet Union, Belgium and Sri-Lanka in order to have a general view on ethnic conflicts.

2-2 Former Yugoslavia

Yugoslavia's break-up graphically illustrates the dark side of ethnic nationalism and how, in the words of one observer, `animosity among ethnic groups is beginning to rival the spread of nuclear weapons as the most serious threat to peace that the world faces."[8] Certainly this view applies to former Yugoslavia. There, xenophobic ethnic nationalism -rooted in a turbulent Balkan's past, unresolved border disputes, and collapse of the multinational Hapsburg and Ottoman empires -shipwrecked the Yugoslav state from 1991 onwards. [9] Wars broke out between Croatians and Serbians, Croatians and Bosnian Muslims, and Serbians and Bosnian Muslims -with Serbians engaging in a gruesome, systematic `ethnic cleansing" of Bosnian Muslims in quest of expanded terrotory. [10] While ethnic conflict is no stranger in the Balkans, few observers anticipated the scale of ethnic nationalist violence that exploded as communism collapsed in the former Yugoslavia from 1990 onwards.

In pressing for a `Greater Serbia," Serbians became famous for a Nazi look-alike brand of `ethnic cleasing" in Bosnia, while conducting their ethnic war in Croatia. By Christmas 1992, over 128,000 were dead, 500,000 refugees had fled the country into neighboring states, around 3 million Bosnians were driven from their homes, and nearly 1.7 million were at risk of starvation in the approaching winter. Such conditions hardly foreshadow stable political rule in former Yugoslavia's new states, nor do they form a basis for regional stability. [11]

2-3 Former Soviet Union

In the former Soviet Union ethnic (national) tensions have escalated dramatically since its break-up into the

Commonwealth of Independent States(CIS) in 1991. Such tensions stem from the collapse of Communism and centralized control, weak political institutions incapable of managing conflicts, and political elites all too ready to exploit ancient feuds to advance personal agenda. Yet it should be noted that ethnic (national) conflict in a region so complex and mixed as the former Soviet Union is not axiomatic. [12]

Whether ethnic nationalism produces conflict or instability is a function of other phenomena, such as the roles played by political elites, social conditions and economic factors.

What we can say about ethnic nationalism in the new republics is that they have inherited multiple crises that were at work in the former Soviet Union before it collapsed.

These crises— economic, irredentist-territorial, and political in nature —have been passed on to the newly independent republics, spawning intensified ethnic identities and regional tensions. The economic crisis, for example, is illustrated by the former Soviet Union's declining growth rates and high inflation, the former running around 14-15 percent annually, the latter at 5-8 percent. Declining productivity after the break-up was matched by a 25-30 percent rate of inflation a month in Russia, with similar patterns in Ukraine and elsewhere. [13]

A national crisis, in the sense of centrifugal ethnic (national) forces spawned by a territorial irredentism in Russia and the other new states where ethnic minorities abound, is another historical inheritance, kept alive in part by economic conditions. Russia has the largest number of ethnic minorities —over 100 non-Russian ethnic groups in Russia and twenty areas with large non-Russian ethnic

concentrations, numbering over 27 million non-Russians residing within the Russian Federation. [14]

Territorial and political crises add to the heavy baggage and formidable challenges faced by the newly independent countries of the former Soviet Union. The territorial problem springs from disputed borders of Russia's sixteen borders, twelve are disputed. Of Ukraine's seven borders, five are disputed. The large numbers of minorities living within other states, like the Armenians inside Azerbaijan, not surprisingly exacerbate such territorial disputes.

The consequences of these inherited crises have been expressed in multiple forms —from Estonian, Latvian and Lithuanian opposition to Russian presence in the Baltic region to ethnic national wars in the Caucasus and Central Asia. In Latvia, for example, anti-Russian nationalists have demanded the removal of Soviet Army soldiers' remains from a military cemetery in Riga, because their presence was offensive. [15] In Nagorno-Karabakh in the southern Caucasus, under the rule of Azerbaijan but populated mostly by ethnic Armenians, a five-year undeclared war between Armenian separatists and Azerbaijanis has raged, taking about 3,000 lives, while Abkhazians and Ossetians inside Georgia have battled Gergians for self-rule. [16] Communal violence in Tajikistan has led over 50,000 to flee for their lives. [17]

Ethnic tensions mark Russia's political landscape, with secessionist movements in Tatarstan, Bashkortostan, Sakha, Tuva, Chechenya, and Northern Ingushetia becoming more vocal in resisting central control. In some cases, such movements want control of natural resources, such as in the vast Siberian republic of Sakha, rich in gold and diamonds; or oil in Tatarstan and diamonds and natural gas in Siberia. Strong independence movements, however, are offset by long association with Moscow and the costs of national security

for regions that house co-existing ethnic groups. Nevertheless, one possible future in Russia, as David Shipler notes, is civil war. [18]

Russo-Ukrainian tensions are especially worrisome, given the nuclear weapons that remain in the possession of the two states. Russian politicians advocating protection of Russian-speaking minorities outside Russia naturally alarm Ukraine and other republics, for they raise the specter of Russian imperialism. Russia's new military doctrine assigns to Russia's armed services the mission of defending Russia's citizens, as well as defending `Russian speakers" living in those newly independent states bordering Russia, and Russian military forces reportedly have engaged in action in four former Soviet republics -Moldova, Georgia, Tajikistan, and Azerbaijan. [19] In this regard worth noting is President Yeltsin's Security Council declaration of November 1993 that highlighted Russia's main source of military danger is no longer any nation or alliance, but small local wars and conflicts -a danger the Security Council saw as `constantly growing." [20] Lenin was right when he called Czarist Russia a `prison house of nationalities," and while the Soviet Union's totalitarian rule may have slammed shut the prison doors temporarily, the fall of the Soviet empire has opened the cell doors again. [21]

## 2-4 Belgium

Belgium was created in 1830 when it seceded from the Netherlands after only 15 years of union. The national question in Belgium was initially defined as a language issue. Cultural deprivation spurred a Flemish movement, whose roots are to be found already in the nineteenth century. After 1945 divergent economic developments between north and south gave rise to a genuine Walloon nationalism. Finally, in the

1960s and 1970s the lines of conflict converged in and around Brussels, where a Francophone `nationalist' movement became articulate. [22]

Ethnic conflict in Belgium has been intense, but peaceful. Its roots are linguistic: a majority of the population speaks Dutch, but the official language in the nineteenth century was French. Ethnic demands and conflict management strategies were initially non-territorial, but increasingly acquired a territorial aspect. The fact that Dutch and French speakers were to a large extent territorially segregated facillitated this evolution. At a later stage, ethnic conflict also acquired a socio-economic dimension. The increased territorial emphasis in ethno-linguistic politics had made the emergence of economic ethno-nationalism easier and was in its turn reinforced by these later developments.

But the issue is more complex, as each of the two forms of nationalism demanded a slightly different type of territorial settlement. This made the ethnic challenge ambivalent in two ways. First, language and socio-economic interests were treated as separate criteria in drawing and redrawing boundaries. Which was to have priority? Second, the two were to some extent contradictory. Was a territorial solution really the better choice for the management of ethnic conflict in Belguim? This ambiguity gave ammunition to those who sought to postpone or prevent territorial devolution. [23]

Hence, political actors in Belgium had considerable leeway in dealing with the ethnic issue. This leeway was a consequence of the structure of the conflict, and the actors used it to their political advantage. Thus they were likely to change definitions of the groups-in-conflict when political opportunities altered. Furthermore, actors who

favoured a terrotirial position on one occasion might be found to take a much less radical or even a non-territorial stand in another situation. Put differently, political actors in Belgium were prepared to draw and redraw boundaries such that inter-group contact was lessened, but only when it was to their advantage. [24]


2-5 Sri Lanka

Sri Lanka's Sinhalese -Tamil ethnic conflict is a good example of what Wood calls `a process of dynamic interaction and cumulative effect... occurring in stages'. [25] The first stage of the conflict was associated with a Tamil demand in 1937 for constitutionally-guaranteed power sharing at the centre. [26] This was not conceded and in 1949 the demand shifted to separatism -the creation of a federal state with considerable autonomy for the Tamil areas. [27] By 1976, when separatism had also not been realised, the demand was raised to secession -the establishment of a separate Tamil state `Eelam'. [28] The demands in the first two stages were articulated by peaceful and constitutional means. But the third stage gradually transformed itself into a guerrilla war with acts of terrorism to which the Sri Lankan government responded with a military campaign and repressive measures. After almost eight years of fighting that cuased much bloodshed and loss of property, India directly intervened in 1987. Developments since then indicate that the Tamil separatist movement has reached a fourth `post-secessionist' stage and is apparently willing to give up the demand for a separate state in favour of a high degree of autonomy for the Tamil areas. [29]

This situation has undermined the regional peace asking therefore for foreign intervention manifested in Indo-Lanka Peace Accord and the Indian military intervention that brought the Indian Peace Keeping Force(IPKF) to Sri Lanka in July 1987. The Indian forces who were deployed in the region were withdrawn in full in March 1990. This led to the collapse of the provincial administration run by the Eelam People's Revolutionary Liberation Front that was elected to office in November 1987 with the backing of the Indians. The principal Tamil separatist group, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam(LTTE), who fought the IPKF and also opened talks with Colombo in April 1989, have taken control of the two provinces on the departure of the Indians. [30] The LTTE has not yet officially renounced its secessionist aims although in their talks with the Sri Lankan government they indicated that they were willing to settle for something less than a separate Tamil state and participate in the electorale process.


2-6 Conclusion

This review of the global situation has helped us understand the dynamic character of national or ethnic conflicts in the world. What we may conclude from this illustration is the fact that there are many reasons which explain the manifestation of ethnic conflicts.

However, in most cases, the central issue is connected with the state practice which seems to undermine the identity or the security of minority peoples . In countries where the issues have been recognised officially and where both parties are involved in negotiation process, peaceful solutions are possible. Another fact that should also be noted is the timing of the rise of national or ethnic conflicts in former socialist countries, is it an hazard that conflict came after the end of the cold war or the break up of the Soviet union ? Some peoples consider that there is a connection between democracy and the rise of ethno-nationalism.

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# CHAPTER 3: CONCEPTUAL ISSUES

## 3-1 Introduction

In the preceding chapter, we have made an overview of the
ethnic conflict in the world by selecting some few countries
in other continents except Africa. Our intention is to remind
to our readers that we are dealing in this thesis with a very
dynamic socio-political fact which involves many countries in
the world. However, this review alone does not explain why
the same phenomenon is found in so many countries of
different historical bakgrounds and geographic environments.
Thus, in order to understand well why this phenomenon of
ethnic conflict is a global one, there is need to fully
apprehend the meaning of some important political concepts
which are directly connected with the modern political system
and the apparition of ethnic conflicts in the world.

Thus, the main objective of this chapter is to apprehend
the meaning of some political concepts which have influenced
the evolution of politics in the world .

The first difficulty which is met by social science
students is related to the choice of concept. This is so,
not only because of the unlimited number of the conceptual
approaches but also because the contradiction between them
seems sometimes unsolvable. But, as the tradition and the
necessity ask us, an academic thesis should at first shed a
light on the limit and the object of its analysis. As George
Orwell points out, unclear language leads to unclear thinking
about politics. [1] This problem will be alleviated by
considering the concepts of ethnic group, ethnic conflict,
nationalism, national self-determination, intervention and
conflict resolution.

Therefore, in this study we will analyze these concepts, give our point of view, and make some comments in relation to African historical and political context. This point is important to us because most of these concepts have been conceived by European political thinkers. But despite the fact that they are claimed as universal, we feel the need to say that in the political context of Africa, their interpretations have changed sometimes, thus, creating some conceptual dilemma.

3-2 Ethnic Group

In the media or academic world, we find many expressions which are being used in place of ethnic group. For instance we may note: Tribe, Communal group, Sub-national group, Ethno-national group etc...

Historically speaking, the term ethnic derives from the Greek word ethnikos, refering to a people or nation. In its contemporary form, the term describes a group possessing some degree of coherence and solidarity, composed of people who are, at least latently, aware of having common origins and interests. [2] Therefore, an ethnic group is not a mere aggregate of people or a section of a population, but a self-conscious collection of people united, or closely related, by shared experienced. [3] Ethnic groups are communities in themselves with interests in preserving and maintaining the internal [and to some extent the external] condition that sustain them. According to Jackson among the most important of these conditions are freedom and autonomy which enable an ethnic membership to carry on its joint cultural enterprise and its members to express their identity without interference from others. For example, the defining interest of a language community will rest in the promotion of those

conditions, internal and external, which enable its common language to be preserved. [4]

In his work of ethnic groups and identity in the 1960s Fredrik Barth defines ethnic group as a ˘a membership which identifies itself, and is identified by others, as constituting a category distinguishable from other categories of the same order"; namely a category that ˘classifies a person in terms of his basic, most general identity, presumptively determined by his origin and background." [5]

Like Foltz, he notes four important aspects which characterize the ethnic group ①being largely biologically self-perpetuating, ②sharing fundamental cultural values, ③ making up a field of communication, and ④having a membership which identifies itself, and is identified by others, as constituting a category distinguishable from other categories of the same order. [6]

In these objective approaches of ethnic group the most common elements that have been used to distinguish ethnic groups are language, religion, tribe, nationality, and race. Race may at first glance appear not to be cultural at all but biological. After all, are not the physiological features of individuals so often used to identify the members of different ˘races" inherited and thus may be considered as permanent personal attributes? This is of course true, but it is also true that certain biological features such as skin colour or eye shape are quite unimportant by themselves and only become important in human relationships when a given society attributes cultural and social significance to them. That is why race also serves to denote an ethnic group, and some authors speak of ˘social races" in contrast to the usually perceived ˘biological races." [7]

However, some definitions of ethnic group tend to place more emphasis on the historical ties of the group than on the real or believed common ancestry of the group. That is to say, some definitions tends to stress such factor as ˚the historically derived consciousness of being a separate group˝ as the defining characteristic of the term. For Max Weber, the term ethnic group refers to those human groups that entertain a subjective belief in their common descent because of similarities of physical type or of customs or both, or because of memories of colonization and migration; this belief must be important for the propagation of group formation; conversely, it does not matter whether or not an objective blood relationship exists. [8]

3-3 Ethnic Group and Tribe

In the African context, the concept of ethnic group is a very confusing one. Until the late 1960s, ˚ethnic groups˝ were conventionally viewed by sociologists and anthropologists in ways that were little more useful than their views about tribes.

The assumption that Africans ˚naturally˝ and necessarily belonged to tribes was a cardinal tenet in the beliefs of almost all involved in colonial rule in Africa; so too was the notion that Europeans did not. [9]

Though the term tribe is far from precise and its meaning a matter of contention among anthropologists, it has traditionally been employed to describe an ethnically homogeneous sociopolitical unit, but one which forms only part of a larger interrelated grouping. In the same volume as Skalnik, John Sharp explains that ethnic groups(tribes) were conceived essentially as

simply cultural groups which had developed their distinctive features by virtue of their original (and enduring) isolation from each other. The common assumption was that when these groups were brought together in the modern era their boundaries were obvious and clear-cut. Moreover, these boundaries were, supposedly, the prime cause of the social problems of the ˚developing˝world, because people were suddenly required to interact on a much larger scale than had hitherto been the case. People from different ethnic groups had difficulty in understanding and adapting to each others' ways and values. Hence, in the 1950s and 1960s, there was a rash of literature dealing with the supposed problems of ˚culture contact,˝ ˚intercultural communication,˝ and of fitting ˚old societies˝ into new states. [10]

However, this view of tribal Africa was challenged by Barth when he argued that ethnic boundaries result from social interaction, no isolation. As neatly summarized by Sharp, Barth's basic argument proceeded as follows:

Ethnic boundaries are not sustained, moreover, because of traditional cultural differences, but because of political differences. Ethnicity is a political process by which people seek to form groups, and to differentiate one set of people from another, by appealing to the idea of ineluctable cultural difference...[In fact] people can readily invent cultural differences if it is in thei political interests to do so. Ethnicity is the pursuit of political goals -the acquisition or maintenance of power, the mobilisation of a following -through the idiom of cultural commonness and difference. [11]

What should be pointed out is that the preponderant number of human categories to which the term tribe is most commonly affixed constitute separate nations or potential nations in and by themselves. Well known examples include the Ashanti, Kongo, Hausa, Ibo, Xhosa, and Zulu. There is liable to be as much difference -psychologically as well as tangibly -between two African ˚tribes' as there is between Frenchman and German. In referring to them as tribes rather than as nations or potential nations, scholars have been lulled into badly underestimating the emotional magnetism that these collectives exert upon individuals. Calling this magnetism

tribalism, while reserving nationalism to describe attachment to the new states, both reflect and strengthen a presumption that the loyalty of the individual will assuredly over time be transferred from the part(which is actually the nation but called the tribe) to the whole (actually the state but called the nation). [12]

Another reality which need to be mentioned is that if we use the word `tribe" in the sense in which it has been defined in the Oxford Dictionary, then, we would refer to it as a group of people in a primitive or barbarous stage of development acknowledging the authority of a chief and usually regarding themselves as having a common ancestor. [13] There is not doubt that the Europeans approach on African societies have been influenced by this definition and that in their minds `Tribe', in addition to conveying the idea of subethnic status, also popularly connotes a primitive, evolutionary stage in human organization.

In fact, in colonial times, tribe was used derogatorily to indicate that the `superior' Europeans may have nations but `inferior' Africans could only have tribes, which by the implied ethnocentrism were less sophisticated. Ethnocentrism" has the notion that we are different and necessarily better as well. Ethnocentrists tend to see themselves as virtuous and superior, while outgroups are seen as contemptible, immoral and inferior.

The definition of what constitut an ethnic group is still a subject of academic debate. Our view is that it is conceptually inadequate to define any group on subjective factor as Weber assert. This is so because in Africa colonialists created many groups which since then have been conceived as ethnic groups without any real differences with other groups.

In our view an ethnic group is comprised only of persons with shared ascribed cultural characteristics; existing alongside similar groups in a larger [plural] society; share a common identity; and are bound together, and interact and communicate in their own language with one another, to a greater extent than with members of other similar groups. This definition may apply to such group as the French Canadians in Canada, the Ibo group in Nigeria, the Kongo group in Congo, Zaire and Angola.

Therefore, an ethnic group for us is a group of persons, biologically self-perpetuating, predominantly of common descent, who think of themselves as collectively possessing a separate identity based on race or a shared cultural characteristics, usually language or religion; although they may or may not think of themselves as a nation. [14] These criteria will be found in the concerned groups in our case studies.

3-4 Ethnic Conflict

There is a tendency of the mass media to present all the internal conflicts which rise in Africa as ethnic conflict. This is a very confusing situation which give the impression especially to foreign peoples that all the conflicts in Africa are fought on ethnic basis.

What is obvious and which needs repeating, however, is that all internal conflicts cannot be merely ethnic in character. Ethnic conflicts, class conflicts, caste and group conflicts, occupational conflicts and regional antagonisms are all part of a multi-dimensional and complex reality. All forms of identity exist ranging from class, ethnic, religious, occupational to regional and linguistic groups. [15]

Ethnicity is, therefore, a dynamic concept which may have an ethnic character as well as a class character; class and ethnic conflicts may be waged simultaneously. It is for this reason that some may have defined ethnic conflicts as `procracted conflicts', characterized by such enduring features as economic and technological underdevelopment and unintegrated political systems. This problem is succinctly identified by John Burton:

The conflicts which are of global concern involve deep issues of ethnic and cultural identity, of recognition and participation that are usually denied to ethnic minorities, in addition to issues of security and other values that are not negotiable. [16]

Thus, behind ethnic conflicts are often structural issues transcending immediate grievances. The pervasiveness of these conflicts is a challenge of modern nation states. [17]

For the purpose of this study, ethnic conflicts may be referred to Ted Gurr's definition of conflict. Gurr identifies four basic properties that the term contains as follows: (1) two or more parties are involved; (2) they engage in mutually opposing actions; (3) they use coercive behaviors; (4) these interactions are overt. [18] These properties, taken together, can be defined as follows: A conflict situation is one in which two or more contending parties engage in the overt, coercive interaction that results in actions and counter-actions in pursuing a mutually opposing goals.

Ethnic conflicts may take the form of a power struggle between two or more contending parties within a state, each seeking to accede political power in order to achieve its goals and objectives. Such parties can be groups identifiable with reference to certain characteristics, such as ideology, ethnicity, geographic region, language, race and socio-economic status.

The conventional practice has approached the study of ethnic conflict in terms of internal (intra-state) conflict, making a strict difference with international conflicts which are inter states. It should be pointed out here, however, that the distinction between internal and international conflicts seems to be melting away because of the direct or indirect intervention of other states in internal conflicts. This point is supported by Quincy Wright in his definitions of international and civil wars:

International war is a conflict betwen governments on opposite sides of a generally recognized boundary, ceasefire, or armistice line. War between two factions within a state or between a government and insurgents,... is considered civil war. In many cases even if the hostilities were primarily civil, the intervention of outside forces made them international. (19)

3-5 Nation and Nationalism

Nationalism presupposes a nation, which is not the same thing as a state. A state is an administrative apparatus legally defined by territory, population, a government in control, and the ability to carry on international relations. [20] A nation is a group of people who have a sense of belonging together and of being different than other groups around them. This involves both subjective and objective components.

A nation has certain objective features, such as language, race, or religion, which differentiate them from other groups. When Gandhi complained that he could not see the difference between a Bengali Muslim and a Bengali Hindu he was depending on an objective definition of a nation. The problem with limiting nationalism to this aspect is that there is not a set of characteristics which can be enumerated as being necessary for a nation to exist. Factors such as language,

race, religion, culture, custom, and history are relevant, but in no universally standard hierarchy of importance.

Language is often cited as the most critical objective feature of a nation. The argument flows from both theoretical and practical considerations. In discussing them, Kedourie states that ˚a nation, then becomes a homogeneous linguistic mass which acts as a magnet for groups speaking the same language outside its boundaries..." [21]

Nations, within this perspective, are singular, unique, specific units that are clearly distinguishable from other, similar units. ˚In nationalist doctrine," states Kedourie in summing up this position,

language, race, culture, and sometimes even religion, constitute different aspects of the same primordial entity, the nation. The theory admits here of no great precision, and it is misplaced ingenuity to try and classify nationalisms according to the particular aspect which they choose to emphasize. What is beyond doubt is that the doctrine divides humanity into separate and distinct nations, claims that such nations must constitute sovereign states, and asserts that the members of a nation reach freedom and fulfilment by cultivating the peculiar identity of their own nation and by sinking their own persons in the greater whole of the nation. [22]

Edward Sagarin and James Moneymaker, bring more precision on the impact of language by stating that:

Language is not an essential for a nationalism movement. People can have identities other than those of their neighbors while speaking the same language. However, language offers a symbol and a mechanism for the homogenization of a people, and for the distinction of such a people from others around them. [23]

Some nations, such as the Scots, have been singularly unsuccessful at reintroducing their traditional language despite a rise in nationalist sentiment, reinforcing the

contention that language alone is neither a necessary nor a sufficient feature of a nation.

An additional observable feature of a nation that deserves particular comment is religion. Every nation does not have its own religion, but a nation's strong devotion to a particular religion or creed may be a part of the whole sense of national identification. This devotion, and especially the unique ways of celebrating it, may become a defining factor. Both nations in Northern Ireland are Christian, but their different approaches to the religion are part of the means by which they distinguish themselves from each other. In the case of Pakinstan, religion is clearly an important feature, because it was the claim for a Muslim nation that provided the foundation for the Pakistani drive for separation from India. In Africa, Sudan is divided into two part the North of which is Muslim and the South Animist. The same may be applied also in Nigeria which is split into two parts. The division between the North and the South is at least partially dependent upon the fact that the North is mainly Muslim while the South is predominantly Christian or animist.

The successor States that emerged from the disintegration of the Austro-Hungarian empire at the end of the First World War reflected the objective reality of the pre-existing but suppressed nations (Czechs, Hungarians, Bulgarians, Albanians, etc. ). [24]

Not all theories of the nation and nationalism begin with the idea of a preexisting, objectively identifiable nation. An alternative approach holds that it is not essentially a series of objective traits that define a nation so much as the subjective awareness of it by its presumed members. A nation thus becomes the expression of a common consciousness; a common will to be a nation, and not the other way around.

A recent author puts this approach in a nutshell. "A nation," he argues, is an imagined political community –and imagined as both inherently limited and sovereign. It is imagined because the members of even the smallest nation will never know most of their fellow-members, meet them or even hear of them, yet in the minds of each lives the image of their communion. [25]

Members of the nation have a common experience, and a desire to define the future for themselves. Hans Kohn emphasizes this aspect of the nation saying that nationalism depends upon the feelings of individuals. "Nationalism is a state of mind, in which the supreme loyalty of the individual is felt to be due to the nation-state." [26] Thus nationalism is inherently political in that it makes assumptions about the correct ordering of the units in the international system.

Nationalism becomes politically relevant when it conflicts with the existing state power structure. Insofar as a nation already controls a state nationalism is helpful as a motivating factor, but is supportive of the status quo. Insofar as the nation is left out of the state power structure, nationalism is a potentially disruptive force. This is because members of the nation demand a change in the power structure so that their nation may have the political control that it desires. This demand is particularly potent in regard to the possession of a homeland.

Thus, nationalist demands challenge the legitimacy of the existing international order on two levels. On a concrete level, nationalism demands that international boundaries be redrawn to give the nation its own state. On the normative plane, nationalism questions the "rightness" of the existing international order by claiming the right to a state based on the moral legitimacy of the nation-state as the international

unit. Nationalism in the European context historically has played both a consolidating and a corrosive role, unifying principalities into nation-states and breaking empires into constituent parts.

Nationalism because of its ability to harness the power of the individual in pursuit of group demands, has proved to be a particularly potent mobilizing force. This has implications for both domestic and international politics. Domestically, it may rearrange the power structure of the state administration. Domestic players are struggling for their vision of the optimum domestic society. According to Astri Suhrke and Garner Noble this activity spans a continuum from a desire to redistribute various social resources to attempts to overthrow the status quo and create a new state. [27] The latter end of the continuum makes nationalism a critical force in international politics.

A salient property of nationalism is its protean nature, allowing it to combine with many ideologies. This accounts to a great extent for its power as a political force. The basic ideas of the nation as a group of people with similar characteristics and a group identity, and of nationalism as the political expression of group goals, are easily manipulated to apply to a wide variety of objective conditions. [28] The Irish demanded independence from Britain based on a pre-existing nation. The Kurds plead for their own territory in which to create their nation-state. The movement for an independent Pakistan applied nationalist vocabulary to a religious group. Nigeria, as part of the decolonization movement, claimed to speak for a diversity of ethnic groups united only by the boundaries drawn by the European colonial powers. While both the objective conditions and political ideologies and aspirations of these cases vary widely, nationalism has been used by each to unite domestic forces and gain international legitimacy.

3-6 Pan-Africanism

These two conflicting conceptual approachs, lead us to realize the complexity of the nation and nationalism in the political context of Africa.

However, historically speaking, there were nations at different levels of intensity in precolonial Africa, corresponding to social formations made up of closely related lineages or other kinship groups unified by a core cultural tradition and a relatively durable politico-administrative structure.

What should be remember is that the states were alien creations with geometrical boundaries that were determined by imperial ambitions rather than ethnic, linguistic or local political considerations. What evolved as a state in Africa was more frequently an accident of history, a mere geographical feature without any coherent and functional unity; and, consequently, inherently fragile. [29]

It must be emphasized however that not all precolonial states corresponded to or overlapped with nations. [30] With the colonial conquest and occupation, the potential of African social formations to develop viable nations was greatly diminished, those nations which existed at the time of the conquest lost their vitality, if not their very existence, as nations.

However, in the decolonisation period, three approaches came to dominate the political debate on the future of the political form of the coming African nation.

① The first was the reestablishment of the ethnic nation of the ancient glory whose construction was arrested by the colonialism or the one born out of the contradictions of the colonial situation (Luba Kasai, Ibo). This approach receveid a passionate though unconvincing defence in Chief Obafemi Awolowo's 1947 book Path to Nigerian Freedom, in which he argues for a multinational state based on a federation of ethnic nations. [31]

②The Pan-African nation, defended by people like Kwame Nkrumah, who advocated a Pan-African entity and proposed the creation of the `United States of Africa.'[32] In the same context, Julius Nyerere of Tanzania warned African youth that `the African national state is an instrument for the unification of Africa, and not for dividing Africa, that African nationalism is meaningless, is dangerous is anachronistic, if it is not at the same time Pan-Africanism."[33] The Pan-African ideal had fallen victim to imperialism and petty bourgeois opportunism. As Walter Rodney writes, the African petty bourgeoisie `reneged on a cardial principle of pan-Africanism: namely, the unity and indivisibility of the African continent. [34]

③ The actual African nations were born from the territorial entities of the colonial partition, not as a matter of necessity in the organization of the anti-colonial struggle, as Crawford Young maintains, but as the result of the interplay of imperialist and African petty bourgeois interest. [35]

3-7 National Self-Determination

In relation to our study of ethnic conflict in Africa, it is important to illustrate some problems which are related to the different interpretations of the concept of national self-determination.

The principle of national self-determination has been the international legal weapon for all the oppressed nations. Nationalists claim that existing states must honor the right of national self-determination. This means that the nation has the right to choose how and by whom it will be ruled. If and when this leads to sovereign statehood for the nation, this state should have the right to use its resources in any way it wishes. Twice in recent history according to Emerson, self-determination has come close to universal acceptance, but only for short times and specific groups. These were for Europeans at the end of World War I and for colonial peoples at the end of World War II. [36]

Equating self-determination and decolonization resulted in what Rejal and Enloe call state nations. [37] Most former colonies could not demand greater autonomy based on national rights because no nation existed. Using the vocabulary of nationalism they demanded self-determination, that is, freedom from rule by colonial powers. However, the states that came into existence as a result of these demands rarely represented a nation. The drive since independence has been to create a nation for the state as it now exists, a nation based on territory rather than history. However, the state practice of hegemony, centralism, discrimination and the ethno-politization, which has caracterized the post-colonial Africa, had brought the fear of domination to other groups which had asked for separation.

In cases such as Nigeria, this has entailed fighting civil wars to prevent self-determination from arriving at its logical conclusion, the secession of internal nations within to form their own nation-states. Once decolonization has taken place, the new state becomes a staunch defender of the international status quo.

As the imperial power could not acknowledge the right of its dependencies to overthrow the existing colonial governments of their own free will by revolutionary action, so the newly established states cannot tolerate having their rule challenged by disaffected minorities or regions, no matter how good the claim of the latter to separate national existence may be. My right to self-determination against those who oppress me is obviously unimpeachable, but your claim to exercise such a right against me is wholly inadmissible. [38]

This demand for reconceptualization of the application of self-determination by the minority people seems to be in deep contradiction with the principle of territorial integrity which is an important norm of international system because it helps to maintain the world political order. Emerson identifies the contradiction:

If the right of secession is eliminated and the maintenance of territorial integrity takes priority over the claims of people to establish their own separate political identity, the room left for self-determination in the sense of the attainment of independent statehood is very slight. [39]

Another issue regarding self-determination is either or not to consider it a right', thus applicable to all. Higgins argues that the UN, through the cumulative effect of a variety of resolutions on the issue, indicated the emergence of customary law. [40] Van Dyke argues against this interpretation, in part by making a distinction between external self-determination, which is more internationally acceptable (especially as decolonization), and internal self-determination, which is rejected with references to the importance of territorial integrity. [41]

We argue that a proper look at the UN legal approach indicates clearly that the subjects of this right were the colonial territories. To the UN, it was a weapon to be used against the colonial powers and a means to accelerate the process of decolonization in order to establish peace in

those territories. However, once this process of decolonization was over, the right to self-determination should come to its end.

Despite Higgins's claim, the U.N. seems to recognize that self-determination, taken to its logical extreme, the right to secede, is potentially chaotic, and therefore threatens the order that the U.N. was designed to protect. In regard to the Nigerian Civil War, General Secretary U Thant argued that members of the U.N. accept the sovereignty (and thus territorial integrity) of fellow members, stating that:

as far as the question of secession of a particular section of a Member State was concerned, the United Nations' attitude was unequivocable. And he added that as an international organization, the United Nations had never accepted and did not accept and would never accept the principle of secession of a part of its Member State. [42]

Professor Espiell believes that the right to self-determination is jus cogens, but only in a very limited form:

The United Nations has established the right of self-determination as a right of peoples under colonial and alien domination. The right does not apply to peoples already organized in the form of a State which are no under colonial and alien domination, since resolution 1514(XV) and other United Nations instruments condemn any attempt aimed at the partial or total disruption of the national unity and the territorial integrity of a country. If, however, beneath the guise of ostensible national unity, colonial and alien domination does in fact exist, whatever legal formula may be used in an attempt to conceal it, the right of the subject people concerned cannot be disregarded without international law being violated. [43]

From the foregoing discussion, it is clear that a pivotal question regarding the right of peoples to self-determination is that of the definition of a people: who are the peoples who enjoy the human right of self-determination?

This is precisely where we encounter serious theoretical and practical difficulties. There is no legal definition of a people. There is not even a generally accepted sociological or political definition of a people. The United Nations has carefully avoided to define ˚people," even as it has conceded all peoples the right to self-determination. The 1960 declaration on decolonization referred to peoples under alien domination (that is, colonies), but it rejected explicitly any attempt to undermine the national unity or the territorial integrity of a country. Some of the governments consulted by the special rapporteur, Hector Gros Espiell, for his study on the right to self-determination, made a distinction between ˚people" and ˚minorities," and the special rapporteur himself holds that international law applies to peoples and not to minorities. [44]

Thornberry considers that the UN never defined the term ˚peoples," in an ethnic sense, but referred to it as the inhabitants of a colonial territory. People, is a territorial concept, and the territorial integrity of the colonies was to be maintained until and beyond independence. Thus, he concludes, self-determination in the modern incarnation has little to do with minorities. " [45]

Considered as a right, national self-determination poses a more fundamental question: the beneficiaries of these rights. Are individuals the appropriate right-bearing units, or are there group rights which need to be dealt with separately? In regard to cultural minorities, Wirsing put it this way:

A broad interpretation of self-determination) obviously confronts head on the ticklish problem of defining the right-bearing unit, for it compels identification of the ethnic, religious, linguistic, or any other types of selves to be embraced by the rules of self-determination. Once minorities are allowed within the framework of self-determination, the often vague, shifting and characteristically controversial nature of their cultural identities will... inevitably come to the

surface. With it will come the much more pivotal issue of whether the cultural group, as such, rather than individual members of it, bears rights. [46]

The League of Nations argued for the idea of group rights in the minorities treaties. Minorities, as groups, were given special protection in their new states, with the right to appeal to an international body if national policy was unsatisfactory. The United Nations, on the other hand, has moved to the idea of protecting individual rights, arguing that protection of individual rights will guarantee that minorities, as groups of individuals, will thereby be protected. A former U.N. official, Conor Cruise O'Brien, takes this position. [47] Van Dyke, on the other hand, supports the contrary decision that is reflected in the statement that all "peoples" have the right of self-determination. I think it clear that ethnic communities and "peoples" may have collective interests, and that some of them are of such fundamental importance and so general. that they are and ought to be called rights. Further I think it clear that individuals sometimes have interests that can best be promoted and protected by grating a right to the community. Some interests of individuals cannot be effectively served unless a right is conceded to the group to which the individuals belong. [48]

This thesis argues for Van Dyke's position. It makes little sense when talking about the rights of a nation, an inherently collective concept, to limit rights to individuals. Culture, a fundamental part of a nation, cannot be understood outside of a group context. Western thought concentrates on the rights of individuals, and this tendency is buttressed by the apparently democratic aspect of self-determination; the people decide how and by whom they will be governed. However, government rule is not determined by an individual, but by people. Under conditions of national self-determination, these people comprise a nation.

The international scene in recent history has been one of competing self-determination because every nation does not have its own state. While some nations have been satisfied, others were disappointed, and frustrated expectations led to political conflict. The League addressed the problem by recognizing the group dynamic of the nation, and by providing international recourse for these groups. The United Nations remedied the apparent failure of the Leage approach by focusing on the individual.

What should be noted in relation to Africa is the fact that African states adopted a very narrow interpretation of the right in the post colonial context of independence. Because of the extreme ethnic heterogeneity of most African states and the resulting difficulties in developing a sense of statehood in the immediate post-independence period, the principles of territorial integrity and national unity have been determined to be more fundamental than that of self-determination, [49] whether in the context of minority secession or even the adjustment of borders.

3-8 Intervention

The problematical relationship between territorial integrity and national self-determination in the international system is, in part, the basis of intervention. Actions taken to promote national self-determination often disregard the norm of non-intervention, while territorial integrity is predicated on it. Intervention is important in international relations because it may violate sovereignty, and state sovereignty is one of the fundamental norms governing relations in the international system. Territorial integrity flows from the idea of sovereignty. According to Thomas, sovereignty, territorial integrity, and the legal equality of states provide "cornerstones guiding the external

actions of states," and "intervention, by disregarding these rules, and especially that of sovereign authority, challenges the basic pillars of order in the system."[50] It is worth noting, however, that the most fundamental challenges to sovereignty result from uninvited participation in the internal affairs of a state.

For the purpose of harmonizing relation between states especially the newly independente ones, the UN has devised international legal measures, altering ideas about self-determination and the use of violence as well. According to Emerson, an early casualty in the struggle against colonialism was the Charter's prohibition of intervention in matters essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of a state, an injunction which was swept aside where colonial matters were involved, as it frequently has been swept aside in other situations where a majority found action politically desirable or expedient. [51]

Intervention, like nationalism, has generated a great deal of literature, resulting in a plethora of definitions. Hoffmann defines intervention as "acts which try to affect not the external activites, but the domestic affairs of a state."[52] This is useful because it emphasizes domestic affairs, and permits a wide range of activity.

In general, intervention is a means of dealing with conflict which is not limited to states, let alone military activity, but not be so broad as to make it synonymous with international relations. Vincent points out that since intervention is an event in international relations rather than an abstract concept, a single satisfactory definition is probably impossible. However, he states that analysis of intervention contains six components: an actor intervening, the target of that intervention, the activity of intervention,

the types of intervention, the purposes of the activity, and the context. [53]

During the cold war, a new approach of humanitarian intervention has came to be adopted. The threat to human rights was seen to come chiefly from tyrannical governments, and, in the absence of the possibility of collective intervention by regional organizations or the United Nations, state intervention was usually understood to involve forcible self-help by states[54]. The central question was this: if governments abused their authority by flagrant mass violations of the basic human rights of their citizens, should other governments intervene militarily to remedy the situation?

This definition of humanitarian intervention as forcible self-help by states to protect human rights is still regarded by a number of commentators as the correct usage in international law and state practice. For example, Wil Verwey defines humanitarian intervention as follows:

[t]he threat or use of force by a state or states abroad, for the sole purpose of preventing or putting a halt to a serious violation of fundamental human rights, in particular the right to life of persons, regardless of their nationality, such protection taking place neither upon authorization by relevant organs of the United Nations nor with permission by the legitimate government of the target state. [55]

Others, still within what we call the "classical tradition" use a somewhat broader definition. There are two main variants here: first, the inclusion of forcible action by international organizations, as well as action "by a state or states' [56] ; second, the inclusion of other forms of coercion in addition to the "threat or use of [military] force" -for example, "substantial debilitating economic coercion' [57]

In the context of Africa, intervention has taken diverse meaning. In some cases, individual intervention by great powers motivated by political, ideological and economic interest has been manifest. In other situations, we saw interventions initiated by international organizations.

3-9 Conflict Resolution

In the process of conflict resolution, scholars distinguish between conflicts which are settled and those which are resolved. [58] Such writers emphasize that [settlements] tend to be arranged (or even imposed) in situations characterized by successful coercion either by one of the adversaries or, sometimes, by powerful outsiders. The post-settlement relationship inevitably therefore remains a fragile one, liable to be overturned at the earliest opportunity.

By contrast [resolution] of conflicts (admittedly difficult to achieve and -according to some writers - available only through specialized processes enabling parties to analyze thoroughly and together the underyling causes of their dispute) provide durable, long-term and self-supporting solutions to disputes by removing the underlying causes and establishing new, and satisfactory, relationships between previously antagonistic parties, salience for the parties to the agreement. [59]

Recent extension of this view of the nature of a resolved conflict and of conflict resolution processes is one that links the idea of resolving conflict by removing underlying causes to the existence of BHNs(Basic Human Needs) in individuals, groups, societies and -thus -parties in conflict, including complex social entities such as ˚ethnic groups, ″ ˚ communities″ and ˚societies.″[60] Fundamental to this view of conflict resolution seems to be the idea that only

arrangements that fully satisfy BHNs can bring about any final resolution of the conflict -one which ˚deals fully″ with the issues in dispute and establishes a new, self-supporting relationship between the adversaries.

This view is very clearly put in John Burton's latest work on resolving what he terms ˚deep rooted″ conflict which tend to resist conventional efforts at finding a solution and to ˚ protract″ over time. [61]    Part of this ˚protraction″ is caused by inappropriate conflict management procedures being applied in the search for a settlement of the dispute but the greatest cause of failure arises from an inability (on the part of both protagonists and third parties) to recognize that deep rooted conflicts are caused by the denial of basic, inalienable values or the frustration of BHNs.  Conflicts are seen as arising and inflicting costs that are thus attributable to ˚ignoring, suppressing or failing to promote revealed, non-negotiable needs.″[62]

In Burton's view, given that ˚conflict is likely to be caused by the need for identity, recognition, security of the identity group and other such human, societal values″ what he terms ˚ facilitated″ conflict resolution must aim at determining such human needs and values and then assisting parties ˚ to deduce what alterations in structures, institutions and policies are required to enable the fulfilment of needs.″[63] In short, successful and final resolution of any conflict must involve satisfying those needs of the parties involved that are being frustrated by existing conditions and relationships.

At every social level, man's natural and universal needs are the fundamental, causes of conflict and disputes, from the simple to the complex. A similar view is taken by other writers on social conflict.  For example, in a recent paper on the Middle East by Alexis Heraclides, he examines the Arab-Israeli conflict which he characterizes as a prime

example of a protracted conflict punctuated by temporary truce arrangements. [64]  Having noted how any definition of the issues in conflict in terms of inherently scarce material values (e. g., control of territory, exclusive rights to land) leads to a ˮquagmireˮ and a zero-sum impasse, Heraclides suggests the possibility of reconceptualizing the disputed issues in terms of higher order values such as ˮpeaceˮ or ˮsecurity.ˮ    Clearly, he also feels that any final resolution of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict must be sought in the satisfaction of certain basic needs experienced both jointly and separately by Israelis.

At the tactical (or process) level, the approach provides procedural guidelines for facilitative exercises which must: (1) seek, together with the parties to analyze the nature of the basic human needs (BHNs) being frustrated on both sides and then (2) jointly search for acceptable new structures and relationships that permit the fulfillment, rather than the frustration, of those needs. [65]

What we could state is the undeniable fact that many political concepts seem difficult to apply directly in the context of Africa, because of the difference in political culture.

Footnotes

1. ˮ... the slovenliness of our language makes it easier for us to have foolish thoughts.ˮ George Orwell, ˮPolitics and the English Language,ˮ in A Collection of Essays, (New York: Harvest/Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1946), p. 157.

2. Cashmore, E. Dictionnaire of Race and Ethnic Relations (London:Routlege & Kegan Paul, 1984), p. 85.

3. Ibid. , p. 85.

4. Jackson, R. H. ˮEthnicityˮ p. 206.  In G. Sartori (ed. ) Social-Science Concepts(London Sage Publications, 1984), p. 211.

5. Barth, Fredrick. (ed) Introduction to Ethnic Groups and Boundaries(Boston: Little Brown, 1969), pp. 11-14.
   Most Attempts to define ethnicity or ethnic groups subsequent to Barth share much in common with is definition. For some representative see Harick, I. F 1972 . ˮThe Ethnic Revolution and Political Integration in the Middle Eastˮ, International Journal of Middle East Studies. No 3 pp. 303-23; and John. Wright 1991. Ethnicity and History: Towards Discussion of the Zulu Case. Paper presented at the Critical Studies Group Seminar, University of Natal, Pietermaritzburg In this paper he writes that the construction of ethnicity is best conceved as a localized, sociohistorical process ˮby which people come to see themselves as belonging to a group (other than a kinship group) whose members share, or believe they share a common historical origine and therefore a common historical origin and, therefore a common culture, a common way of giving meaning to the world they live inˮ p. 4

6. Barth, F. cited in Ethnicity . by R. H. Jackson, op. cit. , p. 230.

7. Rodolfo Stavenhagen, The Ethnic Question: Conflicts, Development, and Human Rights(Tokyo:The United University Nation, 1990), p. 3.

8. Max Weber, Economy and Society, ed GuentherRoth, G and Clauss Wittich 1968 (eds) (New York: Bedminster Press) p. 389.

9. Skalnik, Peter. 1988. "Tribes as Colonial Category." In South Africa Keywords: The Uses and Abuses of Political Concepts. (ed). E. Boonzaier and J. Sharp(Cape Town:David Philip), p. 68-70. He also goes on to point out how nineteenth and twentied-century antropology which has conceived basic tribal identities as 'ancient and powerful, and not open to amelioration, so that animosity and tension arise whenever and wherever members of different tribes come into contact with each other', has contributed to the hold that these notions have in the popular mind.

10. Quoted by Ronald R. Atkinson(ed) in The Roots of Ethnicity :The Origin of the Acholi of Uganda before 1800 (Philadelphia University of Pennsylvania Press, 1994), p. 13.

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The Concept and use of the term 'Tribe' in Anthropology has been widely debated and critized since the late 1960s; Similar self-scrunity with respect to ethnicity followed from the late 1970s.
See for example Mafeji, Archile. 1971. "The Ideology of Tribalism. "Journal of Modern African Studies 9, No 2:pp. 253-61. and Horowitz, Donald L. 1985. Ethnic Groups in Conflict. ( Berkley:University of California Press.)

12. Walker Connor "A Nation is a Nation, is a State, is an Ethnic Group is a ... ". Ethnic and Racial Studies Volume 1 Number 4 October 1978. p. 393.

13. See Oxford Dictionary.

14. Van Dyke, V. 1975 "The individual, the state and ethnic communities in political theory"p. 244. in World Politics. Vol. 29. no. 3. , pp. 343-369.

15. Kumar Rupesinghe "Internal Conflicts and their Resolution: The Case of Uganda" in Conflict Resolution in Uganda, (Ohio University Press, 1989), p. 2.

16. Burton, J. W. "International Conflict Resolution Priorities", in Forum, Peace Institute Reporter, June 1987, p. 5.
17. Kumar Rupesinghe, op. cit. , p. 2.

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## CHAPTER 4: SOME THEORIES OF ETHNIC CONFLICT
## MANIFESTATION IN AFRICA

In chapter 3, we have tried to discuss the meanings of some political concepts which have an important impact on the phenomena of ethnic conflicts in the world. Occasionally, we have noted their specific implications in the context of Africa. This has helped us understand that, although some political concepts have an universal dimension, their interpretation may differ in time and place. This is very important because we think that in the context of Africa, some of these concepts have precipitated the rise of conflict when their application has been done without any consideration of the Africa's socio-economic realities.

In this chapter, we will try to review some theories which have been proposed by different social scientists in their effort of explaining the ethnic conflicts in Africa.

### 4-1 African Mass Irrationality Theory

This theory is a restatement of the old assumption that Africans are by nature `tribal' people and that `tribalism' is little more than an irrelevant anachronism, an atavistic residue deriving from the distant past of rural Africa. It should have evaporated with the passage of time, but, inexplicably, something went wrong, and it continues to refuse to obey the laws of social and political change. It thus remains able to motivate Africans to frequent actions of conflict and violence. Ethnic consciousness is, in this view, a form of collective irrationality. [1]

Largely used by the foreign mass media, the problems with this theory are clear. First, it is always dangerous to assume that people consistently act out of mass irrationality. People tend to act rationally, and there is no reason to believe that Africans are exceptions. Secondly, this argument is, in effect, also a tautology with no analytical power, arguing as it does that Africans act `tribalistically' because they are naturally `tribal'. Thirdly, and most tellingly, empirical evidence shows clearly that ethnic consciousness is very much a new phenomenon, an ideological construct, usually of the twentieth century, and not an anachronistic cultural artifact from the past.

Generally, however, interethnic attitudes and group behaviour are not self-generated and are certainly not to be attributed to some underlying, immutable ethnic hostilities or rivalries. If and when ethnic hostility or rivalry occurs, there is generally a specific historical reason for it that relates to political struggles over resources and power. Thus, for example, when superficial observers attribute conflicts in, say Africa, to some abstract °tribal rivalries″ as if rivalry and conflict were something inherent in the concept °tribe″ itself, they probably miss the point and more often than not, confuse the issues. [2]

In fact, ethnic rivalries, hostilities, and conflicts are no more °natural″ than interethnic solidarity and co-operation. While ethnic identity and in-group solidarity are universal phenomena, they do not necessarily imply hostility and rejection of other ethnic groups. Peaceful coexistence between different ethnic groups within the limits of wider political units are at least as common and persistent as interethnic conflicts. What seems to be a constant, however, is that when interethnic rivalries, hostilities, or conflicts exist, these are usually the result of underlying structural disparities and inequalities that result from historical grievances often related to conquest, colonization, economic exploitation, political oppression, and other processes of

domination and subordination associated with the ethnocratic State.

As an offspring of the changes associated with so-called `modernization', therefore, it is unlikely to be destroyed by the continuation of these same processes. For all these reasons, then, this theory must be discarded.

4-2 Primordialistic Explanation of Ethnicity

The proponents of ethnicity or primordialists are a larger and more disparate group. They include early critics of the nation-building paradigm such as Walker Connor, Cynthia Enloe, Nathan Glazer and Daniel Moynihan, Donald L. Horwitz, Harold Isaacs and other theoreticians of nationalism (nationalism being the intellectual forebear of theories of disintegration), such as Anthony D. Smith, and the proponents of consociationalism and control, in particular Lijphardt, Leo Kuper and van den Berghe. [3]

The fundamental tenet of this approach is that ethnicity – ethnic identity or ethnic consciousness –is the essential independent variable that leads to political assertiveness and militant separatism, regardless of the existence of inequality or dominance. Social and economic discrepancies per se create discontent and may incite revolution, but only discontent founded on ethnic symbols, such as language, religion, culture, origin or race can lead to separatism. [4] Distinct communities prefer to be governed poorly by their ethnic brethren instead of wisely by aliens. The latter is worse than oppressive, it is degrading. [5]

This school of thought argues that ethnicity is the primary source of conflict. Political conflict and ensuing political instability is seen in terms of conflict between different ethnic groups within a society. For instance, John Hatch states:

Nigeria is a collection of mutually antagonistic tribal groups only recently and artificially constructed into a state, without regard for ethnic and cultural differences and jealousies. [6]

He argues that political instability is a direct result of ethnic conflict within the state.

Finally, deriving from a Durkheimian notion of the importance of the role of the `community', or Gemeinschaft, there is the `primordialist' interpretation of ethnicity, an interpretation which now appears to be in the ascendancy amongst many scholars. [7] Its attraction lies in its serious attempt to answer the crucial question as to why the ethnic message possesses such strong appeal. This interpretation seeks explanation in the realm of psychology. Africans, it is argued, were badly affected by the disruptive socio-economic and political changes of the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Pre-capitalist and pre-colonial hierarchies and elements of order in social life were undermined by the growth of capitalist relations and the impact of colonialism, thereby depriving people of social and psychological security. As a result, in a hostile world they have instead sought security through the invocation of a lost past of firm values as a way of recreating a life in which they can achieve emotional and, even, perhaps, physical safety. Ethnic identity provides a comforting sense of brotherhood in a world tending towards social atomization and rootlessness. Ethnic leaders represent and embody the unity of the cultural group. In this view, ethnicity is a kind of romantic rejection of the present. Enduring rather as religious fundamentalism or faith healing does in western societies, it is a reaction to the sterility of modern positivism and has become something akin to a civil religion with great emotional appeal. [8]

Once again, this argument is attractive, particularly as the ethnic message, once established amongst people, does appear to be a part of the natural order of the universe. It categorizes people in accordance with inevitable, largely unself-conscious ascription: people belong to tribe X because they are born in tribe X and are, regardless of personal choice, characterized by the cultural traits of tribe X. Thus one is a member of a `tribe' not by choice, but by destiny, and one thus partakes of a set of `proper' customs.

We agree with Leroy Vail that this approach has three serious problems [9] First, the mere appeal of, or belief in, a generalized idyllic past and the presumed unity of the ethnic group seem insufficiently definite to explain the relevance to people in specific historical situations of the statements that comprise constructed ethnic ideologies. Why have vague cultural statements about language or a common history or a hero from the past succeeded in `comforting' people or mobilizing them? Does ethnicity appeal because it is intrinsically `primordial', or is it constructed as `primordial' in its discourse to render it more generally appealing? What specific messages within the ethnic ideology actually appeal the most and to whom? And why? In short, the stress upon the `primordial' aspect of ethnicity tends to overlook both the actual intellectual content of the message, which can vary from group to group, and its varying appeal among different members of the same ethnic group.

Second, by stressing the backward-looking, `primordial' aspect of ethnicity, this interpretation fails to answer the central empirical question of how the most backward-looking ethnic ideologies, with their glorification of long-dead heroes and their delight in `traditional values', have been able at the same time to contain within them a powerful acceptance of western education and skills and a willingness to `change with the times'. The emphasis on the primordial past does not take into account ethnicity's forward-looking aspect which, as commentators have frequently observed, gives it a Janus-like appearance. This is so, we suggest, largely because the role of class factors in creating and shaping ethnic ideologies has been largely overlooked. It is the direct appeal of fresh ideas and institutions to certain new classes that appeared in twentieth century Africa that has been translated into the progressive face of ethnic identity. The psychological appeal of primordialism and the concern for specific present-day interests of specific classes perhaps seem unlikely bed-fellows, but they are real ones nonetheless and must be explained.

Third, it is illogic to assert that African peoples are always attached to the past because this means that African societies are against progress. However, the contribution of African peoples in the universal civilization shows that African peoples were engaged in a continual process of development and modernization of their society in conformity of their daily life needs.

As an interpretation, the `primordialist' explanation of ethnicity, on its own, is simply too ahistorical and non-specific to convince. In analyzing ethnicity's real appeal one must instead try to relate its actual assumptions about the past to the current historical reality of those accepting them.

The ethnicity or primordialist approach has difficulty accounting for separatist struggles on the part of groups that can hardly be characterized as ethnic groups. And clearly many movements have their militant separatism based on an extreme level of inequality.

4-3 Internal Colonialism

The problem of internal colonialism was originally alluded to by theorists such as Lenin and Gramsci, and has more recently been taken up by students of Latin America, of the black ghettos of the United States and of the Palestinians of Israel. [10] It has been more thoroughly developed by Michael Hechter, who argues that states that are not integrated tend to split into two cultural groups: the core, that is the dominant cultural group, and the periphery, those territories largely occupied by the subordinate or peripheral cultural groups. When the division of labour is cultural and when there are economic inequalities between the cultural core and the periphery, the deprived cultural group resists integration and tilts towards separatism. [11]

Micheal Hechter's work divides the nation states into core and periphery regions. The core is characterized by early economic development and political centralization facilitating their early economic expansionism and imperialism. Perpherial regions, on the other had, are easily subdued and conquered, their status and economies restructured to the advantage of the core. When a system of stratification emerges in the division of labour, which is reproduced over time between core and periphery areas, and is superimposed on pre-existing cultural divisions and other group distinctions, a system of cultural stratification occurs. In this tradition, he argues, Wales, Brittany and Quebec are examples of internal colonies that are dependent upon richer and ethnically different core regions.

'... ethnic mobilization is activated when the core region attempts to integrate the dependent ethnic periphery. The greater the economic inequalities between collectivities, the greater the probability that the less advanced collectivity will be status solidary and hence will resist political integration. "[12]

Krippendorff, along the same lines, argues that the essence of all forms of separatism is social discrimination and class stratification, which are the outcome of existing social distances. [13] Similarly, Galtung claims that separatism emerges in a relation of dominance directed against a group or groups, when this dominance is linked with a specific territory within a state and with a distinct people living in that territory. [14]

In terms of cause-effect relation, each model is in essence arguing that ethnic solidarity flourishes when uneven industrial development produces a highly dependent periphery region associated with an ethnic population.

Ethnic stratification is sometimes attributed to subjective factors such as attitudes held by members of ethnics regarding the value or superiority of their own group and the supposed inferiority of other ethnic groups. [15] Ethnocentrism does of course play a role in shaping interethnic relations, and it is sometimes sharpened by collective attitudes such as chauvinism, xenophobia, or racism. Such attitudes, when they exist, determine social behaviour between groups and, conversely, certain patterns of social relations between different ethnic groups in turn shape and condition individual attitudes, thus compasing a mutually reinforcing pattern that may generate intergroup hostility and rivalry. This is a common phenomenon when racial, linguistic, or religious groups coexist within the framework of local communities, and it may lead to communal conflicts, as have so often shaken India in putting Muslims against Hindus, for example. Of course, subjective attitudes and attendant group behaviour may be instigated or manipulated by special interests within or outside the community itself. Again, in India this seems to be the case of the separatist movement of a part of the Sikh community.

The `centre-periphery" pattern is an internal trans position of the world system. This mean that the international colonial and imperialist relationships that came to characterize the world system during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries created the conditions for its own reproduction within a number of colonial and post-colonial societies.

In many parts of the world, a persistent pattern of unequal development, regional disparities, economic exploitation, political oppression, and social polarization has been historically associated with European expansion and colonialism, which became the world capitalist system and incorporated practically every region and society in the world, either directly or indirectly. [16]

Colonialism and imperialism are an integral part of the expansion of capitalism on a world scale. Indeed, they are part of its very nature. [17] Capitalist accumulation requires unequal development and social and economic polarization. The underdeveloped countries of today, the so-called third world, are not simply the laggards in the race to development and modernization; they are the necessary by-product of capitalist accumulation.

The international bourgeoisie, the social class that is the historical instrument of capitalist accumulation, is not only localized in today's capitalist centres (New York, London, Tokyo...), it is also entrenched in the third world countries. Here it is, to be sure, a dependent subordinate local bourgeoisie, but it plays a crucial role in keeping the network of capitalist accumulation within the centre-periphery framework working smoothly. [18] And many a third world state also plays this very same role within the new pattern of economic transnationalization.

Within this general framework, the system of stratified interethnic relations plays a crucial role. Because more often than not, the pattern of capitalist domination/subordination involves not only economic classes (landlords/peasants; industrialists/workers) and geographic regions, but also ethnic groups, particularly when in the post-colonial ethnocratic state social class divisions happen to coincide or overlap with ethnic (linguistic, cultural, religious, racial) distinctions. Of course, this does not just `happen" accidentally but is the outcome of a particular colonial and post-colonial history. Thus, the pattern of ethnic stratification that we encounter in so many countries today is the expression of a deeper structural relationship that we may call internal colonialism. [19]

Some authors criticize the use of the internal colonialism approach when applied to first-world countries. Also this theory of internal colonialism is put to severe test by the separatist tendencies on the part of rich territories and privileged groups. While it can be claimed that separatism is due to external factors (the international division of labour or external sponsors), to past neglect or perhaps more ingenuously, that its basic remains economic, and that it essentially amounts to a question of injustice, it is still very doubtful whether the theory can predict and explain all, or even the majority of active secessionist movements.

But there is no doubt that it is a useful tool for the analysis of asymmetrical ethnic relations in a number of post-colonial states in the third world, where ethnic, regional, and class exploitation are closely linked within a significant and recurrent pattern. [20]

## 4-4 Cultural Pluralism and Value Incompatibilities

The theory of a plural society has been refined and modified by M. G. Smith following the work of Furnivall. [21] According to Smith, cultural pluralism consists of the coexistence within a single society of groups possessing `mutually incompatible' institutional systems. He defines institutional systems as `social structures, value and belief patterns, and systems of action.' [22] They form the `core' of any culture. For Smith, cultural pluralism differs from mere cultural heterogeneity: Most societies display heterogeneity of occupation, stratification, and even ethnicity, but a society is only culturally plural, in a true sense, when there is `a formal diversity in the basic system of compulsory institutions.' [23] If such a society is dominated by one of the cultural sections, then it is a plural society. Thus pluralism, in Smith's words, simultaneously connotes `a social structure characterized by fundamental discontinuities and cleavages, and a cultural complex based on systematic institutional diversity.' [24]

The notion of cultural pluralism as described by Smith has distinct characteristics. First, the differentiated groups tend to form a closed socio-cultural unit because any institutional system tends toward internal integration and consistency. Second, `where culturally divergent groups together form a common society, the structural imperative for main tenance of this inclusive unit involves a type of political order in which one of these cultural sections is subordinated to the other. Such a condition derives from the structural requisites of society on the one hand and the wide cultural differences within some populations on the other. [25] Third, plural societies as depicted by Smith are `defined by dissensus and pregnant with conflict...' In other words, such societies are characterized by separateness, domination and instability.

What is relevant and important for us is the explicit assertion in Smith's model that whatever the form of the political system, `the differing sectional values within a plural society are a profound source of instability.' [26] That is, most of the instability which characterizes culturally plural systems is the result of a conflict of values. For similar events in a culturally plural society evoke differing interpretations precisely because, as Smith points out, `the moral axioms of one section are not the axioms of another.' [27] Hence, there is a high probability that in a situation of fragile social, economic, and political institutions, the greater the degree of cultural pluralism, the greater the competition between the systems of value, and hence, the greater the chance for communal conflict and social disintegration.

In the African context, the existence of culturally diverse groups of people in most states is more often than not depicted as the salient destabilizing element in Africa's quest for nation-building. The dysfunctionality of cultural pluralism results from the clear dichotomy between primordial sentiments (ethnicity) and civil ties (territorial national identity). The danger of ethnic discontent poses a serious threat to both national unity and nation-building. A sense of `political dismemberment' leads to systemic frustration and subsequently to communal violence. Clifford Geertz describes this process in the following words:

It is this crystallization of a direct conflict between primordial and civil sentiments -this `longing not to belong to any other group' -that gives to the problem variously called tribalism, parochialism, communalism, and so on, a more ominous and deeply threatening quality than most of the other, also very serious and intractable problems the new states face. [28]

Cultural pluralism in Africa is potentially capable of generating an intensity of identification which can eclipse

all other issues. Indeed, it can absorb other conflicts and translate them into communal hostility. Racial and ethnic consciousness, usually facilitated by its extreme visibility, creates its own stereotypes of cultural differentiation. Religion, `by positing a divine or supernatural imperative for communal identity, removes differentiation from the plane of human rationality or debate. Conflict can become invested with a mandate from heaven and be pursued as a holy duty.' [29] The saliency of racial, or ethnic and cultural distinctiveness, `assures a daily reinforcement of identity with the group of which one is a member and its uniqueness with regard to other groups.' [30]

The European colonial withdrawal marked an important turning point in inter-racial (as in the case of the Sudan) and inter-ethnic relations (as in the case of Nigeria). It meant that after independence, as the racial and ethnic collectivities struggled for power, they no longer operated within the same limitations as they had during the colonial period. The external restraining and cushioning force had now disappeared and such new countervailing factors as central strength, sense of common history, and transnational identities and aspirations were all too often incapable of dealing with the new strains. [31] Post-independence politics has increased rather than decreased inter-racial and inter-ethnic conflicts, and some of these now have come into the open.

Despite the increase in social communication among Africans as a result of new technological opportunities, most states are experiencing the agony of what Ali Mazrui has called `retribalization of politics: the resurgence of ethnic loyalties in situations of rivalry in the arena of resource allocation and domestic power politics.' [32] Of no less importance is the problem of the incompatibility of values of ethnic groups and the desire by public leaders to preserve

and protect the values of their respective collectivities. Karl W. Deutsch has argued that `this is a human need which social scientists, and in particular political scientists must recognize.' [33]

Cultural pluralism as a disruptive force in nation-building must not, however, be overmphasized; communal conflict is not produced simply by the clashing of incompatible values. Indeed, race, or ethnicity per se, is neither an integrative nor disruptive force, but its manipulation by individuals or groups for power and privilege leads to these social processes. Most of the conflicts generally begin at the elite level among the segments of the various groups that are `culturally westernized,' [34] so that the erosion of traditionality among the elites does not entail the diminution of ethnicity. Elite competitions for political power and economic rewards are often translated into ethnic grievances and rivalries, so that `income distinctions can be superimposed upon ethnic labels and thereby obfuscate the initial cause of the conflict.' [35]

Racial or ethnic conflicts generally vary with conditions other than cultural differences. For, `as long as culturally diverse peoples agree that they constitute one nation,' it does not matter which language or languages they speak, whom they recognize as their ancestors, or which religion they profess.' [36] Hence, historical differences, elite and political instability, differences in access to the means of production, and scarce economic and political resources, deserve more scrutiny than primordialities in the understanding of communal violence in Africa.

## 4-5 Regional Inequalities

Modernization theories of ethnicity also commonly stress that the benefits of modernity are not equally spread among ethnic groups. [37]  This uneven distribution of economic and educational opportunities in the modern sector is an important source of group tensions.  How and why?

One answer given by modernization theories is that, because some groups gain a headstart in the competition for the rewards of the modern world, the social classes that emerge tend to overlap and reinforce ethnic group boundaries, thereby making ethnic group confrontations more intense.
The fewer the cross-cutting socio-economic linkages, the more naked such confrontations and the greater the likelihood of secessionist and other movements of communal nationalism."
[38]

Another answer, not inconsistent, puts the matter in terms of class resentment.  Ethnic groups that are more wealthy, better educated, and more urbanized tend to be envied, resented, and sometimes feared by others; and the basis for these sentiments is the recognition of their superior position in the new system of stratification."[39]

A third interpretation of the growth of ethnicity is that it resulted from uneven development within African colonial territories. [40]  Certain peoples were able to do comparatively well from the educational and employment opportunities that colonial capitalism presented unevenly, with aspirant petty bourgeois groups able to establish themselves in some areas but not in others.  When it became clear that the colonial era was nearing its end, these petty bourgeois groups mobilized support along ethnic lines so that they would be in a position to maximize their opportunities for access to resources and power after independence.  This

situation led in turn to the continuation of specifically ethnic politics in many countries of Africa, resulting in a rash of coups d'etat and civil wars as ethnic fragments of the national petty bourgeoisie competed for their own advantage.  From this perspective, ethnicity tends to be seen instrumentally, as little more than an ideological mask employed by ambitious members of upwardly-aspiring groups as a way of papering over growing class divisions within their ethnic group so as to secure their own narrow interests through demagoguery and mystification.  Ethnicity, then, when ordinary people embrace it, is the very epitome of 'false consciousness'.

Again, this interpretation, with its emphasis on the pivotal roles of influential petty bourgeois intellectuals functioning as culture brokers and on smart politicians craftily manipulating popular opinion, especially in the post-colonial period, has obvious elements of truth in it. It also goes far towards explaining why some cultural groups who have had such a 'modernizing' petty bourgeoisie within them are more 'tribal' than other groups within the same country who lack such a class.  Yet, on its own, it too ultimately fails to explain ethnicity's appeal.  This is so because it goes too far in depicting ordinary people as being credulous, blindly accepting the ethnic party line from their devious betters.  It fails to explain why, today as in the colonial period, the ethnic message should find such resonance with ordinary people.  Why, in short, have ordinary people chosen so often to support ethnic politicians rather than national politicians?  What is in the ethnic message that is not in the nationalist message?  One must once again guard against the assumption, necessary to this interpretation, that ordinary Africans act either irrationally or sentimentally.

## 4-6 Communalism

The main focus of the various communalist approaches is modernization, the rise of aspirations, scarcity, the distribution of rewards, elite interests and the compartmentalization of institutions on communal grounds. Communal politics is regarded as a modern phenomenon, above all a useful strategy within a constantly shrinking civic arena. The roots of separatism are to be found in elite disputes over the direction of change and grievances linked with the scarcity of resources. Separatism develops when previously acquired privileges are threatened or alternatively when underprivileged groups realize that the moment has come to redress inequality. Modern states, and in particular states in middle levels of economic development cannot cope with social mobilization and are unable to satisfy the aspirations they generate. Thus communal violence ensues. The main proponents of such theories are Immanuel Wallerstein, Samuel Huntington, Milton Esman, Rabushka and Shepsle, Orlando Patterson, Melson/Wolpe and Michael Banton. [41]

Other scholars argue that rapid socio-economic modernization intensifies and reinforces communal conflict and ethnic identity. Melson and Wolpe advance the proposition that:

... in a culturally plural society, the competition engendered by social mobilization will tend to be defined in communal terms. [42]

The reason for this is that, first, social mobilization changes peoples' aspirations and expectations. People want and demand the more goods and power. Thus, it was ˝by making men ˝more alike' in the sense of possessing the same wants, that modernization tends to promote conflict˝[43] in plural societies. Second, as social mobilization increases so does the demand for scarce resources. Since the supply of scarce

resources is so limited in less developed countries, the competition to control these resources intensifies conflict and competitors perceive themselves as engaged in a zero-sum game where the winner takes all and the loser forfeits all, thus making both the political and economic competition a life and death struggle.

Thus, it is rapid social mobilization and the highly competitive nature of the modern sector which lead to communal conflict in culturally plural societies. According to Melson and Wolpe:

In culturally plural societies, citizens tend to perceive their competitive world through a communal prism and to be responsive to communal appeals. Communalism therefore becomes a matter of opportunism. Thus aspirant... politicians seek to mobilize their ˝tribal union' behind their candidacy; at the same time, their towns people --those residents in their home community as well as those residents in the alien city--view their candidacy as an expression of group aspirations and their election as an indicator of group recognition and power. Conversely, the members of other communal groups view their candidacy as a threat to their own group aspirations and vested interests. Thus, creating communally oriented competitive strategies in virtually all walks of life. [44]

They also advance the proposition that differential rates of social mobilization and the attempts to reduce commural imbalance in wealth, status and power intensify communal antagonism. [45] They cite the different rates of social mobilization between Southern Nigeria and Northern Nigeria to illustrate this proposition.

For Rabushka and Shepsle, competitive politics in plural societies is characterized by ethnic politics. Ethnicity is the (only) major basis for the ˝authoritative allocation of values.˝ [46] Thus, unlike politics in pluralistic societies where fluid coalitions, shifting alliances, and changing world views are preeminent, [47] the practice of politics in plural societies is almost exclusively along ethnic lines.

The primary task of politics in plural societies is the subordination of ˚primordial sentiments˝ to the requirements of civil politics. [48]

Rabushka and Shepsle contend that conflict in plural society arises from conflicting interests among different communities on what they term incompatibility of ˚ethnic preference function.˝ However, it is the political elites who manipulate the natural social cleavages and make some of those cleavages politically salient. As Rabushka and Shepsle state:

Politicians are office-seekers. For whatever reasons--prestige, power, material perquisites--they are in the business of winning elections. And in order to win elections, they must assemble electoral organizations (coalitions). The natural cleavages that divide men in the community provide the obvious and perhaps strongest nuclei around which coalitions are built. [49]

Thus, astute politicians manipulate these natural social cleavages and make them politically salient in order to win elections.

Theories of communalism tend to overemphasize the element of greedy elites and manipulative, power-seeking regional leaders who take advantage of the communal spirit for their own ends. [50] Thus they tend to play down the element of inequality and communal identity as well as the degree of ingroup legitimization for separatism. Undoubtedly, many militant separatist leaders and members of elites are motivated by the search for power, privilege and economic gain. But for a separatist front to gain mass support and become a true ˚movement', it should be able to capitalize on situation of disadvantage and rising group awareness. It must be able to tap a reservoir of group frustration and group pride. Naked self-interest cannot thrive on its own without the normative symbols of unity. But these very symbols of unity enchain the prospective manipulators, who

either conform with the new requirements made upon them or are rendered redundant, being substituted by more genuine nationalist leaders. [51]

4-7 Relative Deprivation Theory of Mobilizaion

The relative deprivation approach has many variants. It is a perspective which views social movements as resulting from the expression of irrational impulses. It is one of the oldest perspective on mobilization in the conflict literature. The relative deprivation approach has been more widely employed in the social movement literature than any other single theory of mobilization. [52]

This theory of relative deprivation attributes the root cause of communal conflict to the discrepancy between rising expectations and actual capabilities. [53] The basic assumption is that political instability or communal violence is more characteristic of countries with unbalanced processes of modernization in which economic performance lags far behind the rate of social mobilization, a factor which increases expectations.

Therefore, communal conflict is expected to be more prevalent in societies in which the ˚capabilities produced by modernization are distributed more unevenly among social groups than of societies where such capabilities are distributed more equally.' [54] The aspirations of one group, as Huntington has argued, ˚almost invariably increase if its members perceive that the capabilities of a similar or neighbouring group have increased. Economic development itself often involves increasing disparities of wealth, income and power among social groups in society.' [55] In Africa, the regional stratifications may coincide with known

socio-economic cleavages. The most obvious cleavages are in societies with racial and cultural schisms.

Within the rural and urban areas of African countries, there are income differentials between the wage earners and the owners of capital and large-scale farms. Gradually, many more people have been induced to go to the urban areas where there are jobs available and this migration will certainly lead to grave social problems. But, although a process of differentiation is taking place in Africa, it has not yet produced any major cleavages. [56]

The ethnic groups which seized power at the time of the colonial withdrawal have generally entrenched themselves both politically and economically, for in Africa, political power leads to economic power. Consequently, there is disproportionately greater participation in the political process by the beneficiaries of independence. Politicians at the national level struggle for the scarce resource allocation, and national economic development plans are subjected to regional and political considerations rather than to economic priorities. [57]

Economic competition for scarce material resources and opportunities which are valued in common may lead to inter-racial or inter-ethnic violence, but intense economic conflict among ethnic groups usually exists, at the elite rather than the mass level. That is, there is no evidence to show a linkage between economic grievance and racial/ethnic hostility at the mass level in Africa. It seems that 'the masses of relatively deprived ethnic groups commonly do not conceive of their relations with relatively affluent ethnic groups as economically disharmonious.' [58] Nevertheless, modernization produces common aspirations and these in turn generate ethnic conflict on economic grounds. The role of elites in translating economic jealousies and rivalries into ethnic conflict at the mass level is significant. For, although grass-root opposition movements are not common in Africa, skillful elite activists can easily spark enough of a reaction in large segments of a population to pose a serious threat to political authority. Such a development is greatly facilitated by the regional disparities which typify economic imbalance in many African states. In short, economic differentials among ethnic and culturally diverse groups lead to relative economic deprivation of the disadvantaged groups and this subsequently may result in communal violence.

4-8 Resource Competition Theory

Resource competition theory posits that increased rivalry over scarce and valued rewards in the political, economic and social arenas will tend to exacerbate conflict between groups within society. The forces of modernization tend to allow increased access to resources, and since the political processes and structures of the modern state appear to reward the collective efforts of fairly large-scale groupings, ethnicity has come to be seen as a relatively more efficacious anchorage for the advance of collective interests than, for example, family, kinship or region[59]. Also while the complexion of contemporary world politics would appear to favour the nation state as an organizational framework, the association between ethnic and national interests has tended to enhance the legitimacy of ethnically based claims in political and economic arenas[60]

While we can seldom predict the specific combination of factors that will result in the mobilization of politicized ethnicity, this theoretical perspective shows us that 'ethnic boundaries are constructed through a process of group interaction in the context of political and economic interests' [61].

One of the most intense areas of rivalry and competition between ethnic groups involves control over the political power embodied by the state.

While the struggle for political and economic power may be seen as the motive of ethnic conflict from the resource competition perspective, the coercive role of a dominant ethnic group in control of the state apparatus is more interesting from the viewpoint of cultural pluralism.

Even when the state may be considered ethnically impartial, however, matters of ethnic group identity and conflict are of paramount interest to the government, especially in those cases where the significance of cultural differences in politics impacts upon the developmental processes associated with nation building.

Resource competition models tend to focus on the instrumental motivations underlying ethnic group behaviour. In so doing, however, it is important to avoid the reductionist tendencies exhibited by rational choice theorists such as Hechter[62] who gloss over the complexities of social interacion in their quest for `elegant' explanation. From this perspective, ethnic group behaviour may be understood, and even predicated, in light of the claim that, since individuals may be shown to make choices that maximize benefis and minimize costs to themselves, collecivities will, on average and in the long run, be similarly motivated. Members of ethnic groups, more specifically, will make decisions regarding their group identity on the basis of a rational calculus of cost/benefit.

It would appear, however, that rational choice theory does not allow for instances of ethnic group behaviour that fail to reflect a proclivity to maximize material gain. It is also flawed by the assumption that group behaviour is a reflection of aggregate interests; groups are often comprised of differing interests and are subject to the influence of leadership, majority opinion and the force of ideological persuasion. The result may not be rational, nor need it reflect the collective will of the group. Finally, rational choice theory does not adequately accommodate situations in which ethnic group identity and behaviour emerge reactively, that is to say, in response to majority group pressure or in response to discrimination[63].

Thus, while the theoretical excesses of rational choice theory suggest the limitations of the resource mobilization perspective, the emphasis on politics and the role of the state in giving shape to inter-ethnic relations enhances our understanding of the contextual dynamics within which ethnic stratification develops and is reproduced in contemporary societies.

In the preceding paragraphs different theories have tried to explain the ethnic-conflicts in Africa. We may separate them in three groups.
Those which focus on primordialism, economic competition and power competition. Certainly these theories contain some part of truth which may explain the manifestation of ethnic conflicts in Africa. But in the formulation of these theories some of their explanations on ethnicity do not satisfy us. It is because we do not see the relation between ethnicity or ethnic conflict and post-independence African states practice. (government, political institution, military) The theory of communalism, for example, talks about the role of political elite in the manipulation of common peoples' feeling. It gives us the impression that the common people lack a political maturity or act only irrationally.

As the review of these theories indicates, the question of the manifestation of ethnic conflict in Africa is an object

of serious theoretical debate. Some of these theories contain some elements of truth, but what makes their limits is the fact that they don't consider the multi-dimensional aspect which intervene in the manifestation of ethnicity in Africa.

From our view point, any proper analysis of ethnic conflicts in Africa should at first consider the historical legacy of colonial policies of divide and rule, the role of the state, the policy and behavior toward ethnic groups and lastly the international factors.

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3. We may note for example, Anthony, D. Smith, 1981, Nathan Glazer and Daniel Moynihan, 1975, and Donald L. Horwitz, 1985.

4. Alexis Heraclides, The Self-Determination of Minorities in International Politics (London:Frank Cass, 1991), p. 8.

5. Ibid.

6. Hatch, Joh, Nigeria:The seeds of Disaster, (Henry Regnary Co., 1970).

7. As, for example, in Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in Conflict, passim, and A. Giddens, The Nation-State and Violence (Berkeleyand Los Angeles, 1985), passim, but especially pp. 212-221. See also J. F. Stack, Jr. , ed. , The Primordial Challenge:Ethnicity in the Contemporary World (Westport, CT, 1986).

8. Leroy Vail, op. cit. , p. 6.

9. Ibid.

10. See for an introduction John Stone, "Introduction: Internal Colonialism in Comparative Perspective, "Ethnic and Racial Studies xx (July 1979), pp. 255-9.

11. Michael Hechter, Internal Colonialism (London, 1975), pp. 9-43; Michael Hechter and Margaret Levi, "The Comparative Analysis of Ethnonational Movements", Ethnic and Racial Studies xx (July 1979), pp. 260-74.

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13. Krippendorff, Ekkehart, "Minorities, Violence, and Peace Research", Journal of Peace Research xvi, no. 1 (1979), p. 34-38.

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15. See Horowitz, op. cit.

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20. See, Smith, Anthony D. The Ethnic Revival in the Modern World. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981).

21. M. G. Smith, Plural Society in the British West Indies (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1965), p. 82.

22. Ibid.

23. Ibid.

24. Leo Kuper and M. G. Smith (ed.), Pluralism in Africa (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1969), p. 27.

25. M. G. Smith, op. cit., p. 62.

26. Ibid., p. 90.

27. Ibid., p. 174.

28. Clifford Geertz, "The Integrative Revolution, " in Old Societies and New States, Clifford Geertz (ed.), (New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1963), p. 111.

29. Mehden, Anderson, and Young, Issues of Political Development (Englewood Cliffs, N. J. : Prentice-Hall 1967), p. 26.

30. Ibid.

31. For a succinct discussion of this issue, see Donald Rothchild, "Ethnicity and Conflict Resolution, "World Politics, vol. XXII, no. 4 (1970), pp. 597-616.

32. Ali Mazrui, Violent Contiguity and Politics of Retribalizationin Africa, p. 93.

33. Karl W. Deutsch, "Peace Research:The Need, the Problems, and the Prospects,' John Hamilton Fulton Memorial Lecture presented at Middlebury College, Vt., 26 April 1972 (mimeographed), p. 12.

34. For a refreshing analysis of this issue, se Donald Horowitz, "Multiracial Politics in the New States," in Issues in Comparative Politics, R. J. Jackson (ed.) (New York:St. Martin's Press, 1971), pp. 167-72.

35. Kenneth W. Grundy, Guerrilla Struggle in Africa:An Analysis and Preview. (New York:Grossman Publishers, 1971), p. 23. I have benefited greqatly from Grundy's Model of Violence in Africa presented in this book. For a similar analysis of elites and ethnicity in Africa, see, for example, Richard L. Sklar, "Political Science and National Integration:A Radical Approach, "Journal of Modern African Studies, vol. V, No. 1 (May 1967) pp. 1-11.

36. A. Smock, Ibo Politics:The Role of Ethnic Unions in Nigeria (Cambridge:Harvard University Press, 1971), p. 203.

37. This assumption is based on the observation of the colonial policies of most European powers in Africa. For more information, see our Chapter 4.
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39. Ibid

40. This point was developed by at an early point of study by in J. S. Coleman, Nigeria Back Ground to Nationalism (Berkeley )

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43. Ibid., pp. 5-6.

44. Ibid., pp. 6-7.

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48. Ibid., p. 8.

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50. Esman, Milton J., "Perspectives on Ethnic Conflict in Industrialized Societies", in Esman (ed.), Ethnic Conflict in the Western World (Ithaca, 1977), p. 372.

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52. See for example, Williams, 1975;Zimmerman, 1982;Gurr, 1969, 1970;Morrison, 1973.

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## CHAPTER 5: FACTORS AND SOURCES OF ETHNIC CONFLICTS IN AFRICA

The chapter 4 has dealt with a long process of theoretical review which helps us understand some theories which have been advanced by different social scientists in their efforts to explain the phenomena of ethnicity in Africa. Through this study, we have reached the conclusion that although some theories possess some elements of truth, there is not any theory which could be claimed as universal and therefore applicable in all the conflicting situation found in Africa. This inevitable conclusion permits us to believe that the only possible way for understanding the ethnic conflicts in Africa is to establish an approach which takes diverse factors and elements into consideration.

We think that it is because some social scientists have missed to fully recognize the multi-dimensional aspect of ethniciy that their work have suffered from weakness. We do not intend to say that this kind of situation will be solved in this thesis, but we simply want to state that ethnicity which is the essence of ethnic conflicts is a social phenomena deeply influenced by many aspects of a social environment.

Thus, the aim of this chapter is to give a general view of factors and sources of ethnic conflicts in Africa in order to help our readers understand better the proposed case studies. We consider that some factors and sources are common to most African states but others may be related to the specific historical, cultural or political evolution of the countries or regions concerned. Therefore, our 2 case studies can not claim to represent all the conflict situations found in Africa since 1960s. By taking this fact into account, we think that a general view which includes more reference of diverse cases will give our readers a global view of ethnic conflicts in Africa and better understand the sources and factors of protracted ethnic conflicts in Africa.

So, the first question we should ask ourselves is: why has Africa been undermined by so many proctracted ethnic conflicts? In order to challenge such a difficult question, it is very important to refer ourselves to the three important historical facts which have influenced the history of modern Africa; we mean (1) the colonialism and its legacy, (2) the nation state-building process and (3) the entrance of African nations in international political arena as sovereign subjects. Therefore, it is through an analysis of these historical events that we intend to find out the sources and factors of ethnic conflicts in modern Africa.

However, in order to appreciate and fully understand our logic, there is a need to have in mind the realities of African societies before the colonial period. We strongly believe that any worthwhile study of the problem of government and politics of Africa must necessarily take account of its past forms of political, social and cultural organizations. This is not only because Africa has, until recently, been known and regarded by the Western World as the ˝Dark Continent˝ which had no history and no culture of its own, but also because a full appreciation of the contemporary human endeavour up and down the continent can only make sense against the general background of its ancient past.

The aim is not to glorify a lost Golden Age of Africa and of its peoples by an attempt at a mythological explanation of its human, no less than of its material, resources; rather, it is to attempt a sober and rational appraisal of the experiences of men in a social and physical environment such as can only be described as peculiar to Africa. [1]

Thus, prior to seeing the sources and factor of ethnic conflicts in Africa, we will make an analysis of the precolonial political institutions there.

## 5-1 Historical Background: The Precolonial Traditional Political Organizations

In precolonial Africa, the system of government, defined as the ordering of human relations, was characterized by structural diversity and pluralism in political thought, political habits and institutions.    The diversity of the system was a reflection of the pluralism of political philosophy espoused by Africa's diverse socio-cultural groups.

In African political system Fortes and E.E.Evans-Pritchard and others describe three types of political organization evolved in precolonial Africa.  Distinctions among the three types were based on the degree of control exercised by the political center, the extent of the regulation of force within the society and the nature of the relationship between kinship and political authority. [2]

### 5-1-1  The Small Segmented Societies

In these types of pre-colonial African societies, kinship was the basis of people's membership as well as holding and exercising political power. As an example we may note the Mbuti of Zaire, the Namadi of Mauritania, the Jie of Uganda and the Twa of Rwanda. [3]  What distinguished these societies is the fact that `political relationships were coterminious with kinship relations so that the society and polity were one." [4]  Political authority within this type of society was segmented as the kinship groups seldom interacted with each other and had no common leader.

### 5-1-2  Larger Segmented Societies

As in the case of the first societies described above, these societies were segmented, but they were more larger and more extensive in their interaction than the former. These societies, were found everywhere in Africa and as example, we may note the Igbo of Nigeria, the Kru of Sierra Leone and Liberia, the Tallensi of Ghana, the Nuer of Sudan, the Luo and the Gikuyu of Kenya, the Masai of Kenya and Tanzania, and the Tonga of Zambia etc. [5]

They preferred an egalitarian diffusion of political authority through different segments or units of their society and nation. This ensured cohesiveness, localization of political power and a beneficent egalitarian political process within units of the nation.

Within each segmented political system, as the political organization of these societies is defined, there was `a cultural and linguistic nation" performing all the functions of a political system. [6]  Segments of this cultural and linguistic nation, while recognizing their individual affinities to the nation, were often in competition with one another and lacked a unified political authority for the entire nation. But, they found their dispersal of political authority and indivitual sub-group autonomy most satisfactory, and A.E.Radcliffe-Brown's argument that these societies lacked a government,  because they were without a `centralized authority, administrative machinery and constitued judicial institutions,' [7] seems to miss the point.

### 5-1-3  Centralized Kingdoms or States

Another type of political organization which evolved in precolonial Africa, and is identified in Fortes and Evans

Pritchard is described as centralized kingdoms or states. Examples of African societies that practiced the system include the Ashanti of Ghana, the Baganda of Uganda, the Bemba of Zambia, the Hausa and the Yoruba of Nigeria, the Baluba of Zaire, and the Zulu in South Africa. [8] The well-defined institution the societies evolved was usually a king or a king-in-council to whom all other groups within the society were required to give allegiance.

Each of the centralized kingdoms had some institutional features, including administrative machinery and judicial structures, unique to itself. But they all assumed that the concentration of political power served the good of society better than the fragmentation of the segmented systems and that the loss of subgroup autonomy was a worthwhile price to pay for the strength and co-ordination that often accompanied a more centralized form." [9]

Christian Potholm has identified three major variations of the centralized system of such political organization. These are the pyramidal monarchy, the associational monarchy and the centralized monarchy.

The first pyramidal or federated variety had a strong central authority and a recognized head of state, but also featured considerable subgroup autonomy.

The second associational monarchy was similar to the pyramidal type. It was a federation of associational groups that cut across clan lines. It had a strong central political structure alongside a subgroup autonomy, and a council that exercised necessary checks on the political powers of the king.

The third, centralized monarchy, unlike the two other variants of the system, had a highly centralized political

administration, a firm territorial base, and heterogeneous membership. Individuals and communities joined the system not solely on the basis of kinship but also by conquest and by pledging direct allegiance to the king. He had a council whose membership was determined by him. What should be noted here is the fact that the subgroups and communities conquered and annexed were allowed cultural but limited political auto-nomy. [10]


5-2 Government in States and Stateless Societies

In general there were as many as four basic units of government in African societies that governed themselves. The first was the chief, the central authority. The second was the inner or privy council, which advised the chief. The third was the council of elders. If there were 10 lineages in the village, for example, their heads would form a 10-member council of elders. The fourth institution was the village assembly of commoners or their meeting. [11]


5-2-1 Africa States

The African societies that ruled themselves had all four units of government: a chief, an inner council, a council of elders, and a village assembly. The chief, in most cases, was a male. He was the political, social, judicial, and religious head of the tribe. As such, he had wide-ranging powers. [12]

In some centralised societies, the office of Chief was elective, while in others it was hereditary. There was and is usually a body of kingmakers responsible for the choice of a successor to a deceased chief.

The traditional African chief performed many functions. First, as the political(administrative) head of the tribe, he was responsible for maintaining good order, handling public affairs, and acting as the ultimate authority in all matters affecting the welfare of the state.

Second, he presided over the chief's court, which was the final court of appeal unless there was a king, in which case his court was the final.

Third, he was the religious head of the tribe, the presumed direct living representative of the ancestral spirits that guarded the tribe and whose goodwill and cooperation were considered essential to the everyday existence of the tribe. [13]

The chief was usually assisted in governance by a small group of confidential advisers which was called the inner or privy council with whom he discussed important matter prior taking any decision.　After the chief had raised an issue with his inner council, he might take it to the council of elders.　This was much wider and more formal body comprising all the hereditary headmen of the wards or lineages; in essence, the council of elders represented the commoners. According to Mensah Sarbah,`the village council represented the commonlife, and its determination found expression in the popular voice.' [14]

Essentially, the council of elders had two functions: to advise and assist the chief in the administration of the tribe and to prevent the chief from abusing his power. Olivier noted that the council of elders voiced its dissatisfactions, criticized the chief, and kept him `under the necessary control."[15]　It is important to keep in mind how the chief was checked and criticized because modern African leaders do not tolerate criticism or rebuke.

## 5-2-2 Stateless Societies

Stateless societies had only two of the four units of government: the council of elders and the village assembly. The council of elders chosen in virtue of their being the titular heads of local families, each such arrangement being of co-ordinate authority with neighbouring ones, but without any of the co-ordinate segments being regarded as having any supra-ordinate power over its equals.

It is true, of course, that among the councillors, a definite degree of seniority is recognised, and that it is the most senior head among certain local families who are traditional religious officiants who act as a kind of superintendent or chairman of council, and central authority being absent, the tribesmen could shift their allegiance from one leader to another. [16]

Chiefless societies operated on more or less similar lines, since the local council of elders must take specific mandates from their families before committing them at council meetings over important matters.

Their resulting ˚stateless society″ would seem almost a contradiction in the eyes of Westerners who see the state as an institution necessary to avoid chaos and tyranny. Africans who lived in stateless societies, on the other hand, tended to view the state as unavoidable tyranny. To resolve conflicts, such socieites reached compromises instead of making judgments or applying sanctions.　Kinship governed their system of law and order. [17]

5-2-3 Comments on African Pre-Colonial Societies

An observation of these pre-colonial societies let us to conclude that some aspects developed in these societies are different from western political values, however others might be considered as universal.

Firstly, for what could be considered as African one, we have the use of age criteria in the political context. In Africa, They maintained that age conferred wisdom and that older people had special political knowledge. The political role of elders in every precolonial African society was, therefore, considerable as their age and accumulated wisdom gave them power——to serve economic, social and political needs of their community.

Secondly, The traditional political leader was regarded as a representative of the ancestors of the society over which he presided; as a link between this society and the spiritual world. This was the essence of the interplay between political authority and spirituality which regulated the behaviours of the kings and gave them also legitimacy.

Thirdly, the indigenous African political system was based on unanimity. Majority opinion did not count in the council of elders. This explains the African penchant for debating, sometimes for days, to reach unanimity. The primary reason for unanimity was survival.

Rawlings of Ghana observed that traditional decisionmaking in Africa involves the chief and council of elders' creating a forum ˙at which every member of the community can make his or her voice heard.˝ [18] In the same way, Julius Nyerere, for example, once said: ˙The very origins of African democracy lay in ordinary oral discussion. The elders sat under a tree and talked until they agreed˝ [19]

This existence of the freedom of expression permited the emergence of a political system based on consencus.

However, as the same as in western societies, we found the existence of the principle of check and balance because existing custom not only sanctioned their legitimacy but also required that they, as rulers, assume full responsibility of leading their society according to the customs of the society. This is the essence of the concept of ˙rule of law', that both the rulers and the ruled are subject to the laws of the land.

We also find the principle of popular sovereignty-the concept that the people, not the king or ruler, are sovereign-which Western scholars regard as a product of European nationalism was a strong element of the political philosophy and practice of precolonial African societies. The Basotho of Lesotho in southern Africa provided an illustration of this philosophy and custom. Their maxim, ˙A chief is a chief by the people; and a people is a people through the chief˝ is an expression of a basic canon of traditional government of the Basotho of Lesotho. [20]

A duly constituted council was the ruling voice of the community in all matters political as well as judicial. The head of the community could carry on no legal act affecting the interests of the community without the knowledge, approval and concurrence of the councillors. They represented the sovereignty of the people. The king served as their head and the embodiment of the sovereign idea. [21]

Confirming the existence of this practice, Oginga Odinga of Kenya, wrote that:

A chief did not issue orders. He sounded out the elders and when he said ˙this is my decision˝ he was announcing not his personal verdict, but an agreed point of

view. His function was not to lay down the law, but to consult and arbitrate, to learn the consensus of opinion and to keep the unity of his people. [22]

In conclusion, the review of African pre-colonial political organizations enable us to argue that Africa had developed a system of government which in some cases were centralized and in other cases decentralized. What should be noted is the fact that these political organizations developed in conformity with the socio-cultural evolution environment and therefore seemed well adaped to the local peoples. As in modern Western society, a system of check and balance was developed to provide for a good governance.

However, the non-existence of women in the highest political institutions should be considered as a very negative. By far, these political institutions served African societies much better than the present political systems derived from those imposed on the societies for a period of one hundred years or so by European colonial powers. The problem is that not only these European powers imposed a system which did not take any consideration of the local culture but also altered the positive practices such as democracy , legitimacy, and people's souvereignity which have an universal application.

5-3 The Colonial Legacy and the Structural Sources of
    Ethnic Conflicts in Africa

A review of African pre-colonial political institutions shows us how the African peoples had organized their political society before the comming of European people.

However, all these societies and their political organizations were profoundly altered by the colonial penetration and the system of domination which they established. Therefore,

even if we conceive that many aspects should be considered in the manifestation of ethnic conflicts in Africa, it is commonly agreed that colonialism is the starting point of Africa conflict.

This is not to assert that colonialists are to blame in all the events which are happening in Africa. Certainly not. What we intend to say is that the application of colonial policies altered negatively the normal historical evolution of Africa traditional societies, and that these policies created in Africa a kind of situation in which the political, economic, social and cultural structures were brought to a near complete destruction and in consequence that we may say that Africa is living in a period of ˚civilisation crisis˝.

Thus, because this crisis is a consequence of contact with colonialism, we say without pretention that the legacy of colonialism constitutes main historical factors in the political instability and economic underdevelopment of modern African nations.

In this study, we can't examine all the aspects of colonial policies in Africa. Our thesis will be concentrated on some important aspects.

5-3-1 Legacy of Artificial Boundaries

In the large part, the root of ethnic problems in post independence Africa is easily traceable to the haphazard nature of the colonial division of the continent. [23]    At the 1884-1885 Berlin Conference held by the European powers to divide up their claims on protectorates in Africa, these powers created artificial political and social boundaries to avoid disputes among themselves without consideration of the different ethnic/tribal structures in Africa.    In some

instances, the boundaries drawn by the European powers cut through the tribal groups, leaving some of the people on one side and some on the other. [24] They marked out `spheres of interest'. Then each invaded the continent within its own `sphere'. [25]

## 5-3-2 Colonial Classification of African Societies

As we have seen in the preceding section, African precolonial political order was not rooted in notions of nationality as it was understood by European colonialist. The identity issues were not commonly translated into political ideologies, nor would rulers have dreamed of commissioning anthropologists to prepare ethnic maps of their domains. [26]

However, in the construction of its hegemony, the colonial state″ soon acquired a compulsion to classify. Particularly for the British and Belgians, administrative organization was rooted in a ″tribal″ image of Africa. As Patrick Harries remarks, ″Europeans implicitly believed their concept of ethnicity to be the natural order and not merely one convention amongst others used to make sense of the word. Caught within this mental structure, Europeans applied to Africans their own system of ethnic classification and accepted without question that Africans should use the same distinctions and concepts.″[27]

Thus, ethnic boundaries were territorialized, and often novel taxonomies acquired the weighty sanction of official texts and printed maps. Large states were dismantled to form units of convenient scale, in the name of freeing″ tribes″ held in thrall to tyrannical rulers.

In the extreme case, they created some new categories of identities which didn't exist in the pre-colonial period.

This occurred most frequently in areas under the British rule; as Apthorpe argues, ″certainly in Anglophone Africa(but with broader applicability), what happened were the tribes administratively created by the colonial regimes . [28]

In Zaire, the Belgians unconsciously entrenched ethnic stratification through the creation of territorial subdivisions (provinces); an accompanying strategy promoting inequality with respect to social mobility for different cultural groups; and the system of identity cards, which the Congolese were required to carry, listing the individual's ethnic group. [29]

Therefore, the colonialists sought to secure for each African group the right to maintain its identity, its individuality, its chosen form of government, and the peculiar political and social institutions which it had evolved over the years. This objective was made concrete in the administrative system of indirect rule. Even the French, although they ostensibly applied direct rule, used it.

Local administration, in its various forms, produced native authorities whose own standing was tied to the cultural categories through which domination was mediated. Uganda offers a particularly clear example of this dimension. [30]

By expanding and strengthening the precolonial traditional authorities this system ensured that a linguistic-cultural focus existed for ethnic identification. [31]

Over all, the radical reorganization of African political space into various forms of the ″territorial colonial state″ had a profound impact upon cultural self-definitions in the societies concerned. Policies pursued in the edification of

the colonial state dramatically altered the existing cultural geography, though this was not necessarily their conscious purpose. [32]

Local ethnic group identities were largely shaped by this historical experience, being marked by considerable fluidity and variability. [33]

In the political sphere, the creation of administrative units and boundaries at the local and regional levels emphasized cleavages between ethnic groups, intensifying the competition between them for the scarce goods of modernity. Noting that Nigeria's three-region structure was a colonial construction' established by British authorities, Larry Diamond goes on to remark:

This produced the peculiar coincidence of region and ethnicity observed during the final decade - one which reified the tripartite ethnic division, forged a volatile contradiction between the political power of the one and the socioeconomic pre-eminence of the other two, and fostered deep, reciprocal distrust and insecurity not only between the three major groups but between these and the numerous minority groups as well. [34]

In a similar way, the separate administration of the southern Sudan and the general disregard of its economic modernization created a dualism between North and South which had grave disintegrative implications in the post-independence period.

5-3-3 The Legacy of Colonial Policies of Economic and Social Development

The colonial economic policies were based on the exploitation of African law material, natural resources without taking any account of the economical development or integration between different ethnic groups and regions and the real needs of African peoples.

The locus of major urban centers, the routes chosen for major access to communication-road and rail -, the siting of major centers of cash employment, the establishment of public infrastructure and commercial centers were actively done in some regions whereas in other regions of the same colonial territory, nothing was done to facilitate their access to development. Also some ethnic groups because of their geographical position, became the producers of raw materials and natural products which in the modern economy introduced by colonial powers, were very much in need. So this fact gave the well located ethnic groups advantage which put them in strong position compared to other ethnic groups which are located in poor regions. [35]

For example we could indicate the production of cotton which was very well developed by the Baganda in Uganda, of coffee and cacao developed by all coastal ethnic groups like the (Agnis, Baoule, Fanti, Ashanti) of Ivory Coast and Ghana; and also the extration of mineral resource in Katanga and Kasai of Zaire puts the ethnic groups of these regions in superior position compared to neighboring groups whose the soil did not satisfied modern economic requirments. [36]

Educational opportunity interacted with location and migration. Ethnic groups located near schools or willing to migrate to such areas gained educational advantages. The siting of mission schools was not a wholly unplanned process, but it was often the result of ethnically random factors, such as the rivalries between Christian churches. The Baganda became the most highly educated people in Uganda, largely because mission schools were for a long time confined to the Kampala area, where the Baganda are located. [37]

These educated ethnic groups felt a kind of superiority complex to other ethnic groups.

The impact of modernization and social change on the crucial process of national integration during the colonial period was more volatile than assumed by the proponents of the "modernization theory." They argued that the melting-pot effect in a colonial-territorial setting would forge national-territorial identity among diverse ethnocultural groups.

But, this was not the case, because this educational headstart by the ethnic groups over other ethnic groups, coupled with the fact that much of the basic economic infrastructure (such as roads and the railway) was concentrated in only some regions, contributed in no small measure to perceptions of regional deprivation among some ethnic groups which in turn led to the political activation of their ethnoregional identity.

We think that when resources are controlled by one ethnic group or region the situation of economical pressure and ethnic conflict became confused. The interests and economic conflicts that are commonly called interest or class conflicts became strictly connected with these divisions and, as a result ethnic conflicts became more intense. The social groups which could seem to be like a social class is almost connected to one ethnic group or is fragmented by ethnic belonging feeling.

In fact, the impact of differential modernization actually fostered and galvanized ethnocultural nationalism at the subterritorial level. G-Balandier writes on Ghana that pluralism is not only social and cultural, it appear also in econimical aspect. This pluralism is manifested by the juxtaposition of a modern economy badly integrated and a

traditional economy. This lack of integration constitute a serious impact on development. Thus, because of this reality, the physical aspect of African nations is unintegrated and is a cause of aggresive diversities which do not develop an indispensable relation between regions. [38]

Given this thrust of colonial policy, it was not surprising that when nationalism began to develop in Africa, it took the form of separate ethnic nationalisms to a large extent. This deepening regionalism, and the manifest contradictions in the regional system constituted the most damaging legacy of the colonial rule.

From a global view point of African development, we have to say that the process of colonial education was not coordinated, because it first concerned only a few people and also each colonial power was only interested in an educational system which could provide the persons necessary to assist the reinforcement of colonial rule and administration. It was not an education system able to give to African, avaible human resource able to manage the modern necessity of society. This lack of proper knowledges was present in the administrative and political sphere.

Also it is difficult to see how the colonial economic practices could facilitate African development. This is so because colonial powers altered the African agricultural base of economy through the introduction of cash crop :cotton in Nigeria, cocao in Gold Coast( Ghana ), tea and coffee in Kenya and Uganda. The problem is that these pattern of colonial economies were, however, malintegrated. Heavy investments in the small export sector came at the expense of the underdeveloped and largely ignored indigenous economies in which most Africans operated. [39] The consequence was that at the end of colonial rule, the economy of most African states were still underdeveloped, with no local technology

and no self food sufficiency, because the labor forces were turned toward the production of these cash crops.

This type of economy created the actual situation of external dependence. This is so because by introducing these pattern of economy in Africa, colonialists also brought African territories into the world economy and then systematically subordinated them to the need of the industrialized north. This means that the African economy could work only if the European countries are in need of their product or to buy it at a price favorable to them.

Thus, despite their political independence, this economic external dependence of African states has created a situation of state inability to satisfay the mass demand and economic competition based on the polics of identity.

## 5-3-4 Missionary Language Policy

The impact of the Christian missions also deserves mention in considering the impact of classifications. While not directly a part of the state domain, at the early and middle stages of the colonial era the missions were virtual auxiliaries of the state.

Within a given colonial territory, on both the Catholic and Protestant sides of the great religious divide, there was a territorial partition by congregation. While subject to some overall state regulation, especially after the 1920s, the mission congregations had a broad autonomy of choice in their educational philosophies as well as languages strategies, both of which were to have important impact upon the subsequent configurations of cultural pluralism . [40]

Missionaries thus set themselves to the task of identifying, classifying, and reducing to writing, selected African languages. On the basis of the most slender knowledge, resource-maximizing choices were necessary, to identify a language which ideally could serve throughout the territorial domain of the congregation. [41] Thus, in the local population, missionaries of identity then emerged to carry the message back to the rural hinterland, a dynamic vividly captured by Abernethy:

What was the best course of action open to the urban migrant who was acutely concerned lest his ethnic group fall behind others in the struggle for wealth, power and status? Certainly the rural masses had to be informed of the problem. If the masses were not aware of their ethnicity, then they would have to learn who they really were through the efforts of 'ethnic missionaries" returning to the homeland. These 'missionaries" would also have to outline a strategy by which the ethnic group, once fully conscious of its unity and its potential, could compete with its rivals... the gospel of ethnicity and the gospel of education were thus mutually reinforcing. Educational schemes sponsored by the tribal unions fostered ethnic consciousness in the rural areas; a heightened sense of ethnicity, in turn, facilitated the spread of education. [42]

Among the Bakongo of the lower Congo basin a cultural identity had been constructed by indigenous intellectuals in alliance with missionaries. It was reinforced by the creation of a standardized written language and expressed through historical works on the Bakongo. Subsequently the Bakongo were a major unit in the political conflicts of the independence era. [43]

## 5-3-5 Urbanization Policy

Ethnicity as an active sociopolitical force was first noticed in the 1950s, above all as an urban phenomenon, in seminar monographs by Paul Mercier, Immanuel Wallerstein, and several scholars associated with the Rhodes-Livingstone

Institute in Zambia. [44]   Solidarities defined by ethnicity could serve as a veritable lifeline in surmounting the survival challenges of urban existence -employment, housing, schooling, assistance in life crises (sickness, death).

Solidarity became more efficacious when organized and led. Particularly in the last stage of colonial rule, ethnic associations proliferated giving organizational expression to new identities.   Political entrepreneurs and cultural brokers found leadership niches in this associational web, and they became articulate spokesmen for ethnicity, however recently constructed. [45]

There was development of new ethnic consciousness in the experiences of rural people in industrial workplaces.   As members of various cultural groups left their isolated rural areas and interacted with each other in industrial or urban localities, they formed stereotypes of themselves and others, and these stereotypes effectively highlighted and strengthened culturally defined distinctions amongst peoples. The tendency of employers to prefer certain ethnic groups for certain types of work and their conscious manipulation of ethnic differences to keep the workforce disunited resulted in competition between ethnic groups being built into the hierarchically structured workforce.   In this view, ethnicity was a recent phenomenon of the modern urban workplace in which boundaries and distinctions between people had been built up.   It was not a phenomenon of the rural areas, where people were assumed to live in accordance with prescriptive patterns derived from a `traditional' past and where they were largely isolated from peoples of differing cultures.

In Congo (Zaire) ethnicity was not encouraged by the Belgians because of the imperatives of political control. Nonetheless, with increasing urbanization during the colonial period, ethnically based organizations developed to support

mechanisms vis-a-vis other ethnic groups.   These institutions were tolerated as long as they presented no threat to public order. [46]

Ethnic polarization and mutual suspicion occurred with the urbanization and the resulting competition for social, economic, and political status.   Belgian positive and negative stereotypes of various cultural groups became embedded in the popular consciousness and further fostered divisions. [47]   The Luba in Kasai, for example, had been viewed by the early European explorers as superior to other groups based on their willingness to adapt to new ideas. This positive image gave the Luba a high status in the colonial framework relative to other ethnic groups, as they soon occupied lower level administrative posts in many of the Congo's largest cities.   Other groups viewed them with hostility, condemning what was viewed as aggressiveness and opportunism.   It is therefore not suprising that both preindependence political mobilization and the Congo Crisis had important ethnic dimensions.   Rivalries long held in check by the colonial administration were unleashed with the departure of the Belgians, and ethnicity became highly politicized.

As a consequence, we may assert that ethnicity in urban center was a reaction to a colonial policy of social economic and cultural discrimination.  So, ethnicity emerged not because white people simply put different ethnic groups together in the same work place but, gave them a different treatment based on ethnic criteria.  It is through this discriminatory practice that urban African people came to realize the interest of group solidarity and created many ethnic associations not only because of the need of a community life but also a need to face the urban realities.

Thus, if racial discrimination between white and black produced a racial conflict, ethnic stereotypes or tensions were indeed largely produced in work places.

In conclusion, we may assert that when we try to understand the phenomena of ethnicity in Africa, the colonial policies should first be considered.

This position is also maintained by Ali Mazrui who argues that the root cause of African conflicts stemmed, to a large extent, from European colonialism, stating that the experience of European colonialism by Africans still affects almost all aspects of African life today. [48]

Viewing from these standpoints, we think that the Berlin Conference of 1884-85 brought the structural basis of conflict in Africa just as the Versailles Conference of 1919 set up the basis of the Second World War, because , as the consequence of their policy of divide and rule, they created the structural and psychological conditions favorable to conflict development.

The only difference is that the Versailles Conference was for a just cause, " the reinstauration of world peace." Instead, the Berlin conference used a false excuse of humanitarian action " mission de civilization" to the destruction of peaceful order in Africa.

5-4 Nation-States Building and the Ethno-politicization of African Society

African decolonization process was symbolised by the victory of nationalist political leaders. As we have noted in chapter 4, their political project was to build states in Africa based on the European model. But, if in Europe nation states are the product of natural socio-economic development , in Africa they are simply the product of colonial creation , which presents two general features.

The first feature of these newly created African nation states is that there is not a congruence between the state and the nation by the simple fact that most of these states are composed of many historical nations. Thus, a fundamental problem of national consolidation is found in the need to bring nation and state into coincidence. [49]

The second feature of these newly created African nation states is that African leaders received a structure of control but lacked a power base on which they could effectively establish priorities and pursue policies. The lack of large power base, the persistence of ethnic loyality, the weakness of economy and the high expection of people made them find the best means of control and legitimacy in centralisation.

The third feature of the most African states was the integration in socio-economic aspect as a consequence of the colonial policy of development. In most of these countries, the contrast was a regional and also an ethnic one.

Thus, the first few years of independence were accompanied by systematic efforts on the part of the new state leaders to overcome the contraints of the colonial legacy by reorganizing public institutions and by concentrating power at the political center. [50]

To understand well this situation, we intend to examine some of the practices initiated by most African states in their process of nation states building and demonstrate their role in the rise of ethnicity and ethnic conflicts in Africa.

5-4-1 The Centralization of State Institutions

The African rulers, anxious to realize the objective of national integration and modernization, came to realize that it was necessary for them to reinforce and control the state apparatus, because without this condition, it would be difficult to implement the project of new society they have in mind.

For that reason, they looked upon the centralized state as a solution to the many economic and social problems confronting them. [51]　Such preferences led them to facilitate the growth of such institutions of control as the executive, civil service, military, police and governing party, and to inhibit others that appeared to limit their capacity for action: federalism, multi-party elections, bicameral legislatures, complex franchise arrangements intended to protect minority ethnic or regional interests, and various legal and constitutional safeguards. [52]

① Presidentialism

The outstanding institutional feature of these interventionist states remains the prevalence of what has been described as `presidentialism'. Basicaly the phenomenon of presidentialism involves the centralization of state power in the hands of president and his office.
In this process of power consolidation, all the opposition party and any other power center are eliminated. [53]

② One Party System

The theory and practice of one party system is perhaps the best reflection of post independence African political system. Built on the exclusive principle of the colonial state, and on the experience of the Maxist-Leninist states like the Soviet Union and China, this system has been hardly defended by the African leaders.

The principe of mono-partism means that all the political parties should be integrated in one main party which will transcend all the ethnic conscienceness by building a common ideological background.

Thus, in Ghana for example the Nkrumah government reduced the regional (middle) tiers of government to a purely advisory position. It would be wasteful, cumbersome and altoghther unsound administratively(argued government spokesmen) to have in the proposed local government structure another tier, in the form of Regional Assemblies. There would be exercised powers and functions which have normally been exercised by local authorities. This would mean taking a retrograde step and departing from the principle which the Govenment has always observed of permitting Local Authorities to develop more and more into responsible bodies with extensive functions. [54] See table 5.1 for a detailled study.

## Independence, Presidentialism and One Party System

|  | Years of Independence | Years of Presidentialism | Yeas of Mono-partism |
|---|---|---|---|
| Cameroon. . . . . | January 1960 | September 1961 | July 1962 |
| Congo. . . . . . . . . | August 1960 | March 1961 | Jul 1962, Apr 63 |
| Ivory Coast. . . . | August 1960 | November 1960 | Since 1957 |
| Dahomey. . . . . . . | August 1960 | November 1960 | April 1961 |
| Gabon. . . . . . . . . | August 1960 | February 1961 | bipartisme |
| Guinea. . . . . . . . | September 1958 | November 1958 | September 1958 |
| Burkina Faso. . . | August 1960 | November 1960 | Junuary 1960 |
| Madagascar. . . . . | June 1960 | June 1962 | Multi-partism |
| Mali. . . . . . . . . . | June 1960 | September 1960 | March 1959 |
| Mauritania. . . . . | November 1960 | May 1961 | December 1961 |
| Niger. . . . . . . . . | August 1960 | November 1960 | Octorber 1959 |
| Central Africa Republic | August 1960 | July 1961 | November 1962 |
| Senegal. . . . . . . . | June 1960 | March 1963 | June 1966 |
| Tchad. . . . . . . . . | August 1960 | April 1962 | Junuary 1962 |
| Togo. . . . . . . . . . | April 1960 | April 1961 | Junuary 1962 |

Why were these practices adopted by most post-colonial African states? Two reasons may explain this logic. The first reason is the existence of diverse political center in each region which the ruler have considered as a danger to national integration, which shoud be eliminated in order to reinforce the state and build a new national identity.

Kwame Nkrumah defended the move to one-party rule by suggesting that the multi-party system was divisive and antithetical to the needs of economic development and national integration. [55]

To most African nationalist leaders, priority in new nations is to forge national unity. Tribal and sectional divisions stand in the way of unification. With more than one party, political organizations tend to reflect religious,

tribal or sectional divisions. But with a national movement identified with the nation as a whole, such opportunities for tribal grouping are eliminated. [56]

In Tanzania, Julius Nyerere saw the one-party concept as essentially democratic and reflective of African cultural attitudes and communal practices which favour decision by consensus. It is not African to organize society in such a way that one side exists to oppose another: instead, all participate in decision-making. [57]

Competitive parties were perhaps legitimate in class-ridden Western industrial societies, but Africa, ran the argument, did not have such social divisions. Thus, lacking any sociologically valid reason for existence, opposition parties inevitably fostered and exacerbated illegitimate lines of division: those rooted in religion or ethnicity. [58]

It has also been argued that in nation building, an essential factor is communication between the people and the government. This must be two-way traffic, from the people to the government, and from the government to the people. The only machinery that can achieve this satisfactorily is a national movement wholly identified with the people and the government. Hence the need for a one-party state. Through the machinery of the party, the government can pass its policies to the people, and the people can convey back their reactions to these policies. [59]

③ Constitutional Reform

In countries where presidentialism and mono-partism have not been established, constitutional reform has been used by the ruling elite in order to reinforce the state control on civil society.

In his process of total hegemony, the modern African states, not only inherited the bad behaviours of colonial states practices but also they rejected the fragile institutions of a constitutional democratic order hastily erected in the final days of the colonial. Indeed, the very notion of constitutionalism was soon rule abandoned. Mamadou Diouf provides a suggestive explanation:

The African constitutions imported from London, Paris or Washington became inverted versions of those after which they were modelled. The historical logic which led to the appearance of constitutionalism in Europe is a logic of resistance by civil society, the dominated vis-a-vis the dominators. The constitution serves to limit the power of the state and guarantee the liberty of the citizen. In Africa it served to guarantee the authority of the state and the uncontrollable and uncontrolled exercise of power by the occupants of the state apparatus. And for this reason the constitution undergoes constant modifications. The legislative armature, the structures which are supposed to be the expression of civil society, is constantly subjected to the assaults of networks of kinship and clientele, accentuating the tradition of the subordination to the state which the colonial system inaugurated. [60]

These political practices of African states aliened the true meaning of political competition and hindered the development of democratic institutions.

This dynamics is reinforced by competition for political power. Within the same ruling class it is often difficult for an opposition political party to justify its separate existence from the ruling party on the basis of appeals to socio-economic programs. Nevertheless, it must justify its separate existence on the basis of some important and viable indicator. Ethnicity provides one of the most convenient and appealing of such criteria. Political constituencies are often geographical in nature and quite often ethnically homogeneous, and therefore to win the support of an ethnic group is to win a political constituency. Such parliamentary candidates tend to become entrenched because of the political

gains likely to accrue to them from appeals to ethnic sentiments, and their presence acts to perpetuate ethnicity because they continually fan the members of ethnic identification. [61]

5-4-2  State Domination over Administrative Institutions

In their effort to strengthen the state , political leaders came to realize the importance of the administrative apparatus. They saw that the control of this apparatus could give them the possibility to realize their modernization project without any opposition. In these circumstances, rulers sought not to undermine the administrative infrastructure but to remold these functional bodies to what would promote their interests. [62]

Therefore, they came to use all the means in order to control the access and promotion in the public service. The party which controlled the government began to use it influence to give access and promotion to keep administrative post to his members.

As the result of this practice, the state administration became an object of competition between politicians or different political parties. By having installed a system of domination over administrative institution, African states had created a favorable conditions for conflit development as the colonial powers have done. This is so because the private economic sector is very weak in the African states.

Therefore, in their struggle for wealth and power these leaders build a system of preferences based on ethnic groups [63]. In-group-out-group boundaries are created around these parochial communities which serve to exclude others from enjoying the privileges of the society. Thus members of an

ethnic group believe that members of other groups would discriminate against them in the competition for resources, that they can expect preferences only from members of their own group in a position to help them, that it is in their interest to promote the activities of their own group in competition with others, and that none of the other groups would give them preference over their own people. As a result anyone who finds himself or herself outside the system of ethnic preference is lost. [64]

5-4-3 State Hegemony over Economic Activities

A more basic and long-term cause of conflict has been the catastrophic economic performance of many African countries. In 1992 Boutros Boutros Ghali, Secretary-General of the UN, stated as the deepest causes of conflict: `economic despair, social injustice and political oppression'. [65]

Contrary to the prospect of economic development which had been advanced by the modernist theories, African economy progress have been very negative.

The World Bank noted that in the 1970s output per person grew more slowly in Africa than in any other regions. Seven countries in Africa had negative growth in their GNP, and eight more had negative per capita rates of growth. In Sub-Saharan Africa the per capita growth rate in food production dropped by 1 per cent per annum, while the population rose by 2.7 per cent per annum. [66]

Many reasons explain this poor performance. But the most important is the policies of development adopted by these countries that is, the phenomenal parastatalization of the economy! Zambia had 134 parastatal enterprises by 1970, the Ivory Coast nearly a hundred by the late 1970s, Nigeria

approximately 250 by 1973; Zaire by 1975 had vested most of its economy in public enterprises. [67]  The ubiquity of the parastatal led Sudanese African Development Bank economist Lual Deng to characterize the African state as a `policed economy," with comprehensive administrative rationing as its most salient(and negative) feature. [68]

By 1980 public-sector employment accounted for 50 to 55 percent of all nonagricultural jobs, compared to 36 percent in Asia, 27 percent in Latin America, and 24 percent in the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development Countries. [69]

State expenditure levels, as fractions of GDP, also rose inexorably, until forced into retreat by structural adjustment programs in the 1980s.  In 1967 the average fraction of GDP consumed by the African state was less than 15 percent. [70]  By 1982 it was more than 30 percent in several countries.

But many of these parastatal enterprises failure for different reasons like: the mismanagement because, instead of being managed by a qualified staff, they were in the hand of party bureaucrats who, not only didn't have any management knowleges, but were more interested in their personal enrichment through use of public fund.

As a result of this economic failure, poverty and unemployement came to raise desparately. As this happened, members of an ethnic group tended to look more and more toward their group for support. The consequent intragroup cohesion acted to further separate it from the other ethnic groups. Its members began to develop common experiences in relation to others and, therefore, a common history, tradition, and set of interests. Under the circumstance, further conflicts of interest increased their social distance

in economic and security considerations as well as in ideology. If ethnic group lines coincided with regional geographical boundaries, the resultant territorial cohesion acted to convert ethnic group boundaries into cultural, economic, and, as a prelude to secession, military barriers.

At the same time, this poverty augmented the elite competition for resource control. Ted Gurr writes that conflict in Africa is often a fight for shares of a shrinking pie of economic resources, protecting patterns of distribution and control: `the extraordinary privileges of most African rulers and bureaucrats and their use of state power for private gain would be regarded as prima facie evidence of illegitimacy and a potent incentive for political changes'. In practice, he notes, resentment seems confined largely to the less-advantaged members of the elite. The well-educated and vocal segments of the elite become impatient when denied greater political access. [71]

In Sierra Leone, as the table 5.2 indicates, both class formation and the relative deprivation of the north were thus instrumental in the political activation of northern ethnoregional identity.

Table 5.2 Ethnic Composition of Sierra Leone's Cabinets
(1962-86)

| Ethnic Group | 1962 | 1964 | 1973 | 1986 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Mende | 7 | 6 | 3 | 3 |
| Temne | 4 | 2 | 10 | 9 |
| Limba | – | – | 2 | 1 |
| Sherbro | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| Koranko | – | – | 1 | 1 |
| Creole | 5 | 4 | 5 | 3 |
| Others | 1 | 1 | 2 | 2 |
| TOTALS | 18 | 14 | 24 | 20 |

Sources: West Africa, June 9, 1962, p. 625; West Africa, May 9, 1964, p. 513; West Africa, May 28, 1973, p. 717; West Africa, June 16, 1986, p. 1249.

The ethnicization of party competition (i.e. before the declaration of a one-party state in 1978) and cabinet appointments heightened the stakes involved in competition between ethnic groups. It also created vast opportunities, especially on the part of the group in power, for patronage as both a source of material wealth and a mechanism of political control. Cabinet posts became rewards to ethnic clients and supporters, carrots to political opponents and a means of neutralizing potentially resistive ethnic communities. As Carew Notes:

Each time a high office goes to someone in the community his or her tribesmen jubilate openly, culminating finally in a delegation to the Head of State to thank him for the appointment of their son or daughter to the high office. All top statal as well as parastatals are treated in this way. [72]

Again, ethnicity, like religion, was an available tool employed to whip up support, antagonism, suspicion and emotions in the struggle to win access to the state and

preside over the collection and allocation of scarce resources. As Eme Ekekwe points out:

It is in the competition for control of and/or access to the state that a... component of the ideology of development comes in. This component is ethnicity. Conflict between ethnic groups can be manifestations of class struggles and competitions. In the Nigerian situation this appears to have been the case; explanations of ethnic conflict there would be imcomplete without references to the class situation. As Amilcar Cabral pointed out, it is usually those persons who are detribalized and well off -such as those who comprise the governing class -who resort to an appeal to ethnicity. There exists a certain dialectic between ethnicity and class that has to be appreciated in the search to understand politics in many post-colonial societies. [73]

In conclusion we may say that ethnic conflicts in post-colonial Africa were not the product of mass irrationaliy. The real reasons are to be found in the competition of power that the undemocratic process of nation states building had created.

The African rulers have, instead of taking account of their socio-historic and cultural specificity, preferred to adopt the model of nation state building as it was applied in Europe and also act in the same way as the colonial states without any respect of democratic principles and consideration of minority groups rights and interests. It is for that purpose that ethnicity in the post-colonial African society was politicized. The political position of each group came to condition their socio-economic situation. In this condition where the winner takes all and the loser completly excluded, it is difficult to speak about peace and stability.

However, by considering the fact that the state , as the first distributor of wealth and status, is not free from the group to group competition, the objective of the political leaders and the elites becomes the absolute protection of their class interest through the control of state apparatus.

5-5 The International Factors

After having considered the colonial and national factors, we intend in this section to analyze the international factors. Our assumption is that like the preceding factors, international factors have contributed directly or indirectly to the rise of ethnic conflicts in Africa.

Colonialism, by its very nature, has put African states in the world system at the limit that, despite their independence, these states have to maintain contact with this world system because their subsistances were conditioned to this system. However, being new and weak in this world system, they came to be victimized by the political, economic and military order established by the great powers which in turn seriously undermined the African stability.

To make a clear separation between the domestic environment and the external circumstance would be most unrealistic in these circumstances. The contemporary world of which African states are a part is a much smaller world, neatly linked by strongly interlocking economic, political and military forces which find Africa's leaky roofs useful to their goals.

5-5-1 International Economic Order

The role and place of African states in the international economic order have undermined the socio-economic development of these states by the simple fact that they are subordinated

to the satifaction of Western economies from different aspects.

① Infavorable Terms of Trade

The world economic environment has been hostile to Africa. For most of the 1970s and the 1980s there was a general decline in world prices of most of the primary products which African countries export for foreign exchange. Collapsed export prices cost African states a loss of $19 billion in 1986. [74] For this reason, the constant rise in the prices of manufactured goods which African states purchase from the more industrialized nations created for them huge trade deficits.

The first shock was the collapse of the price of coffee. In Rwanda, coffee is a smallholder crop, cultivated by middle-ranking farmers. In September 1989, virtually overnight, Rwandese farmers saw their income from growing coffee cut in half. The government suffered too -the crop accounted for over seventy-five per cent of Rwanda's export earnings. There was a further fall in the coffee price, and a large reduction in coffee production in 1992. [75]

A look at Ghana economic situation may give us a clear picture. From 70's to the early 1980s, see table 5.3, inflation was running at three digits, the balance of payments was very unfavourable, cocoa and other export revenues were at their lowest point, and unemployment and underemployment were high.

This decline can be attributed to both internal and external factors. Unfavourable terms of trade and unfavourable weather conditions, especially the drought of the late 1970s and early 1980s, were among the causes. Ghana's economy is fragile, too dependent on a few primary

exports, especially cocoa and timber. Unstable commondity prices on the international market make unreliable these sources of earnings. [76]

Table 5.3 Ghana, basic indicators of economic performance, 1960-88

| | Average | annual growth | rates |
|---|---|---|---|
| | 1967-70 | 1970-82 | 1986-8 |
| Gross domestic product | 2.2 | -0.5 | 5.4 |
| Gross domestic investment | -3.1 | -5.1 | 16.9 |
| exports | 0.1 | -4.7 | 4.7 |
| Imports | -1.5 | -4.8 | 10.5 |
| Terms of trade | 1.1 | 0.2 | - |
| Total agriculture (volume) | 2.6 | -0.2 | 1.9 |
| Food production | 2.6 | -0.2 | - |
| Population | 2.3 | 3.0 | - |
| Labour force | 1.6 | 2.3 | - |

Source: World Bank, Toward Sustained Development in Sub-Saharan Africa (Statistics Annex), Washington, 1984; GSS, Quarterly Digest of Satistics, Accra, March 1989.

② The Debt Problem

As the consequence of economic decline, African states were forced to borrow externally to meet their basic foreign exchange needs. Heavy external borrowing at high interest rates created debt problems such that the debt service ratios (the relationship between debt payments due and exports of goods and services) of African states have worsened since the 1970s, ranging from thirty percent to eighty percent or more in some countries. In 1988, debt servicing payments consumed two-fifths of Africa's export earnings. [77] By 1989 the continent faced a $240 billion foreign debt crisis.

Many of the new loans have merely gone into servicing debts and not into new investments or the rehabilitation of the economy.

Another adverse impact of the debt crisis in Africa is the fact that when a debtor country accumulates arrears and/or announces intention to reschedule its debt, the flow of new resources declines due to erosion of the country's creditworthiness. The erosion in credit worthiness also leads to higher costs of borrowing, both explicit and implicit. Higher implicit costs are reflected, for example in higher margins on imports and in more stringent conditions for import payments. The decline in new inflows, particularly private inflows, has forced many debtor African countries to adopt contractionary measures in order to generate surpluses to meet debt-service payments. These measures... have not only reduced economic activity but have also resulted in quite heavy social costs. [78]

③ Foreign- Imposed Structural Adjustment Program (SAP) and Their Effects

Because of the sustained economic crisis in the past two decades (1970s and 1980s), the vast majority of African states turned to the leading international financial institutions such as the International Monetary Fund(IMF) and th World Bank(IBRD) for balance of payments assistance. The cost of such assistance was invariably the adoption of a structural adjustment program in accordance with IMF/World Bank conditionality which reshaped the economic policies of recipients. Such IMF/World Bank conditionality as currency devaluation, according to IMF officials, ˚to promote exports,″ increase in prices paid to farmers, again, according to IMF authorities, ˚to promote food self-sufficiency,″ reduction in food and gasoline subsidies and in general, government spending, privatization of parastatals, for example caused additional economic hardships, such as higher unemployment rates, and food riots in those states implementing them. Because of these and the clear danger of

being ousted from office several African governments were unwilling or very reluctant to accept the IMF/World Bank requirements. Such governments frequently had little if any other options because they found that, increasingly, the acceptance of IMF/World Bank requirements had bacome a precondition for obtaining other forms of foreign assistance available to African countries. [79]

The effects of structural adjustment programs are a subject of considerable controversy. IMF/World Bank analysts report that as a result of IMF/World Bank induced economic reforms and adjustment programs, African economies began to show improvement by 1985; that the economic performance of countries with strong adjustment programs was better than that of countries with weak or no programs. They cited Ghana, Ivory Coast, and Zaire as examples of nations which, having adopted the IMF prescriptions could point by 1985 to improvements in overall economic performance. [80] Furthermore, they noted that by 1989 over thirty African countries were participating in IMF/World Bank reform programs.

A contrary view is held by the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa. The Commission stresses that the overall economic situation in Africa since the 1970s has deteriorated continuously because economic restructuring was severely restricted by external constraints, that is, IMF/World Bank conditionality; that during the period 1980-1987, the performance of sub-Saharan African states with strong structural adjustment programs was worse than that of those with weak or no programs; that improvements made in health care, education, and infrastructure during the 1960s became increasingly at risk; and finally, that structural adjustment programs not only ignore the human dimension, but also tend to squeeze many out of the middle class and to worsen the wellbeing of the poor and the vulnerable. [81]

Africa's finance ministers share these views of the UN Economic Commission for Africa. In addition, there is statistical evidence to show that by 1985 and the years there after African nations still suffered from net capital outflows as a result of extraneous factors that affected their economies and which were totally beyond their control. The IMF/World Bank prescriptions did not address such adverse extraneous factors as the deteriorating terms of trade and the consequent reduction in export earnings for debt servicing, extraordinary rise in interest rates, sharp currency exchange fluctuations, and the reduction in the flow of concessional resources. [82]

In Rwanda by the late 1980s, the combination of economic retrenchment by the government, and the prospects of structural adjustment" imposed by the Western donors, meant that the opportunities for obtaining employment in the bureaucracy were dwindling.

Civil War coincided precisely with economic shock therapy administered under the auspices of the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. From 1988, international financial specialists began to dictate Rwanda's economic policy, on the basis of their economic simulations." Negotiations for an austerity program were completed in September 1990, and a drastic devaluation was imposed in November. A second devaluation followed in June 1992. [83]

In all respects, therefore, the structural adjustment programme helped fuel political unrest and tension. As one commentator has noted:

No sensitivity or concern was expressed [by the IMF or World Bank] as to the likely political and social repercussions of economic shock therapy to a country on the brink of civil war. The World Bank team consciously excluded the 'non-economic variables' from their 'simulations.' [84]

The African economic crisis holds major implications for the potency of ethnicity and the subversion of the goals of nationhood. So far, structural adjustment in Africa has failed to strengthen the state, promote productivity, stem waste and corruption, and structurally redefine the location and role of the region in an increasingly complex and hostile international division of labour. The point is that the poor majority have no option but to find solace, support and security in ethnic or communal associations where the state has woefully failed. Such conditions where loyalty and support for the state are mediated by loyalty to and support for ethnic associations, clubs and other interests mean that the questions of patriotism, nationalism, sacrifice and unity become secondary. This is the situation in virtually every African state today. While the resurgence of ethnicity and nationalism in eastern Europe resulted from the release of previously suppressed political pressures under communist regimes, in Africa the resurgence and importance of ethnicity is the direct precipitation of the historical inability of the state, its custodians and agencies to provide house, service, leadership and sense of community to the vast majority of her people. It is therefore a reaction to the failure of the state to be relevant in the struggles of the people to reproduce themselves.

5-5-2 International Political Factors

Just as the one that preceded it, the contemporary international political order exacerbates security issues for African states.

Because of the East -West ideological competition and the desire of the former imperial powers to maintain neocolonial relations with African states, African issues are seldom seen

in their essential African character but rather through the prism of cold war ideology.

In particular, for their own security needs, the United States and its major Western European allies, who had ruled Africa, continue to assume that Africa is, and should remain, part of the Western European sphere of influence. The Soviet bloc powers, on the other hand, refused to acquiesce to this assumption and the implied monopoly of Africa by the West. Hence, willy nilly, Africa became an arena of the East-West ideological and hegemonic rivalry, and is therefore affected by its consequences. [85]

Another reason of foreign intervention in African internal conflict is that great powers' military development has installed a kind of balance of terror which can't let them initiate any international conflict in Europe because of the high risks of mutual destruction. This point is elucidated by Pierre, who asserts that:

In a world in which the major powers are less likely to intervene with their own armed forces to protect their interests, they are more prone to share up friendly states through the provision of arms or to play out their proxies. As the risk of a direct nuclear confrontation between the great powers forces them to shift their competition to presumably safer ground, developments in the Third World are of ever greater import... Arm sales are instruments of diplomacy as well as security. [86]

What we may note is that foreign actors had initially helped to widen state -society gaps in Africa when their aid encouraged particular regimes to believe that, because of foreign backing, they were capable of imposing their will on society. The governments of Angola, Mozambique, and Ethiopia received massive Soviet military assistance which they used to wage war against their internal opponents. The regimes in all of these countries consequently had reason to believe that they had a superpower on their side and could proceed against the internal opposition with impunity. [87]

The international factor could also work on the other side of the state-society equation, strengthening resistance forces so that they could take full advantage of the weakness of the regimes they were fighting. [88]

Table 5.4, which identifies sources of military aid, gives some idea of the number of foreign actors that became involved. Sources of aid, including training, weapons, beases, and non-lethal equipment, have been listed only when their role is fairly well established, and there were no doubt instances of covert foreign involvement that are not listed here. [89]

Table 5.4
Military Aid in Afflicted Countries

|  | government | |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Mozambique | Soviet Union, Zimbabwe, Tanzania, Malawi, France, Britain | South Africa, private western groups |
| Namibia |  | Soviet Union, other Soviet bloc, Angola, Zambia |
| Rwanda | France, Belgium, Zaire | Resistance used Ugandan arms, Ugandan complicity uncertain |
| Somalia | United States, Libya, France, Italy, China | Ethiopia |
| Sudan | U.S., West European countries through 1985, Libya after; China, Iraq; other Arab States, Iran | Ethiopia before 1991; Libya before 1986 |
| Uganda | Britain, Tanzania, other Commonwealth, N. Korea, Egypt before NRA takeover; Britain afterward | Libya |
| Western Sahara | United states, France, china | Algeria |
|  |  |  |
|  |  |  |
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*Sources:* U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, *World military Expenditures and Arms Transfers,* 1989 eds., as well as media reports.

* military aid consists of troops or advisers, training, transport, equipment, or other arms aid or transfers.

Military assistance was the form of involvement that directly helped resistance forces to wage war and governments to defend themselves; the findings in Table 5.3 make it clear that there was a remarkable range of sources for such aid. In part, this was another sign of Africa's weakness and underdevelopment. In part too, the range of actors listed in Table 5.3 testifies to the fact that many did have motives strong enough to propel them toward involvement in Africa's conflicts despite the unpromising prospects for success. [90]

As a consequence, Pierre notes, that in the case of Africa, the trend has been "towards escalating military expenditures on arms, accounting for more of the GNP on defence than even Latin America". And he could see the trend leading to increasing the potential for armed conflict taking the form of civil wars-jockeying for power particularly among ethnic groups, military coups as a means of transferring power and regional clashes between sovereign states resulting from irredentist claims[91]

In sum, we can state the interconnection between the internal situation of which internal conflict is a predominant aspect, and the external environment shown in the immediately preceding paragraphs, in the following way: because African states' political systems are internally incoherent and because aspects of their internal form are projections of the external environment, they are easily manipulated from outside.

Thus, an adequate solution to the ethnic problem must, therefore, come to grips with individual and group insecurity and the international aspects which directly or indirectly influence the manifestation or evolution of ethnic conflicts in post-colonial Africa.

Footnotes                              Chapter 5

1. For a long time, some European philosophers have conceived
   African peoples without any civilization; for a proper
   understanding of African contribution to universal civili-
   zation see, Cheikh Anta Diop, Civilization or Barbarism:
   An Authentic Anthropology (Paris:Presence Africaine, 1981),
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2. M. Fortes and E. E. Evans-P. (eds), Africa Political Systems,
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7. A. E. Radcliffe-in M. Fortes and E. E. Evans(eds), op. cit., p. XIV.

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10. Ibid.

11. Georges B. N, Ayittey (ed) Africa Betrayed, (New York:St Mar-
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16. Georges B. N, Ayittey op. cit., p. 38.

17. Ibid., pp. 38-39.

18. New Africa, a privetly-owned monthly in London, Dec, 1988,
    p. 11.

19. Ali Mazrui, (ed) The African, (London:BBC Publication, 1986),
    p. 75.

20. Quoted in Festus. Ugboaja, op. cit., pp. 101-102.

21. F. U. Ohaegbulam, (ed) Nationalism in Colonial and Post-Colo-
    nial Africa, (Washington:Univ. Press of America, 1977), p. 13.

22. Oginga Odinga, quoted in Christian P. Potholm, op. cit., p. 26.

23. We consider the colonial balkanization and a consequent
    lak of coincidence between the nation and the state as an
    important factor of conflict in Africa; see for instance,
    J. Isawa Elaigwu and Ali A. Mazrui, "Nation-building and
    changing political structures" in General History of
    Africa. VIII:Africa since 1935, Ali A. Mazrui and C. Wondji

(eds), (UNESCO, 1993), p. 435.

24. What should be noted is the fact that the fate of African nation was decided by during the Berlin Conference in 1884-85 by Colonialists who didn't have any knwoleges of of traditional African state systems. See for instance Jean Jolly, Histire du Continent Africain(des origines a nos jours) (Paris:L'Harmattan, 1989), p. 29.

25. The commonly held view by African peoples is that Africa was divided like a cake for the interests of Europe.

26. Crawford Young, The African Colonial State in Comparative Perspective, (USA:Yale University Press, 1994), p. 232.

27. Patrick Harries, "Exclusion,Classification, and Internal Colonialism:The Emergence of Ethnicity among the Tsonga-Speakers of South Africa," in Leroy Vail, (ed), The Creation of Tribalism in Southern Africa(Berkeley:University of California Press, 1989), p. 90.

28. Raymond Apthorpe, "Does Tribalism Really Matter?"Transition 7(1968):18.

29. Winsome J.Leslie, Zaire:Continuity and Political Change in an Oppressive State(USA:Westview Press, 1993), p. 69.

30. Crawford Young, op. cit., p. 234.

31. For Detail, see Nelson Kasfir, The Shrinking Political Arena :Participation and Ethnicity in African Politics,with a Case Study of Uganda(Berkeley:University of California Press, 1975).

32. Being without any knowledge of African pre-colonial state system, the Europeans sought that their were building the

fondation of nations in Africa.

33. Many African peoples conceive that the actual ethnic identity is a colonial creation. See for instance V. Y. Mudimbe. The Invention of Africa: Gnosis, Philosophy, and the Order of Knowledge, (Indiana Univ Press, 1988).

34. Larry Diamond, Class, Ethnicity and Democratie in Nigeria: The Failure of the First Republic, (London Syracuse Univ Press, 1988), pp. 23-25.

35. Lancine Sylla. Tribalisme et Parti Unique en Afrique, (Universite Nationale de Cote D'Ivoire, Presse de la Fonda-tion Nationale des Sciences Politiques. 1977), p. 91.

36. Ibid. See also M. Tamarkin, "Nationalism and Nation-Building in Black Africa:Faterul Connections", Canadian Review of Studies in Nationalism, XXI, 1-2(1994), p. 85.

37. Ibid., pp. 81-86.

38. Georges Balandier, dans la preface a Jacque Boyon, Naissan-ce d'un Etat Africain: le Ghana, la Gold Coast de la Colo-nization a L'independance, Paris, Armand Colin, 1958, p. XII. (Cahier de la Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques), p. 93.

39. Lancine, op. cit., p. 94.

40. In Angola for instance, the Christian agencies identified themselves with the main ethno-linguistic groups. See our case study 7 on Angola.

41. The Colonialists came in Africa with their Religion . The religious activities were done by the mission agencies, in some local languages which were choiced by the

missionaries.

42. David B. Abernethy, The Political Dilemma of Popular Education(Stanford:Stanford University Press, 1969), p. 108.
43. John Breuilly, Nationalism and the State(London:Manchester University Press, 1993), p. 203.

44. P. Mercier, "Remarques sur la signification du `tribalisme' actuel en Afrique noire,"Cahiers Internationaux de Sociologie 31(1960):61-80.
45. Crawford Young, op. cit., p. 235.

46. Winsome J. Leslie, op. cit., p. 70.

47. On this point see Crawford Young, "Patterns of Social Conflict:State, Class and Ethnicity,"Daedalus 3, no. 2(Spring 1982), pp. 79-80. Such Perceptions persist to the present day.

48. Ali A. Mazrui, Africa's International Relations:The Diplomacy of Dependence and Change(Boulder, Colorado:Heinemann and Westview Press, 1979), p. 89.

49. Naomi Chazan, Robert Mortimer, John Ravenhill and Donald Rothchild(eds), Politics and Society in Contemporary Africa (USA:Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1992), pp. 26-27.

50. Ibid., p. 46.

51. Ibid.

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53. Ibid., p. 31.

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55. Kwame Nkrumah, Africa Must Unite(London:Panaf Boods, 1963), pp. 68-71.; see also George B. N. Ayittey, Africa Betrayed. op. cit., pp. 164-165.

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    A Report of the African Development Bank (Abidjan) and the
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## CHAPTER 6: THE NIGERIAN CASE

6-1 Introduction

In the precedent chapter an attempt has been made to analyze some most important factors and sources of ethnic conflicts in Africa in a more general categories of Sub-African states. This study has given us the possibility to understand that ethnic conflicts in Africa are not the product of persistence of ethnicity nor the simple result of colonial legacy as it is often heard in African intellectual and political world but, the combination of diverse factors which have been resumed in three dimensions: the colonial dimension, the nation state building dimension and the international dimension. However what should be kept in mind is the fact that these three dimensions, despite the fact they are easily recognisable in most important ethnic conflicts which have marked the post-colonial African states, their degree of manifestation is different. This is so because of the difference of historical, geographic and political background.

Actually, the African continent is composed of 51 countries. Many of them have experiences of internal conflicts related to ethnic problems. Therefore, in this study, our attention has been drawn to the Angola and Nigeria cases. Of course we don't claim the legitimacy for these two cases to represent all the conflicting situations found in Africa. But, what we may say without exaggeration is that they represent to us the most typical forms of ethnic conflicts in post-colonial Africa.

6-2 The Nigeria Case: Civil war 1967-70

At the independence on October 1, 1960, many obsevers of African politics have a confidence on Nigerian development and saw in her a future exemple of African democracy. However, the reality has followed a different path. Within few years, coups, ethnic tensions and civil war have undermined the country political stability.

A major issue which arose during the early 1960's was the degree to which control should be centralized in the federal government. The Yoruba and Ibos pushed for national policies which were more progressive and responsive to regional issues of the east and west. They viewed the central parliament, dominated by membership from the north, as, unresponsive to their needs and interests. [1]

Tensions grew between January 1963 and December 1965 as political corruption within the federal government became more extensive and as the government came to increasingly pursue policies of racial discrimination against the Ibo. The leaders of the Ibo and Yoruba ethnic groups in particular became increasingly adamant in their demands ˚for more progressive national policies" which were more responsive to their needs. [2]

On January 15, 1966 a violent coup was staged by Nigerian army officers, most of whom were Ibos. High government officials were assassinated and control of the government passed to Major-General Aguyi-Ironsi, an Ibo and commander of the Nigerian army. However, four days later a counter-coup occurred led by northern army officers. The coup was successful and Lieutenant-General Gowon usurped power. Members of the Ibo tribe were massacred and driven from the north and west to their tribal homeland in the east.

Throughout September and October serious violence and massacres occurred in the North resulting from a general breakdown of law and order. Large-scale massacres of Ibos, with deaths estimated to be in the tens of thousands, were reported. [3] A massive migration by Ibos to the Eastern Region of Nigeria(homeland of the Ibo tribe) soon followed. Fearing the possibility of a secession, Lieutenant-Colonel Gowon warned in a radio address on November 30 that force would be employed against any of Nigeria's four Regions should they attempt to withdraw from the Nigerian Federation. [4] However, at this point in the conflict there was no indication of any serious third party efforts to assist the antagonists in halting the civil violence and to resolve the primary issues.

On January 4-5, 1967 Gown and other Nigerian political leaders, including Lieutenant Colonel Odumegwu Ojukwu, the military governor of Nigeria's Eastern Region(Ibo territory), held discussions in Ghana on a new federal Constitution for Nigeria and to resolve their differences. Although some progress was made, disagreement continued over the political reorganization of Nigeria. However, a committee was created to rehabilitate and restore the rights and property of the Ibos who fled their villages and homes during September-October 1966.

Neverthless, tensions continued to mount and on March 13 Ojukwu warned that ˚the East will secede if attacked" either militarily or by a federally imposed economic blockade. [5] By the end of the month Ojukwu appropriated federal revenues and federal corporations in the Eastern Region. The Nigerian government responded by declaring a blockade of the Eastern Region.

At this point Ojukwu appeared to have ignored his earlier threat(March 13) to ˚secede" in the event of a federal

blockade and instead called on the military leaders of the four Regions of Nigeria and the leaders of other African nations to resolve the Nigerian domestic political crisis. Further, he told the leaders of the African nations that he would accept their mediation.[6] It is noteworthy that Ojukwu's personal appeal for a peaceful resolution of the conflict failed to evoke third party intervention and none was forthcoming even as tensions continued to grow. On the day(April 4) following Ojukwu's appeal for peace the Federal Government responded by suspending air service between Lagos, Nigeria's capital, and the Eastern Region. Within two weeks Ojukwu moved from his former conciliatory position and announced that the governmet of the Eastern Region had assumed control of all Federal services in the area(railroads, ports, TV and radio broadcasting, etc).

On April 23 the Supreme Military Council which ruled Nigeria announced a plan to stabilize the Federal Government and prevent disintegration of the Federation. The plan called for a new constitution and election of a new civil government. The Council also advocated strong reprisals against the recent illegal behavior of the Eastern Region leaders.[7] However, in an Chief Awolowo(head of the Nigerian delegation to the Assembly of the Organization of African Unity -OAU) acting as a mediator, sought to establish a compromise which would prevent Ibo secession and end the dispute between the various regions of Nigeria. While his efforts proved unsuccessful, the Federal Government did announce three days later(May 21) the lifting of the economic sanctions imposed in April against the Eastern Region to which would become effective on May 23. In response, Ojukwu indicated that his government would relinquish control over the Federal services, earlier assumed by the Eastern Region, in the intererst of Nigeria.

However, further efforts at reconciliation by the antagonists failed and tensions continued to rise between the Federal Government and the leaders of Nigeria's Eastern Region. And within merely five days of the May 21 spirit of compromise diminished and Ojukwu announced that the East must "make plans for a separate existence."[8] On the next day a mandate was given to Colonel Ojukwu by the Eastern Region's Consultative Assembly to secede from the Nigerian Federation. A state of emergency was immediately proclaimed by the Federal Government. Within two days(May 30) Ibo leader Ojukwu announced the independence of the Ibos and creation of the new state of Biafra. The Federal Government responded by declaring a blockade on all land and sea routes to Biafra.

On June 12 Gowon set the stage for war when he announced that he would seek to put down Ojukwu's revolt and establish a civilian governemtn to reunite Nigeria. Biafran Radio further fanned the flames by calling on the people of the Eastern Region to bear arms and defend their right of secession.[9] The Federal Government then clarified the issue which was ultimately at stake: the Eastern Region must renounce its declaration of independence and accept Federal authority if the domestic crisis was to be peacefully resolved.

On July 7, 1967 Gowon ordered the Federal Army to launch an attack against Biafra, capture Enugu, its capital, and arrest Colonel Ojukwu. Biafra easily repelled the invaders. However, Federal troops received Soviet and British military supplies and eventually succeeded in driving the Biafran forces back. The Biafrans suffered heavy casualties. On the following day, Ethiopian leader Haile Selasie, Jomo Kenyatta of Kenya, Tanzania's Julius Nyerere, and Milton Obote of Uganda issued a joint appeal to the leaders of both belligerents to terminate hostilities and resume peace negotiations. The appeals fell upon deaf ears.

Federal troops continued their attacks on Enugu and the Federal Government further raised the tone of conflict by announcing on August 11 that it now perceived the struggle against the rebellious Biafrans as ˚total war" and indicated that it would not show any mercy towards them. [10]

How can we explain this situation of political desintegration in Nigeria ? As we stated in the previous chapter, the primary cause of ethnic conflicts in Africa is colonialism which put together people of different culture without considering their socio-cultural realities and gave them a different treatment. But, before discussing the colonial policy in Nigeria, let us review the pre-colonial political organization of the main ethnic groups there.

6-3 Nigeria Pre-colonial Historical Background

There is a tendency among the writers on Nigerian history to confuse and to project the variation in spoken dialects in the country as indications of a multiplity of ethnic groups. Various figures from 250 to 400 have been projected. In our view, variations of language do not necessarily indicate multiplicity of ethnic groups. There are about 40 ethnic groups and languages in Nigeria. In terms of population size, three main groups are dominant: the Hausa-Fulani group, the Ibos and the Yoruba. Collectivelly, they shared a population of 30.42 in 1952-53 [11]. There are not a state in Nigeria which is an exact ethnic entity because, apart from the main ethnic groups, there are many other minority groups[12].

Politically speaking, Nigeria is not a nation like many other African states are. A principal feature of the ethnic groups in Nigeria is the difference in their cultures. Before the advent of the British rule the various ethnic groups functioned under their own governmental structure and culture. In the old Northern Region, among the Haussa-Fulani group, their distinguished quality was the large scale state of their political organization composed of about thirty emirates. [13] All the emirates shared a common principle in each, and the religious and political authorities were personified in one person. The Emir, a fusion of ˚the sacred and secular whithout constitutionality.' [14]

Among the Yorubas of the old Western Region, government was through a constitutional monarchy while patrilineage remained the basic element in the political system with a fusion of the sacred with the secular in one person, the Oba[King], but this time with constitutionality. The Oba assumed a sacred status only after his election to the title by other chiefs.

Although the Oba's status was very important, he could be deposed by his chiefs if it was felt that he had misused his powers. To prevent such an abuse of power, the Yorubas developed a kind of political system with check-and-balance which ensured that, although the Oba commanded authority, the policies to which his command ensured obedience were usually made by the chiefs. [15]

The Ibo group of the old Eastern Region had a democratic political culture that was very dissimilar to that of both the Hausa-Fulani and the Yoruba groups. With regards to governmental process, the groups remained entirely autonomous. The communities were politically independent from one another and there was an almots complete absence of a higher political and social unit beyond the village stage.

Village headmen[chiefs] had a role different from that of their counterparts in the Western Region. An Ibo village chief had no defined sacred nor secular duty. He was head only of a specific lineage. His rank allowed him to preside over

village meetings but his authority never extended beyond the village group. Individual and popular participation in the decision -making process had a far higher importance in their value system than in the institutions of monarchy.

As a result, the Ibos never developed permanent or large-scale state system on the Hausa-Fulani or Yorua lines. However, real power was dispersed among groups rather than centralized in any one individual or body. Government was the business of the whole community and as such was essentially democratic. [16]

6-4 Colonial Roots of The Nigerian Conflict

The British colonialism altered profoundely the evolution of these states. From 1874 to 1960, they became an object of colonial rule based on the policy of divide and rule.

6-4-1 Policy of Amalgamation

In the pre-colonial review, we have noted that the unit called Nigeria was occuped by varios ethnic group which governed themselves according to their own political culture.

However, soon after the proclamation of the protectorat of Nothern Nigeria by Lugard in 1900, the British administration went further in piecemeal fashion to develop a larger Nigeria by the amalgation of the South in 1906. What should be keep in our mind is the fact that this amalgation could not be considered as an act of integration because there were not effort by the British to unite the North and the South. They were administered as independent territories with nothing in common. Colman notes, that `For the next six years, Nothern and

Southern Nigeria were administered as separate colonial territories, even to extent of having frontier controls' [17]

A second step in this process came in 1914 when a single Nigeria was created with the amalgation of Nothern and Southern protectorat. However, if in appearence it seems to indicate a positive move toward a national unity, in reality in was simply an act for british administrative conveniance.

Most scholars on Nigerian history agreed that the prime reason for North and South amalgamation was economic pragmatism. According to Michael Crowder, the immediate reason for the decision was economic expediency. The North Protectorate was running at a severe deficit, which was being met by a subsidy from the Southern Protectorate and an Imperial Grant-in-Aid from Britain of about L300,000 a year. This conflicted with the age-old colonial policy that each territory should be self-subsisting... It was also felt that the prosperous Southern Protectorate could subsidize its Northern neighbor until such a time as it became self-supporting. Furthermore, there was the pressing need to coordinate railway policy which at the time was practically non-existant. [18]

Also, in the same vain, the Nigerian historians, Arthur Nwanko and Samuel Ifejika, writing about their country political history, said that Britain's avering interest in Nigeria was economic, and the step taken to amalgamate was aimed at assuring profits and better exploitation of local resources. [19]

The growth of the Southern economy is illustrated by the fact that for the year 1908 exports(mainly palm oil and Kernels) totalled L3,094,175, compared to L4,320,000 in 1910; the value of imports over the same period rose from L3,076,309 to L5,122,000. [20] Thus, the primary objective of

amalgamation was aimed at assuring greater profit and efficient exploitation of both regions' natural resources. The aim of the administrative policy that was carried out was not the fostering of national unity. The amalgamation procedure did not take into consideration the religious, cultural, linguistic and historical differences between the regions. James Coleman pointed out as follows:

The artificiality of Nigeria's boundaries and the sharp cultural differences among its people point up to the fact that Nigeria is a British creation and the concept of Nigerian nation is the result of the British presence. [21]

The amalgamation of North and South into a united Nigeria was a matter of practical economics and geography, and did little to redress regional disparities. The need for educated individuals to fill posts in business and government service meant that, as Nigeria modernized, administration in the North was increasingly given over to individuals from other regions. In many cases these individuals were Ibos. It was not new for the Ibos to work in other parts of the country, but their increasingly indispensable role and the threat it posed to the traditional social structure became an explosive combination.

As a matter of fact, this situation of different traitment to people of the same country could fostere hardly a feeling of national unity.

6-4-2 Colonial Policy of Indirect Rule

The `Indirect Rule' means a policy by which the British administration under Lugar ruled Nothern Nigeria through natives authorities know as Emirs. The essential features of this system of local government according to coleman `were the preservation of traditional political institutions and

their adaptation, under the tutelage and direction of British administration, to the requirements of modern unit of local government. [22]

However, as we have noted in the preceding paragraph the Emirs were the rulers in the traditional Muslim society of the north part of Nigeria, while in the south, they were completly unknow. Thus `Indirect Rule' worked succefully in the North but it failed in the south. The reason was that the British found it convenient and advantageous to utilize existing institutions in the North which were absent in the South. In the North the British had counsolited their power and authority over sprawling Fulany Empire, found highly centralized, hierarchically organized authoritarian states and established procedure for revenue collection; [23] but in the eastern Region, the whole idea of traditional authorities was abondoned in place of a modified form of local government , when the British encountered opposition in its effort to introduce indirect rule.

The failure was due to the culturale incoherence of the indirect rule system in the South because as we noted before, the traditional systems of both the Yoruba and the Ibo rested primarly on principles of segmentation and egalitarian. This suggest that a certain kind of chieftaincy institution, on the pattern of the autocratic Fulani Emir, is a precondition for the successful application of indirect rule.

In their writing about Nigeria, Richard L and Whitaker indicate that indirect rule, as practiced by the British, was even less suited to the character of society in southeast Nigeria, where its succesful application would have required a considerable more knowlege of the indigenous system of dispersed authority than the colonial ever possessed. Futher they continue that a notorious demonstration of protest

occured at Abat in 1929 when Ibo women gave vent to their resentment against a new widely misunderstood method of taxation. [24]

However, the local government introduced in the South was largely according to the English pattern. An essential part of this system was the local council, and in the Nigerian circumstance where tribalism was a fundamental factor in social living, each small group started asking for its own local council within its own tribe, thus fragmenting the country into different tribal groups and intensifying primordial loyalties. [25 ]

The British, with their colonial policy of indirect rule in the North and local administration in the South, further intensified tribalism, regionalism and parochial loyalty rather than national unity and national consciousness. Dr. Connor C. O'Brien, in a New York Review article, 'A Condemned People," states that:

The nature of the colonial experience in Nigeria was therefore such that, far from narrowing the differences between the people who underwent it, it actually widened and deepended these. [26]

In keeping with Lugard's plege to the emirs, Christian schools were excluded from the Muslim sector of the North, except in those rare instance when an emir especially requested the establishment of mission school in his juridiction.

6-4-3 The Policy of Socio -Economic Modernization

Another aspect of the British legacy that has undermined the social integration in post-colonial Nigeria is the policy

of socio-economic modernization as illustred in educational disparity.

In Southern Nigeria, the actual conduct of education was almost entirely in the hands of christian missions, to which Nigerian parishioners made substantial monetary contributions. [27]   While Western education was expanding in the South, the picture was totally different in the North.   In the North, the traditional rulers opposed western missionary education in fear of the infiltration of the Christian religion into already predominatly Muslim areas. The British administration supported the emires in their opposition to missionary education because they were in need of them in order to establish indirect rule and gain control of the of the whole of Northern Nigeria.

Thus in lieu of mission schools the nothern administration sponsored a very modest educational program of its own, tailered carefully to the needs and values of the natives authorities. [28]

In 1947, there were approximately 538,000 pupils in the primary schools of southern Nigeria, compared with 71,000 in the more populous north. At the secondary level, southern enrollement was about 9,600, compared with 251 in the north. [29]   By 1957, after almost half a century of British administration in Northern Nigeria, there was only one government secondary school in the North. [30]

If in term of cultural maintainance this approach can't be viewed as negative, when we think in term of social and political integration in a multi-ethnic state their is a need to question the impact of this practice in long perspective of social integration because this gave Southern Nigeria a competitive edge over Northern Nigeria in terms of employment

in the civil sevice and in the modern sector of the economy (corporations).

In the economic field, there was a large disparity, too. The richest region was the west, by virtue of cocao production, early access to Western education, the location of much of the industrial development, and the presence of Lagos, the capital and the major port. The Nothern Region was larger in population and area than the other regions combined but it was the most poorest region. [31]

Aware of the fact that they lagged behind the South, the Northerners made deliberate attempts to catch up. However, they were too far behind. In 1957, when the South was agitating for independence, the North opposed the idea out of fear of Southern political and economic domination. Even after independence, because of Southern domination of the civil service in Northern Nigeria, the North declared a ˚ Northernization" policy to replace the Southerners, and many scholars view this policy as one of the root causes of Nigerian dissent during the First Republic.

Melson and Wolpe argue that in culturally plural societies different rates of mobilization among agroups bring about communal conflict by creating social cleavages. They state that:

The consequence of communal groups being mobilized at different rates in that some people gain a head start in the competition for the scarce rewards of modernity. New socio-economic categories therefore tend to coincide with, rather than intersect, communal boundaries with the consequence that the modern status system comes to be organized along communal lines. There is, consequently, little to ameliorate the intensity of communal confrontations. The fewer the crosscutting socio-economic linkages, the more naked such confrontations and the greater the likelihood of secessionist and other movements of communal nationalism. [32]

Thus, in Nigeria, in addition to other natural cleavages (culture, language, and religion) different rates of socio-economic development have also created conflict between the North and the South. As a result, any competition for jobs and political office tend to produce communal struggle.

6-4-4 Colonial Constitutional Development.

An analysis of Nigerian constitutional development gives us the right to state that it had a negative impact on Nigeria unity. Under the Richard's Constitution of 1946, Nigerians from all areas first came to be actively involved in the management of their own affairs under colonial supervision.

The Richard's Constitution was based on three perceived needs: to promote the unity of Nigeria, to provide adequately within that unity for the diverse elements which make up the country, and to secure greater participation by Africans in the discussion of their own affairs[33].

The ideal of unity was pursued by including the Nothern region in the political life of the country. On the other hand, regionalism got a boost from the development of regional councils for the North, the West and the East. This was the beginning of the regional (and thus , roughtly, ethnic) basis for politics that has never been transcended by a sense of Nigerian identity.

The revised constitution of 1951, instead of changing the situation, came to make it worse by giving power both to the region and to the central government. This allowed the politics of ethnicity, which had grown under the Richard's constitution to come into full flower. Coleman states:

There can be little doubt that the implementation of the Constitution of 1951 accelerated the drift toward subgroup nationalism and tribalism. Educated Nigerians who aspired to fill the new positions of power and status opened up to Nigerians by that Constitution realized that their most secure base of support would be the people of their own groups. The indirect electoral system strengthened this realization. They also recognized that the disagreement among themselves regarding nationalist objectives, and the tempo with which those objectives were to be pursued, would be fairly well settled by the outcome of the constitutional elections. In the struggle that ensued, tribalism was the dominant note, but then appealing to the people for support the competing parties strove to outdo each other in the use of nationalist slogan. [34]

The constitution demonstrated the ethnic effects of mutual distrust and cultural incompatibilities felt by each group. The electoral base of each party's support was restricted, by and large, to their region of origin.

In party terms, each political party in the country was regionally based drawing their electoral support from the majority ethnic group within the region. The NCNC (National Council of Nigeria Citizens) was intended as a country-wide party, but came to be dominated by Ibos. Controlling the Eastern region. The Action Group developed as a Yoruba response to the NCNC. One of the founders of the Action Group, Chief Obafemi Awolowo, had always been suspicious of the Ibo domination of Nigerian politics. Awolowo's desire was to organize and promote the interests of the Yoruba while making them conscious of the threat of impending Ibo domination of political power in the near future. [35]

The formation of regionally based parties in the Eastern and Western regions also led to the establishment of a regionally based party, the Northern Peoples Congress (NPC) in the Northern Region as a means of projecting the values and concerns of the traditional North.

The emergence of these regionally based political parties demonstrated, beyond doubt, the developement of competing ethnic sub-nationalism in Nigerian politics. Leadership of these parties also came predominantly from each of the dominant ethnic group in each region, [36] indicating where real political power lay in the regions.

The consequence of such an arrangement was: (1) a weak central government, which was unable to mediate and regulate political conflicts, (2) the strengthening of people's commitment and loyalty toward the region of their origin rather than toward the central government and Nigeria as a nation, and (3) a strong association between region, ethnicity, and political party, which became a major source of political cleavage. Thus, when conflicts surfaced within the federation, they became a struggle for supremacy not only between political parties but also between regions and ethnic groups as well. Politics was regarded as a zero-sum game where the winner takes all and the loser forfeits all. Thus, in most cases, attempts were made to eliminate and destroy an opposition.

Vickers and Post argue that it is this kind of political arrangement in an ethnically conglomerate society which leads to political conflict and instability. They state:

Viewed in terms of its constitutional Provisions and institutional arrangements, the Nigerian structural frame served not to hold the country together, but rather, through its complex interrelationship with parties and cultural sections, to strengthen the self-awareness of the latter and reinforce the conflict which together exerted massive stress threatening the persistance of the frame itself. [37]

Reflecting on the structural basis of Nigerian federation, General Yakubu Gowon [Nigerian Head of State from 1st August 1966 to July 1975] felt that certain aspecs of the Nigerian

federation such as the inequality of the various units, had violated federal principles. He declared:

'Our constitution was a glaring contradiction of the most fundamental principles of federalism. The most important principle to ensure the success of a federation is that not a single state or region should be so large and powerful as to be in a position to dominate the rest or hold them to ransom."[38]

There was a constant fear of one regime dominating the others. In the North, the fear was Southern domination of the civil service and the modern sector of the economy; in the South, the fear was the political domination of the Central Government by the North by virtue of numerical superiority.

Therefore, any attempt by other regional parties to reduce the size of the North by creating more states was not tolerated by the federal government and, in most cases, dealt with violently.

Politics was viewed as a zero sum game(winner takes all), which abandons the democratic process of compromise and consensus. Distrust and fear not only created a problem for strong political institutions, they also tended to strengthen primordial loyalty at the expense of national loyalty. There were other national leaders who were also questioning the very existence of Nigeria as a nation. Obafemi Awolowo, one of the leading nationalist leaders and a onetime Premier of the Western region, wrote:

Nigeria is not a nation. It is a mere geographical expression.. The word 'Nigerian' is merely a distinctive appellation to distinguish those who live within the boundaries of Nigeria from those who do not. [39]

The observation of this Nigerian colonial experience gives us the possibility to imagine the impact of colonial legacy on the Nigerian post-independence political life.

All the aspects of British colonial policies tended more toward desintegration than national integration. By practicing discrimination between different groups of the same territory, Britain had contributed directly to the ethno-politicisation of Nigerian society. It is, therefore, this political culture which gave politicians the tendency of considering politics as a zero sum game, and to mass the fear of domination by other groups.

Under this condition of lack of national unity, the political independence was perceived by each group as determinant in order to assure the maintenance of their group identity and security and by politicians as the opportunity to realize their ambition.

6-5 The National Issues in Post-Independent Nigeria

The preceding section showed us how, because of the constitutional pattern introduced by the British, regionalism and ethnic parties developed in Nigeria undermining a peaceful installation of political climate. This atmosphere of political competition based on ethnic line didn't stop after the accession to independence. More than anything, the impact of colonial policy manifested soon on Nigerian post independence political life in many aspects. In this section, we like to illustrate the most important aspect which had an impact on the manifestation of ethnicity which led to the Biafra civil war.

6-5-1 The Issue of Census Enumeration

During the First Republic, the Census Crisis was another political struggle which was drawn on regional and ethnic lines. The important factors which led to the politicization

of census enumeration were: (1)the allocation of seats in the Federal House of Representatives which was based on population. During the First Republic, the Northern region was given more seats in the Central Government because of its large population. In fact, its number of seats exceeded the combined total of seats allocated for the other three regions and gave the Northern region automatic control of federal legislature. (Out of 312 seats in the Central Legislature, the North was allocated 174 seats the East 74 seats, the West 62 seats, and Lagos 3 seats. ); and (2)the federal government revenue was allocated to regions on the basis of population and need.

Thus, the politicians came to realize the importance of population figures in the distribution of seats in the Federal House of Representatives and the allocation of revenue to the regions. When the census enumeration was over, each region inflated its population figures. For example, the North showed an average increase of 30 percent, and the East and West showed increases of more than 70 percent. [40] This brought about bitter conflict between the regions. Each region accused the other of grossly inflating the census figures Okpara stated:

Since the mere publication of the census figures precludes a leader of a major political party from aspiring to the leadership of the nation, something must be wrong with the set-up in Nigeria where one can already know that he has won and his opponent has lost a general election on the bias of census figures. [41]

Under these circamstances, census figures where never been accepted by the major ethnic groups as a true reflection of their numerical size in the country. Each figure was contested, especially since they were being used by Northerners as an argument for giving the Region 50 per cent representation in the federal legislature; and as the basis for revenue allocation. According to S. A. Aluko,

The importance of accurate population figures has hardly been widely acknowledged in Nigeria. The manner in which the country has conducted its census in the past and the population figures claimed each time have never earned the respect of most articulate Nigerian citizens. The controversy that has usually arisen about the reliability of the figures has made them suspect abroad, even though the rest of the world, for lack of any alternatives, has had to quote and use the official Nigerian figures... There has been suspicion and criticism in Nigeria since regular census counts began in 1911. [42]

The Nigerian census was, therefore, seen as a struggle for power between the different ethnic groups, and was a highly politicized affair. The greater the population in the region, the more seats in the Federal House of Representatives, and, consequently, the more political power a region would have. The control of the central government was also important because that is where the most crucial political and economic decisions were made.

However, what is important to note is that in any moment of Nigerian political history, did the Nigerian people has manifested such an interest on census issue. But after regional governments were introduced in 1952 this issue assumed an importance to which any body could be indifferent as a result of the new realization that parliamentary and local council representation, and government amenities were largely dependent upon these recorded figures. (see table 6. 1 and 6. 2)

The ethnic-political and regional overtone which has bedeviled Nigerian census counts, since the late twenties, still exists today. Ibo anger stems from the view that population counts in the North are being deliberately overstated for both political and economic advantages. The Ibos resent what they see as a determined attempt by the Hausa-Fulanis in particular, and the Northern Region in general, to continue the perpetuation of their political and

ethnic domination of the country. Again, this is another source of their discontent.

TABLE 6.1
Population Figures(millions)

| Region | 1952-53 Census | 1962 Census | 1962 Revised | 1963 Revised |
|--------|---------|--------|---------|---------|
| North | 16.8 | 22.5 | 31.0 | 29.8 |
| East | 7.2 | 12.4 | 12.3 | 12.4 |
| West | 4.6 | 7.8 | 7.8 | 10.3 |
| Midwest | 1.5 | 2.2 | 2.2 | 2.5 |
| Lagos | 0.3 | 0.7 | 0.7 | 0.7 |
| TOTAL | 30.4 | 45.6 | 54.0 | 55.7 |

SOURCE: Adapted from Walter Schwarz, Nigeria, Frederick
A. Praeger, 1968, p. 163.

TABLE 6.2
Demographic Test of The 1963 Census

| Region | Constituencies | No. that Passed the Test | No. that Failed part of the Test | No. that Failed the Test |
|--------|---------|--------|--------|--------|
| North | 175 | 99 | 77 | 49 |
| East | 73 | 53 | 20 | 5 |
| West | 47 | 20 | 27 | 10 |
| Midwest | 15 | 8 | 7 | 3 |
| Lagos* | -- | -- | -- | -- |

SOURCE: Adapted from Okoli F. Ekwueme, Institutional Structure
and Conflict in Nigeria, University Press of America, 1980,
p. 63.

Lagos has three constituencies, but the Census Board decided not to apply the test.

The census controversy became an enormous area of conflict between the North and the East, the two regions which had led the nation to independence with a coalition government. In fact, it was the census crisis, and the political bickering it brought about, which led to the military takeover in 1966.

As stated earlier, census results are of the utmost importance not because they provide relevant information about the population but because they determine who controls the central government. Control of the central government is important because that is where the most important political and economic decisions are made. The other important factor is the allocation of government revenues among regions based on census figures. Therefore, the census figures have some economic implications as well.

6-5-2 The Revenue Allocation Issue

The issue of revenue allocation has been one of the most intractable problems in the history of Nigerian politics. Since Nigeria became a political entity, eight committees have been set up to find solutions to this problem and none of them have reached a universally accepted solution. The problems of this issue are: (1)what criteria should be used for allocating revenue between states(the poor and heavily populated states favor size of population to determine revenue allocation, while the oil-rich states favor the principle of derivation, with special provisions to compensate them for ecological risks of oil production).

Here the cleavage is between oil-producing states and highly populated states; and (2)how to divide revenue between

federal, state, and local governments (party alignment heavily shapes position—the opposition parties, UPN and GNPP, wanted the large share of revenue for the state while the ruling party (NPN) wanted the large share for the federal government. The conflict which deeply polarized the ruling and the opposition parties was not heavily influenced by ethnicity, rather it was the regional interest, party alignment, and lack of compromise and consensus.

In 1964, just after the census controversy began, the Binns Commission on Revenue Allocation was set up and recommended, based on the 1963 census, that the federal government revenue (N8.75 million pounds) be divided as follows: North N2.0 million; West N0.60 million; East N0.80 million; and Midwest N0.35 million. [43] The decision of the Binns Commission to distribute revenue based on the 1963 population census further exacerbated the political tension that was prevalent in the nation.

The Binns Commission used the principle of need and population as the criteria for allocating undeclared revenue. This was, again, criticized by the Eastern region, which demanded that oil revenue be returned to the region of origin.

The East was unhappy that its oil wealth was financing the development of the Western and Northern regions. By examining the history of revenue allocation in Nigeria, one can see that the emphasis was not on national development but rather on the advancement of regional development and the sharing of the federal reserve. In fact, the whole financial arrangements that were proposed by these commissions have inhibited the development of an effective, development oriented national fiscal policy. Okoli states:

The very fact that emphasis was on separate development and the devaluation of power and resources from the central government to the state and not on contribution of resources and the surrender of certain powers by the states to the federal government removed the element of common enterprise and common sacrifice in pursuit of common aim... The result was that each region strove to maximize the resources for its own separate development; thus the emphsis was on sharing of resources. [44]

Indeed, emphasis on sharing of resources made the 1964 Revenue Allocation Proposal highly politicized and brought about political infighting and bickering among the regions.

6-5-3 The 1964 Federal Election Crisis

IN the post-colonial Nigeria politic, the election had constitued a very conflicting issue which had brought ethnic mobilization by the elites to win an election. Through an analysis of 1964 federal election process, we want to fund out the reasons of this practice.

As the result of contradiction in national government, the goverment of coalision come to an end in 1964 and organization of new federal election was necessary. Therefore, for the purpose of the coming federal election, political parties started to establish new alliances. This political realignments had produced two competing grand alliances.

The first alliance was initiated on 3 June. At this period, the leaders of the NCNC and the AG announced a formal alliance. Together they vowed `to wipe out neo-colonialism and reactionary elements from the public life of the country' and stressed the underlying similarity of their ideologies. they were latter joined by nothern minority parties of progressiste nature[ NEPU and UMBC ].This coalition gave birth on 1 September to the United Progressive Grand Alliance (UPGA) [45]

In the meantime, the NPC was drawing into its own alliance the new Chief Akintola's NNDP (Nigerian National Democratic

Party), which had earlier broken away from the Action Group to form a new party and various Souther opposition groups, including the Mid-West Democratic Front and a faction of the Niger Delta Congress(an ethnic minority party allied with the NPC since 1959). This grouping was formally announced on 20 August 1964, and subsequently named itself the Nigerian National Alliance(NNA). [46]

What appeared clear at this stage of alliance formations, was that the logic which had undermined their formation is not based on constructive politics. The main parties which initiated these alliances had for objectives to avoid the domination of others in the coming federal parliament and government and to destroy each other electoral basis by using the minorities opposition parties which in both regions, were afraid of the majority domination and thus broaden their own politcal basis. This lead us to conclude that these alliance were a kind of- mariage de convenance - wihout any political consistency.

However, being aware of the possible rise of political conflict, some political leaders asked a more conciliatory approach. For instance, Chief Benson with the endorsement of the Prime Minister called for a prospect for a national Government in which each major party would play the dual role of government and opposition and all major regional interests would be represented following the election. [47]

But, his conciliatory plea was ignored by his own party citing not only the danger of `populist dictatorship' but the absence of any basis of political or cultural unity for such a government.

Similar scepticism was voiced in July by the Northern Premier, who ruled out a new coalition with the NCNC under any circumstance, declaring: `The Ibos have never been true

friends of the North and never will be.' It was the responsibility of all Northerners, he added, to see that none of the Northern constituencies was won by `the Southern politicians'. [48]

The prospect of national government was rejected by each party because each of them thougth the newly formed alliances a new possibility of winning seats, thus the required majorty to control the parliement.

Under this condition of mutual dislike, when the election campaign started, the political messages presented by most of these politicians were based not on economic or political issues but rather on the use of regional and ethnic sentiment. Each political party heavily banked on the support of its community and of dissident minority groups from the other regions.

For instance, the party rallied to the NNA developed an anti Ibo campagne not only among in the Northern part but also among Southern minority peoples as well. This propaganda depicted the Ibos as attempting to swallow up the government, the corporations, everything. Typical was the exhortation, `Wake up and live. Drive UPGA Ibos from your capital city'. [49] The Region's newspaper was also employed, warning that `the philosophy of Iboism' meant that Ibo `unity, progress and hegemony... must be maintained and built on the disunity, retrogression and slavery of non-Ibo' peoples. [50]

In the South, The UPGA also employed anti-Northern propaganda everywhere. UPGA campaigned against Hausa-Fulani domination, alleged that the North had used its Federal power to obtain an unfair share of development resources, and vowed to create new states in the North so as to break its domination of the Federation. In its native Eastern Region,

the NCNC `capitalised on the deep resentment at the way Ibos in the North had been treated'. [51]

As a consequence of these practices, violence, and massive irregularity came to be noted in the election process .For instance, as the 10-18 December nomination period drew to a close, it become apparent that a number of UPGA canditates in the West and especially the North were being prevented by the same thuggery, obstruction and coercion that had plagued the campaign. This has prompted the leader of UPGA, Dr Okpara to describe the election as a `colossal farce ' and declare `there will be election at all'. [52]

Even if the election went on, on the evening of the UPGA vowed not to accept the authority of any government formed on the basis of the elections, saying this would be `compromising with evil', and called on the president to summon a conference of all political leaders to` break up the federation peacefully' [53]

This declaration shows an aknowleged defeat even before the publication of the final result. In fact, the UPGA suffered a crushing defeate especially in the North, where it won only 4 of the 167 seats while the NNA won 198 of the 253 seats awarded in the election, giving it the majority in the house regardless of the outcome in the remaining 59 constituencies. [ 54]

Rabuska and Shepsle contend that conflict in plural societies arises from conflicting interest among different communities on what they term incompatibility of the `ethnic preference function." However, it is the political elites who manipulated the natural social cleavages, and that made those cleavages politically salient. They state :

Politicians are office-seekers. For whatever reasons—prestige, power, material perquisites—they are in the business of winning elections. And in order to win elections, they must assemble electoral organizations(coalitions). The natural cleavages that divide men in the community provide the obvious and perhaps strongest nuclei around which coalitions are built. The astuce politician latches on to an issue precisely because of the groups he believes it will activate. The successful political entrepreneur, then, is the person who manipulates natural social cleavages, who makes certain that those cleavages are politically salient, who exploits, uses, and suppressed conflict. [55]

The observation of the behaviors of political elites during the federal election of 1964 confirms well this assertion. The voting pattern clearly indicated that political and economic issues were not the primary factors for determining the outcome of the election. Rather, ethnicity and regionalism were dominant factors.

The post-independence Nigeria as demonstrated by these situations, was very instable politically. The combined effect of these conflicting situaton and the absolute control of the state under the Haussa, had created tension among the disasvantaged minorities and at the end the Biafra civil war.

6-6 Motives of Foreign Powers Intervention

The war between Biafra and Federal Nigeria was definitely a war between Nigerians but with divergent prospects for the future. It was to all appearances internal. To the extent that Nigerians failed to reassure their anxious compatriots, failed to manage their own diversities, and ended up shooting at each other in a gruelling civil war, we can talk of an internal conflict.

However, this situation could not leave the international community indifferent. Of the greatest importance is the fact

that East/-West ambitions endangered the lives of millions of Nigerians. Nigeria is an African giant that could be a prize to any non-African state that gains a foothold on it. Britain was the former colonial power and, consistent with the "sphere of influence" mentality among powerful states, Nigeria was considered to lie within its orbit. After all, it was part of the British Common-wealth. [56]

So when Nigeria found itself faced with internal difficulties, Britain rushed in arms aid to assist the Federal Government, in accordance with tradition. However, such aid became more substantial and long-lasting when the Soviet Union also extended military assistance. The official reason was to save the integrity of a sovereign and independent Nigeria. Yet, beneath all these apparently disinterested gestures lay a candid military and foreign policy calculation on the part of both countries, to ensure that neither supplanted the other by being seen to have tipped the balance in the civil war in favour of the Federal Government. [57]

In the process the Federal Government, which might have been willing to reach an accommodation with its dissenting region, was turned into a beligerent because of the overconfidence which Anglo-Soviet assistance gave it. Not to be outmaneuvered by both the Soviet Union and Britain, de Gaulle of France came to assist Biafra. French came to support the Biafra side. It gave to Biafra a false feeling of security, a feeling that better days might arrive. The end result was that this external intrusion escalated the level of violence, leading to horrors against the Ibo in Biafra.

6-6-1 British Motives of Intervention

As the colonial power that had created the shape of independent Nigeria, it felt that its pride and prestige were involved. Economic investment was also a cnsideration for the British. Nigerian independence had not destroyed economic, trade, and investment ties between the two contries, and Britain was concerned that all of this could be lost. The discovery of oil only heightened this fear.

Since independence, Nigeria had been closely tied to various Western states in matters of trade. [58] Oil was discovered in the Eastern part of the country and off the coast, a fact that was particularly interesting to Western companies, and that might have given Ojukwu the courage to assume that Biafra could survive economically as an independent state. [59] The proposal of a 12-state Nigeria would have largely removed the control of the oil from Ibo hands, meaning less power within Nigeria for the Ibos. This situation could not have been viewed favorably by Biafrans bent on maximizing both authority within the region and influence within greater Nigeria.

The political aspect should also be considered. The British wanted to aviod Soviet primacy in support of the Federation, and to prevent British loss of influence. Regarding Soviet influence, Wilson noted that: "Nigeria would have been put in the pawn to the Russians had we refused [the supply of arms]. Whatever military supplies we felt it righ to withhold, they in fact provided; they were tightening their grip on Nigeria's life."[60]

The OAU's overwhelming pro-Nigerian stance helped legitimatize the British government's policy of arms sales to the Federation. Wilson rallied support from the right and the left.

African unity had been a popular symbol among British socialists, and the prime minister hoped hat African solidarity against Biafra would restrain the mounting antiwar sentiment among British liberals. Wilson did not expect his pro-federal policy to be challenged by a Conservative opposition that was committed to the need to offset the Soviet presence in Lagos, and was anxious about the future of British investments in Nigeria. [61]

Continuation of the arms trade was controversial, but was made easier by the FMG's choice to accept military supplies from the Soviet Union. This opening to the East forced the West, especially Britain, to re-evaluate their support of the FMG as a means of preventing Gowon from coming under the Soviet influence. British military supplies increased in response to the Soviet presence, but the FMG was never able to persuade the British to provide heavy weapons or aircraft. [62]

6-6-2 Soviet Motives of Intervention

The Soviet Union's involvement in the war was the result of a pragmatic assessment of the potential costs and benefits of intervention. The Soviet government concluded that it was a low risk opportunity to increase its influence in Africa.

Russia only intervened when it became obvious that theother powers had opted out and there was no danger of a great power conflict. Thus, Moscow's main motive for intervention was that it had the opportunity to fill a convenient power vacuum with no danger of antagonizing the West and provoking confrontation. [63]

The Soviet government became the major heavy weapons supplier to the FMG. This changed the face of the war, both internally and internationally. By providing the FMG with heavy weapons and aircraft which had been denied by Britain, the USSR enabled the FMG to fight a different war than that of the Biafrans.

Internationally, the presence of the Soviet Union caused Western states to consider the implications of their policy more carefully. Gowon was unlikely to become a convinced Communist regardless of his need for weapons, but the West was sensitive about the potential for a budding partnership, or at least an extension of Soviet influence. The conflict between the East and the West, played out in policy considerations regarding a war in Nigeria, is an example of the potential for national conflict to become an international issue. The war was about Nigeria's internal political structure, but it provided the opportunity for external actors to pursue their own agenda.

6-6-3 French Motives of Intervention

Two position have dominated the French intervention in Nigeria. The first was the President's Secretariat for African Affairs, headed by the influential Gaullist, Jacques Foccart, who was an active pro-Biafra and wanted an outright French full diplomatic recognition of the new republic(de Gaulle lent his support to this position).
The second was that of the Quai D'Orsay itself(the Foreign Ministry) which was pro federal government . [64]

To resolve this serious disagreement on its Biafran policy between the two departments, a compromise was worked out within the French government. Under the cover of humanitarian assistance the French government was allowed to send a variety of small arms and ammunition to the Biafrans through a convoluted channel of delivery which emanated from France

via the West African states of Gabon and Cote d'Ivoire. [65] However, full diplomatic support and massive military assistance need to stem the Nigeria offensive was denied. [66]

Under pressure from the public opinion at home, and at the ardent request of Francophone African allies, de Gaulle eventually supported Biafran despite his prior approval of a total arms embargo. France's declaration of support for Biafra was made in July 1968, one year after the war began, when a government statement in Paris argued that the bloodshed and suffering that the Biafran people have endured for more than a year demonstrates their determination to affirm themselves as a people... [The conflict should be settled on the] basis of the rights of peoples to self determination." [67]

The Biafran case seemed to fit in well with the French President's perception of Africa, his views on the fate of British-made federations and his fear of the `Soviet menace'. In September, 1968 President de Gaulle said:

It is not certain that the concept of a federation, which replaces in certain areas to a certain extent the concept of colonisation, is always very good and very practical, and particularly in Africa... There is an ethnic element which imposes its authority on others... how can you expect the peoples of the Federation, including the Ibos, to go back to living together?... In this affair France has aided, is aiding Biafra as far as possible. She has not carried out the act which would be decisive, the action of recognising the Republic of Biafra, because she considers that the management of Africa is above all an affair for Africans. [68]

Finally, the weakening of Nigeria, the British-dominated giant of Africa in proximity to the small and weak French-speaking African states, was, needless to say, a highly welcome prospect. [69]

There is also a concensual position which stresses that the French attitude was essentially part of a Gaullist foreign policy project, articulated at the time over such contentious subjects as the Vietnam war, the Cuban Missile crisis, independent nuclear deterrence and NATO, and the EEC, which was aimed at asserting France's own independent judgement and priorities from those of Britain and the United States. [70]

Economic concerns tended to favor the Quai's position, with oil and trade as important considerations. When Biafra declared its independence in May 1967, France had a total of £35 million worth of investments in Nigeria and only 28 per cent(or about £10 million) was in Biafran territory. [71] In fact by July 1968, when France made its first pro-Biafra statement, the entire French investment in Biafra, including those owned by the French oil company, SAFRAP(a subsidiary of the state-owned Enterprises de Recherches et d'Activites Petrolieres ERAP), was already in the territory overrun by the Nigerian army(this included especially the Ogwaza, Azumini and Ebocha oilfields). [72] So it appeared imprudent, especially in economic terms, for France to wish to support Biafra at a time when Biafran resistance appeared to be crumbling.

Political Concerns for the implications of self-determination also required a cautious position. While the Quai d'Orsay argued that such a policy would damage French interests in Nigeria and elsewhere in Africa (especially in Cameroon, Niger, Algeria, Morocco and Egypt, actively profederal Nigerian states, which had lobbied intesively in Paris against French recognition of Biafran independence). [73]

No doubt, the success of Biafra would have set off a chain reaction in Africa which could have led to the collapse of

the organically incoherent states that did across the continent which in the main serve the hegemonist interests of Northern powers of the world(which include France). Thus, Biafra was a long term threat to French interests in AFrica .

This so because most of these states, that were a colonial creation, were afraid of the negative effect a Biafra succes could have on their territorial integrity, which also meant a direct menace to French interests because, as we stated in chapter 2, the project of nation state building was divided on three dimensions.

For the Biafrans French military aid was crucial, although after the war Biafrans claimed that this French assistance was in fact detrimental to their cause, for it raised false hopes and also annoyed the British, making them more determined in their support of Lagos. [74] de St. Jorre indicates that the war was prolonged by the infusion of French arms which resulted in increased intransingence on both sides rather than moves to a negotiated settlement. The effect of France's Biafra policy was like that of drugs on cancer: it kept the recipient alive by ensuring—barring a miracle—a lingering death. "[75]

6-6-4 USA Motives of Intervention

The United States came first in absolute quantities of relief aid, but only seventh in proportion to its GNP. It also repeatedly voiced its concern about the conflict, and placed an arms embargo. Interestingly, during the Johnson Administration, when involvement was fairly limited and the whole attitude detached, Washington had to cope with the strong criticism of Lagos. But under Nixon when interest rose considerably, the USA was to suffer the indignation of the Biafran leaders.

On the whole, US involvement in the conflict can be regarded as fairly evenly balanced until the later period, when it was distinctly pro-Lagos, particularly when Biafra lay the onus of settling the conflict(peacefully) on the Nixon Administration and Nixon did nothing about it. Thus, indirectly at least, the United States buttressed the Nigerian policy of a military victory. [76]

The main reason for Washington's humanitarian involvement was no doubt the public opinion. American concern was so great that the issue virtually became a domestic one, second only to Vietnam. [77] Nixon, it should be noted, had already committed himself by a dramatic statement in favour of `the Biafran people' during his presidential campaign. On the other hand, Washington would go no further, for it considered Nigeria a British responsibility and felt confident that any Soviet influence could easily be counteracted without resorting to unorthodox methods such as assisting secessionists. Furthermore the United States, generalizing from its own civil war, was a believer in federalism, and was at no time speculating on Nigerian dismemberment with an eye on its oil, as the Soviet Union mistakenly conjectured. [78]

6-6-5 Portugal Motives of Intervention

It seems that Portugal didn't supply arms to the Biafrans however, the Portuguese capital, Lisbon, was the major centre of the Biafran private arms purchasing business in Europe. Here, Biafra established the `Africa Operations Bureau". [79]

Portugal's support for Biafra was primarily motivated by the heavy financial returns which it derived from Biafra's payments for the airfields and the arms purchasing business organised in Lisbon. [80] The Salazar regime was absolutely cautious in avoiding being seen by the rest of the

international community in the obvious contradictory role of aiding, albeit indirectly, Biafran national liberation, while fighting desparately to destory similar aspirations in Angola, Guinea-Bissau and Mozambique. [81]


6-6-6 The OAU Intervention

As the prime guarantor of the peace and security in Africa, the OAU was the first to make a tentative peace initiative to the resolution of Nigeria conflict despite the early opposition of the FMG which considered the conflict as an internal matter.

So, a Consultative Mission made up of six heads of state was established at the OAU Conference in September, 1967. It `solemnly reaffirmed... adherence to the principle of respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of member states;" and `reiterated... condemnation of secession of any member state."[82] It also confirmed the FMG belief that the Civil War was an internal matter that must be solved by Nigerians. Since the resolution recognized the `desire for the territorial integrity, unity and peace of Nigeria,". [83] Biafra's position that it should be considered an independent and equal partner in negotiations was rejected from the very beginning. As a result, this first OAU peace initiative was a failure.

However, this did not deter the OAU strong determination; from 1967 to 1969, it tooks many peace initiatives like: The OAU consultative committee meeting, 1968 in Niamey Niger; The Addis Ababa peace Talks under the Consultative committee, August 1968; The OAU Annual Meeting of The Assembly, Algeria 1968; The OAU Consultative committee Meeting, in Morovia, Liberia 1969; The OAU Sixth Assembly Of Heads Of

State and Governments held in Addis Ababa, September 1969. [84]

All these attempts of the OAU mediation showed that this African continental organization has commitment in the reinstallation of peace in Nigeria and in Africa in general. But, when we look on the result we have to recognize that it didn't produce the desired result; most of the resolution were almost stating the condamnation of the secession.

Both the Algier OAU summit in September 1968 and the Addis Ababa conference in September 1969 re-endorsed the official OAU policy on the war. Each conference resolution on Nigeria in the official communique always emphasized the OAU standard position on a United Nigeria solution: `Appeals solemnly and urgently to the two parties involved in the civil war to agree to preserve in the over-riding interests of Africa, the unity of Nigeria and accept immediately the suspension of hostilities...' [85] Only the four African states which recognised Biafra voted against the resolution in Algiers(with Rwanda and Botswana abstaining), while in Addis Ababa they (along with Sierra Leone) instead decided to abstain.

When we follow the evolution of Nigeria political realities systematically, we come easily to the conclusion that the sources of the Nigeria civil war are strictly connected to the British colonial legacy. We realize that the political culture in which the Nigerian people were used to live during the colonial period could cultivate hardly a sense of national unity.

However, we should recognize that the Nigeria political leaders didn't show a common sense of responsibility and maturity in the post-colonial period. This is so because every

However, we should recognize that the Nigeria political leaders didn't show a common sense of responsibility and maturity in the post-colonial period. This is so because every body was aware of the fragility of the peace and should overcome their contradiction in order to restore peace.

Instead of peace, they have opted for the confrontation , thus the combined effects of inter-regional and group-to-group relations of party politics, elections and census figures were to generate the politics of cultural subnationalism and war as a result. But, along with the colonialist and the political leaders, the impact of foreign powers intervention was very big because it introduced weapons and gave the belligerents the moral and material force to fight each other.

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## CHAPTER 7   CASE STUDY: THE ANGOLA CASE

### 7-1 Introduction

After the Portuguese coup of 1974, the Portuguese formally
acknowledged Angolan independence and attempted to establish
a mechanism for the transfer of power to a transitional
government representive of the people of Angola.   Conflict
between the three movements and Portugal was ended and the
transition to Angolan independence was being worked out.   By
the end of 1974, the Portuguese had signed a cease-fire
agreement with each movement. [1]

On January 15th, 1975, for the purpose of preparing the
way for Angolan independence, Portuguese and Angolan leaders
met in Alvor in the Portuguese Algrave and signed an accord
for creating a transitional government that would exercise
power until Angolan independence on November 11, 1975.   This
was known as the Alvor Agreement.   The Alvor Agreement called
for installation of a transitional government on January 31,
leading to independence on November 11, and stipulated that
the Portuguese and the Angolan nationalist forces would be
integrated into a single national security forces. [2]

After the signing of the Alvor Agreement in January 1975,
an uneasy peace existed among the rival groups themselves and
with the Portuguese.   The Portuguese hoped that the Alvor
Agreement would result in a government of national unity.
However, it collapsed in the March conflict between the MPLA
and FNLA.   The OAU's attempt to revive these hopes through
the Nakuru Agreement of June 1975 also proved unsuccessful
under the pressures of the struggle for power between the
MPLA, FNLA and UNITA. [3]

So, what are the factors which contributed to the outbreak of the conflict? We have stated in our main Introduction that, three dimensions should be considered in trying to comprehend the evolution of ethnic conflicts in Africa:the colonial legacy,the process of nation state building and the international dimension.

Howevere, in order to understant our approach well there is a need to make an historical review of the pre-colonial political institution which had existed in the area which form the country called Angola today.

## 7-2 Historical Background: Pre-Colonial Political
   Organization

Before the coming of the Portugueses, the country known as Angola today, was an areas occuped by different indigenous peoples who organized their life in different kind of political organizations which were more or less related with each other.

In the southern part of Angola, we find the Ovimbundu which, with about 36 per cent of all Angolans speaking Umbundu, is the largest ethnolinguistic group and the most homogeneous group in Angola. The Umbundu were concentrated in the south of the Cuanza River on the central highlands in the most populous districts of Anogla: Huambo, Benguela Bie. From this population center the Umbundu scattered to every district so that this most homogeneous group was also the most wideranging of all linguistic groups. [4]

The social structure of the Ovimbundu corresponded to their economic life. After the family, the clan was considered as the strongest and most enduring institution of the Ovimbundu, its significance has declined only in recent decades. The higest social unit(Wemba) consisted of a variable number of clans subordinated to a common chief. The clan headmen were at the same time the advisers of the common chief. The chief, although he was selected by matrilinear succession, had to be confirmed in office by the clan headmen. [5]

There were twelve or so important Ovimbundu kingdoms. The kings exercised three principal function: communicating with the spirit world, relating to other peoples and dispensing justice. The king was generally not arbitrary in his decisions, but was bound by the customs of his people as well as by the opinions of his councillors. Each Umbundu king held authority over a number of sub-kingdoms or atumbu. The largest kingdom, Bailundo, had about 200 atumbu, and each atumbu ruled over 3 to 300 villages. [6] The populous, homogeneous, but scattered Umbundu exercised a cultural imperialism among their neighbours of other ethno-linguistic groups.

In the nothern part of Angola, the region of Cabinda and the current administrative distric of Zaire and Uige,we find the  Bakongo which identified themselves most frequently as peoples of the old Kingdom of the Kongo.Their identity was strengthened by the fact that the Congo region had the only centralized monarchy in Angola. [7]

The old kingdom of Kongo was divided into six provinces: Mpemba(central), Mbata(south of the Kongo River), Sonyo and Mbamba(coastal), Mpangu(remoter) and Nsundi(northern of the capital). The central province of Mpemba was ruled by the king personally. In their evolution, Mbemba kept up a sort of an alliance with Kongo, but Sonyo and Sundi had long ceased to acknowledge any allegiance to the old Kingdom. [8]

The division of the old kingdom of Kongo into provinces was not, in a strict sense, territorial. It was more a division of clans, several of them occupying the same territory. [9] The ancient kingdom of the Kongo, had a hierarchy which had as its spiritual head the founder hero and all the ancestors. The king and the great men of the kingdom formed the aristocracy. The sovereign directed affairs with the help of a council, and the state had an administrative body comprising the provincial governors, the court officials and the priests responsible for the ancestor cult. Then, at lower levels, there were the village chiefs under the authority of the provincial governors. Finally, at the bottom of the hierarchy, came the people in the village community. [10]

In the area of Luanda, the actual capital of Angola, we find the Luanda-Mbundu, which is the second largest ethnic linguistic group in Angola. The Kimbundu spread from Luanda at the coast of the Cassange basin in the eastern part of the district of Malange. Twenty peoples were listed in the Kimbundu group. The Portuguese influence, which was more extensive and intensive in the Kimbundu area than in any other region of Angola, diminished the importance of the Kimbundu peoples as social or political units. [11]

In the Eastern part of Angola, we find the group Lunda-Chokwe which included many other sub-groups. ˚Lunda″ refers to the great empire of Central Africa which sent political chiefs from Katanga/Shaba to the most populous areas of eastern Angola in the seventeenth century. Among the people under the Lunda chiefs were the Chokwe. The Chokwe socio-political organization was built around twelve matrilineal clans ruled by petty lineage chiefs. The Lunda imposed themselves as political chiefs over the local lineage heads and founded kingdoms on the model of the Lunda empire. [12]

This brieve historical review of the pre-colonial history of the now called Angola present a diversity of ethnic group with different political system. However, what should be noted is that these ethnic groups where in a dynamic process of transformation and development. In conformity of their realities, some of these states were entering in a loose form of confederation with other states.

7-3 The Colonial Roots of Angola Conflict

Like those of other African conflicts, the roots of the Angolan conflict can be found in the context of the legacy of the European colonial rule.

7-3-1 The Slave Trade

The principal object of the Portuguese was to obtain slaves, gold and other valuable commodities in the coastal communities. They learned to establish relatiohs with coastal chiefs with whose permission and cooperation they traded. Although Abolished in 1836, this slave trade had produced many impacts. [13]

A review of the Angolan history suggests that the slave trade had significantly affected the politics, economy, and social life of the Angolan peoples. First of all, it caused internal strife in each kingdom as it led to conflict with nieghboring peoples who became the primary source of captives to be sold to the metropole. The desire of tribal rulers to control the sources of the slave trade was at the root of the conflicts between the Kongo kingdom and other tribal kingdoms, such as Ndongo, Mataunoba, Kasaje, and others in the 16th century. Such strife fractured major kingdoms, and created political instability and violence as increasing numbers of

tribal rulers had a direct supply of arms and munitions from the metropole. [14]

The most widely held view is that the trade carried on by the Portuguese with Africa was of a kind which stunted and retarded the productive capacity of the African people. Slave trading, ivory hunting or gold washing involved the expenditure of many working hours and the diversion of manpower which could have been devoted to production. [15] Futhermore, it resulted in massive depopulation.


7-3-2 Portuguese Military Pacification

Earlier Potuguese commercial relations, especially the slave trade, with the African peoples were followed by a slow, spasmodic military conquest that finally extended Portuguese authority over the interior in the late 19th century. Portuguese military pacification can be divided into two phases. The first phase covers the period from the beginning of the slave trade to the 1884 Berlin Conference which gave international dignity to the ˚Scramble for Africa″ and carved Africa up between the European colonial powers. [16] The second phase covers the military campaigns of 1885 to 1920 leading to effective colonial occupation.

The series of Portuguese military pacification also had a significant impact on the fragmentation of the Angolan pre-colonial society becauses, as they pacified the interior and gradually extended their control, the various tribal groups and kingdoms were destroyed or amalgamated .This contributed largely to the destruction of socio-cultural order based on ethnicity.

Especially, the establishment of the international boundary by the Berlin Conference had also contributed to the division of the Angolan society. For example, the Bakongo people, one of the largest ethnic groups in Angola were scattered into the districts of neighboring states, Zaire, Congo(Brazzaville) and Cabinda, while the Ovimbundu people, the largest ethnic group, were to be found in both sides of the border with Namibia. [17]

The Lunda-Chokwe group, the fourth largest ethnic group in Angola, also spanned the borders with Zaire and Zambia. The fragmentation of ethnicity caused by the international boundary produced numerous problems. For example, the Bakongo people in the northern Angola, who stretched into Zaire, had created the opportunity for conflicts of loyalty, porous borders and possible interference in Angolan affairs via the Bakongo peoples. In the early stages of the rise of African nationalism within Angola in the 1950s, Bakongo separatism and nationalism was strong and divisive factor which detracted from the national liberation struggle. [18]

The African peoples of Angola were generally divided into three major ethnic linguistic groups, although there were some hundred tribes in the area. The major ethnic groups which accounted for 70 per cent of the African population were the Umbundu speaking Ovimbundu, the Kimbundu speaking Luanda-Mbundu, and the Kikongo speaking Bakongo. [19]


7-3-3 Land Policy and Labor policy

During their period of settlment in Angola, the Portugueses practised a land policy which consisted of giving the best land to Europeen settler and campanies and of resettling the local peoples in other areas.

The first major attempt to legally dispossess Africans of their land came in 1907 with a decree which allowed fixed zones to be set aside for the exclusive use of Africans. The

practical result of this decree was to provide Europeans with a legal vehicle for taking over the choice plateau areas in rural Angola. [20]

This practice reached a new level with the flow of Europeans in 1950-60. Thus, south on the Huila plateau, most of the best African agricultural land was appropriated much earlier by Portuguese settlers since it was an area of early and intensive colonization. By the 1950s, African agriculture on the Huila plateau was in serious decline, a problem which was only excerbated by the widespread contracting of Africans to work on Portuguese farms, industries, road construction and other public work projects. [21]

Most African peasants had to cultivate land which was not officially recognised as belonging to them, because they were forced to sell them at low prices imposed by the authorities. The average European coffee farmer, owing 100 hectares could have an annual income of $28,000 but an African farmer was restricted to only one or two hectares and consequently earned only around 2 per cent of that amount. By 1971, 60 per cent of the cultivatable land in Angola consisted of large farms, belonging almost exclusively to Europeans. [22]

To satisfy the demand of labor force, the Portuguese administration installed a labor policy which was very much exploitative to the African peoples. Although the labor laws were subject to frequent amemdment, the core of the legislation remained unchanged from 1899 until 1961, with an important recodificaiton in 1928.

This legislation stated that all Africans had a ˝moral and legal obligation˝ to work. They could either exercise a recognised trade or profession, or they could ˝cultivate on their own land of a specified extent˝; failing that, they had to contract themselves to an employer. The term used for a contracted laborer in Portuguese was ˝servical˝, and in theory, a servical could contract himself to whomsoever he pleased, a partly free labour market. If he failed to contract himself, he could be forcibly contracted by the administration. [23]

This trade in forced labor provided Portugal's most stable sources of foreign exchange. Henrique Galvao, a one time colonial administrator, who had the courage to tell the truth, stated that ˝only the dead escaped forced labour...˝[24]

At one end of the specrum of resistance were the actual outbreaks of armed rebelion in which labor issue was clearly a grievance; for instance, the Kongo rebellion of 1913 or the Barue rising of 1917. However, armed resistance petered out after 1920 and from that time the commonest way in which opposition was expressed, was for the population to migrate. [25]

It was difficult to see how Africans would benefit from participation in the Portuguese labor system when as late as 1942 that system guaranteed them payment of less than $1.50 per month. For many Africans the only escape from this modern form of slavery was to flee the colony. By 1954 the United Nations estimated that about 500,000 Angolans were living outside the country. [26]

For example, Marcello Caetano, deposed as Prime Minister in April 1974, looked into African labor conditions in the mid-1940s as Salazar's Minister of Colonies. He stated that the large labour migration was caused by the blind selfishness of Portuguese employers and the system of forced labor which used Africans ˝like pieces of equipment without any concern for their yearning, interests or desires˝. [27]

7-3-4 Portuguese Colonial Policy

The inhabitants of Portuguese colonies were also divided into two categories: non-indigenas and indigena. The former category included whites and assimilated Africans' assimilados or mulattos), while the latter consisted only of non-assimilated Africans. [28]

In theory the assimilado had all the privileges and rights which went with Portuguese citizenship. On the other hand, the indigena had no citizenship. The indigena had to carry an identity card and were subject to all labor regulations. [29]

The policy of cultural assimilation based upon race had been an overwhelming failure. In the official 1950 census, 30,089 Africans were recorded as assimilated Africans who met the requirements for assimilado. These figures indicated that slightly over one-half of 1 per cent of the whole population were assimilados while over 99 per cent of the population were indigena. [30] The assimilado system had caused serious divisions between African natives. Non-assimilated Africans were effectively segregated from assimilados and whites during the colonial period. Arguing that the cultural assimilation policy had failed, Eduardo Mondlane commeted that the assimilado system was designed to produce not Portuguese citizens but servants of Portugal. [31]

Another characteristic of Portuguese colonial policy was that Christian missionary activities had been a major part of Portuguese assimilation policy of integrating the Africans into the civilized way of life. Portugal assigned these tasks to Christian missions, which until the 1950s administered practically all educational institutions as well as most health and welfare programs. [32]

Education in Angola was divided between those schools designed for the white and assimilated Africans and others for the mass of African natives. Government schools were charged with the responsibility of educating only the white and assimilated population. Until the promulgation of new reforms in 1961, the Portuguese government were not concerned itself with educating the African population. [33]

While Christian missionary activities led to the modification of the Angolan traditional society through education, through the introduction of the ideal of Western equality and through the creation of an African clergy, they contributed to the division of the peoples of Angola. One striking feature of Christian missions in Angola was the identification of each of the major mission agencies with the principal ethno-linguistic groups: the Catholics with the Kimbundu; Protestants with the Bakongo; and the Congregational with the Umbundu. It was believed that, by 1966, approximately 40-45% of all Angolans were Catholic. Most of Catholic population was centered in areas which had the greatest number of Portuguese. Therefore, Cabinda and cities such as Luanda, Huambo, and Benguela still have predominantly Catholic populations. Less populatd areas have proportionally fewer Catholics. [34]

The division of Christian churches between hte Catholics and Protestants introduced the potential for conflict by producing divisions within villages. Catholic-Protestant relations had been strained because of the accusation leveled by the colonial government against Protestants as being one of the responsible organizations for terrorist activities in northern Angola. The UPA was said to favor Protestants, while the MPLA represented Catholics. The persecution of Protestants within Angola by Portuguese authorities sharpened the existing division between the MPLA and UPA (Union of People of Angola) groups. [35]

The Portuguese employed many tactics to divide and rule. The most obvious method was to use troops recruited from the south to fight the rebels from the north. In addition to army recruits from the south, Portugal has intensified its forced labor program in order to supply works for the coffee regions. Laborers were sent out from the south to the coffee plantations in the north and to the docks in the coastal cities of Luanda and Lobito. [36]

Another tactic was the order of the colonial authority to village leaders to report any stranger found within their villages. This could not let the Angola peoples to communicate freely and to build a national consciousness.

The colonial government justified its actions by stating that enmity between African groups was inherent within their tribal culture. [37]

When the Angola people initiated any revolt, they were crushed by the army and police intervention. This has been considered as an important role in the suppression of African nationalism. [38]

Another aspect of colonial legacy in Angola is also to be found in the Portuguese practice of destruction of traditional socio-political institutions as well as their hate of African culture.

By acting violently against the Africans' rebellion and later against nationalist movement, the colonialists are to be blamed for the militarisation of Angolan society and the importance which the mass came to accord to such national movement of liberation. Basil Davidson in his book The Search for Africa gives us an eloquent explanation:

In the historical context, the revolt of the Mbunda beginning in the second half of the 1960s may be interpreted

in several different ways. It may be considered as another, if major, act of resistance within the traditional framework of anticolonial peasant struggle: as one more attempt, like others before it, to restore the ˚right and proper way of life" by restoring the rule of the ancestors and their spokesmen here on earth, as well as to free the Mbunda from colonial exactions of one kind or another... Perfectly unshaken by these early attacks, which they easily dispersed, the Portuguese could now have to worry about another factor. This was the arrival on the scene of the spokesmen of a nationalist movement, the MPLA (Movimento Popular de Libertacao de Angola), [39] which proved to have the capacity to reverse the balance, and to embrace the Mbunda in a movement of resistance that was still both modernizing and traditional, but in which the modernizing elements were increasingly to have the upper hand. Under this new leadership, whether of rural or urban formation and equipped now with at least some supply of MPLA small arms, the Mbunda rallied and began again. With varying fortunes they have since continued against a stiffening Portuguese military effort to destroy them. By 1970, at least, they had gone far toward transforming their faith in charms from the old type to a new type, abandoning much of their faith in charms and pells (at least in the matter of bullet proofing), and gradually, if with many false starts and setbacks, to see themselves as component parts in the realization of a program of *national* unity and change such as they had not conceived before. [40]

In summary, the Portuguese colonial practices could hardly foster a feeling of national unity. Instead, they contributed to the creation of a new Angolan nationalism and factionalism while modifying and disrupting the Angolan traditional society.

7-4 The Fragmentation of Angolan Nationalism

Unlike African politics in the other Portuguese colonies in Africa, the liberation movements in Angola never succeeded in creating a united front to bring together the various nationalist groups opposed to colonial rule.

Peaceful and nonviolent attempts by Angolans at acquiring political independence were put down ruthlessly by the colonial authorities. The armed struggle that ensued in the early 1960s soon split into three main movements: The Movimento Popular de Libertacao de Angola(MPLA), the Frente Nacional para a Libertacao de Angola(FNLA), and the Uniao Nacional para a Independencia Total de Angola(UNITA) [41]

The Leaders of thes three movements were unable to reconcile their personal, ideological and ethnic differences with the necessity of creating a united front to fight a common enemy. Although ideological and ethnic differences were responsible for this division, the conflicting personal ambitions of the leaderships played an equally important role. [42]

7-4-1 Ethnic Factor

The ethnic composition of the three liberation movements is normally seen as one of the main causes of disunity.

FNLA was based among the Bakongo people in the north and UNITA among the Ovimbundu in the central and southern regions, both being extremely hostile to the involvement of white and mestico(mixed-race) Angolans in the independence movement. While FNLA was antisocialist from the very beginning, UNITA became so after a confused and confusing interlude with Maoist rhetoric. With some exceptions, MPLA's leadership has, by and large, advocated and practiced a nonracial, nonethnic,

and socialist approach to Angolan independence and development. [43]

Between the collapse of the Portuguese regime and the outbreak of civil war there were massive population shifts, as most people considered it unsafe for the outbreak of a civil war to find them in a region outside their own. Many Ovimbundu people moved en-masse to their central highland roots. The same applied to the Bakongos and the Mbundus, who moved back to the northern and Luanda regions respectively. When eventually the MPLA proclaimed independence, violent disagreements along ethnic lines were clearly visible. Since there was an ethnic framework within which they could operate, both UNITA and FNLA refused to accept the MPLA's declaration, and they went ahead with their own declarations of independence. Thus, it was the case that, as of the time the civil war started, the ethnic lines had been distinctly drawn. [44]

7-4-2 Ideological and Personal Factor

To the leaders of Angola liberation movements modern political beliefs and ideologies have been an important source of strength to resistance movements.
The UNITA and the FNLA were supported by the Western countries while the USSR and its allies were the principal sponsors of the MPLA. [45] The leaders of these three main movements were in bad personal relation and each of them wanted to assume the highest position of leadership.

7-4-3 The Process of Political Power Transfer

The situation in Angola being already alarming, it was expected that with the assistance of Portugal and the

international community, political compromise could be reached and adequates measures taken before the independence.

However, Portugal had no will to involve such international organisations as the UN and the OAU in Angola's independence process, unlike the white settlers in, say, Zimbabwe or Namibia. Portugal's administrative and institutional weakness allowed the three liberation movements to move with impunity from their bases, both in the jungles of Angola and in neighbouring African states, into urban areas with their weapons. This Portuguese blunder accelerated the breakdown of law and order as the three groups shifted their military arenas from the rural areas into the cities.

Third, even as the dark clouds of civil strife were mounting, Portugal proceeded with its stated objective of granting independence to Angola at the stipulated date, 11 November 1975, regardless of whether or not proper political and legisative arrangements were in place: essentially a cavalier stategy of ˚scuttle″. It should be noted that Portugal did make one last-ditch attempt to bring the three movements together in a Transitional Government headed by a Portuguese-appointed High Commissioner with a cabinet of 12 ministers, three each for the Portuguese and the three liberation movements. [46] This arrangement would be known as the ˚Alvor Accords″. It should be noted however that Jomo Kenyatta, rather than the Portuguese, should be credited for making the Alvor Accords a possiblity. It was Kenyatta who summoned Neto, Roberto, and Savimbi to Kenya and persuaded them to form a united delegation for the talks with the Portuguese authorities.

The Alvor Accords, however, did not last long for very predictable reasons. First, neither of the three leaders – Roberto, Neto, and Savimbi –participated directly in the Provisional Government. However provisional the Transitional

Government was, it lacked any real desision-making power and had no control over the quickly deteriorating social, political, economic, and military situations. Consequently, the very instrument that was intended to minimize the political vacuum created by the collapse of the Portuguese administration contributed to the development of a sense of anarchy.

7-4-4 The Foreign Intervention

Two important factors seemed to have affected foreign intervention.

The first factor was the sudden change in the internal situation as a result of the collapse of the Portuguese colonial government in April 1974 and the subsequent failure of the Portuguese to transfer political authority to the Angolan people. [47] Prior to the overthrow of Caetano distatorship by the 1974 military coup, many foreign powers, such as the U.S., the Soviet Union, China, South Africa and neighboring African states had been involved in Angolan affairs, but the sudden collapse of the Portuguese colonial government created a fundamentally new situation. In other words, while no legitimate political authority was formed, there came about a political vacuum which foreign powers attempted to fill. This dramatically altered the prospects for foreign powers gaining influence in a rapidly changing region, as well as creating new dangers for regional powers, such as Zaire and South Africa, whose security would be, to some extent, affected by the outcome of Angolan independence. It is in this context that the decisions of Zaire and South Africa, the regional powers, to intervene militarily in Angola, should be explained.

Military weakness on the part of the three movements was another major internal factor pulling foreign powers into the

Angolan conflict. This factor has made it necessary for the movements to request external assistance not only to successfully challenge the Portuguese power, but also to overpower their rivals in the interfactional conflict. Virtually all the movements had been totally dependent upon European states for arms and other forms of military technology from their beginning, because Angola, like other African states, had never developed a significant indigenous military production capacity. [48]

7-5 Angola Post-Independence and the Continuation of the Conflict

By March 1976, the 1975-76 Angola conflict -the so called Angola civil war was over with the MPLA victory. The OAU and the UN recognized the MPLA government as the legitimate government of Angola and most Western states except the U.S. accepted the reality in Angola. [49] But despite this historical fact which was marked by Angolan political independence, the Angolan conflict did not stop. Contrary to any expectation, it became more intense.

Two important factors explain the continuation of the war in the post-colonial period: the lack of national consensus between the ruling party and the leaders of the main opposition political parties [failure of the policy of national union] and the massive involvement of foreign powers.

7-5-1 The MPLA National Policy of State Building

In chapter 5, we have argued that what characterize most African state governments in the post colonial period is the effort made by the nationalist leaders to consolidate their power base throught presidentialism, mono-partism, constitu-

tional reform, state hegemony on economic activities and administrative institutions. The MPLA practices illustrated well this reality.

In order to consolide his power, the MPLA had to form a government alone and declared illegal all the opposition parties. However, as we have noted in the first section, all these parties had an ethnic composition.

To the UNITA and the FNLA, this decision meant their exclusion in the futur of politics of Angola. This is so because in July 1976, when the MPLA organized the first election in Luanda, for the popular commission for various districts, people with either the Portuguese administration or those with the FNLA and UNITA were banned from participation. [50]

The effort of the MPLA didn't stop merely at the control of political activities; more than any thing, the ruling party devoted itself to the administrative apparatus. As we stated in chapter 5, the African nationalists believe that the control of the administrative apparatus could give them the possibility to dictate their developmental plan without any opposition.

In Angola, this matter was dealt with at the first Congress in december 1977. The MPLA made the decision that it would reconstitute itself from a liberation mouvement to a Marxist-Leninist party, and restructured itself accordingly. In an efford to coordinate party and state more closely, the then president Neto announced reorganization. The new structure would permit the provincial functionaries to co-ordinate both state and party operations in each region. [51]

We think that for a country which had just come through a civil war and the supporter of the MPLA belonging mostly to

one ethnic group, this control of state administrative apparatus could mean deprivation to the members of other ethnic groups and in the situation of African states where the future status of most educated peoples is in the hand of the states, this situation of domination could create an ethnic tension.

First of all, electoral legitimacy is the major factor contributing to the continued UNITA fighting against the MPLA government. The UNITA was able to convince most of the Ovimbundu people that the MPLA government could not be trusted, and that their safety could only come if and when they rose and fought against what the UNITA successfully painted as the hard time ahead. [52]

Therefore, from the UNITA's point of view, the MPLA government is a minority one which represents only 30-40 % of the Angolan population, thus political decisions benefit the MPLA ethnic base, not Angola as a whole. Due to its political representation based largely upon the Luanda-Mbundu ethnic group, the MPLA government is also viewed as a one-party dictatorship refusing to allow democratic elections because UNITA would emerge victorious. Savimbi has argued as follows:

You can not have peace in Angola without a government of national unity and reconciliation that will include UNITA, because UNITA represents the majority of the Angolan people. If there had been elections in October 1975, UNITA would have won, and if there are elections today, UNITA would still win. [53]

Logically speaking, the claim of UNITA is not without solid foundation. A national government's role is to foster national unity in a peacefull and democratic process. However, the policy of state building adopted by the MPLA could be hardly constructive because only MPLA members were allowed to participe in.

In a sense the entire UNITA struggle against the MPLA government can be summed up as follows: the Ovimbundu people continue to fight MPLA rule because the Ovimbundu are the largest ethnic group in Angola and yet have no political representation. Without this condition, UNITA would merely be a dissident group fighting for power they could not hope to achieve through the electoral process. UNITA documents state, `UNITA continues to fight against the minority government."[54]

7-5-2 The Option of Military Solution

The second factor is the choice of military means instead of reconciliation dialogue made by the MPLA in the objective of eliminating all the opposition parties. The MPLA introduced a new internal defence law to combat constant and widespred UNITA guerilla attacks. [55] However, by taking this policy, the MPLA made three mistakes.

a) Miscalculating UNITA's strength and its ability to re-emerge as a powerful military and political force;

b) Underestimating the commitment of South Africa and the United States to support UNITA, and

c) Overestimating its own ability to end the civil war by military means with the help of Cuba and the Soviet Union.

In military terms, the MPLA succeeded in driving the FNLA into Zaire and out of existence, while dispersing UNITA into the savannas of Southeastern Angola closely related to the large number of foreign troops including Cuban troops and Soviet advisers residing in Angola. UNITA believes that it is these foreigners who allow the minority MPLA to continue its rule and prevent UNITA from winning the insurgency outright and that the present MPLA government is a puppet of the Soviet Union and Cuba. Thus, UNITA argues that it is now

fighting against a new Soviet-Cuban colonialism instead of its previous struggle against Portuguese colonialism prior to independence. The major UNITA goal is thus to fight for the total withdrawal of the over 40,000 foreign troops which occupy Angola. [56]

This internationalization of the Angolan conflict brings a certain respect and legitimacy to the UNITA movement. To Western supporters, UNITA is viewed as ˚freedom fighters″ fighting against Soviet-Cuban communist forces. As an underdog fighting against Soviet-Cuban forces, UNITA becomes not only a national liberation movement, but also an anti-communist international movement. Such status provides for Western vocal, monetary, and military support which, in turn, increases the presence of the movement and helps in recruiting. [57]

In conclusion, many factors tend to explain the Angola conflict during its first and second stage. To be sure, the ethnic element was present in the nature of political parties. However, to consider it as an element of irrationality seems to be exaggerated in this case because in face of the Portuguese colonial policies, the contrary could be impossible. But, in the post-independence Angola, the ethnic element has become more important because of the lack of common political vision and national dialogue between the political leaders. Thus, each of them wanting to neutralize the other, and they come to follow the colonial path by focusing on the fear of domination and the need of security for their ethnic group.

The third element is, as we have seen, the presence of foreign forces which aligned themselves behind each groups. This is a very important element as it constitutes a strength for each of them and therefore altered any possibility of local resolution.

7-6 The Motives of Foreign Intervention In Angola

7-6-1 The Former Soviet Union Motives of Intervention

Some observers believe that Angola offers a profitable target for World Communist Revolution, and that the Soviet Union is pursuing its ideologically ordained quest in Angola.

Why ideological considerations played an important role in the Soviet foreign policy decision to intervene in the Angolan conflict? One of the Soviet policies toward the Third World has been the emphasis on supporting national liberation movements. This was in the hope that the future Angolan government will establish a Marxist-Leninism oriented government.

In a foreign policy statement in June 1961, the Soviet Communist Party's general secretary, Nikita Khrushchev, praised the MPLA-led uprising in Angola earlier on in the year, and expressed confidence in the movement's ultimate victory. [58]

The Soviet Union as a leader of the communist bloc thought herself as a great power, which should be involved in the resolution of international disputes as it is in the practice of international politics.

On the political motivations, the U.S. -Soviet and the Sino-Soviet rivalries were significant. The competition for power and influence among these major powers has constituted a prime factor underlying their activities in the Third World in the 1960s and early 1970s. Equally, it is pointed out by this school of Soviet foreign policy analysts that the Soviet Union has tried to influence African public opinion by increasingly identifying itself with the continent's liberation movements which are waging wars to overthrow the

`solid phalanx of white redoubts' in Southern Africa. [59]
The intention of the USSR, it is speculated, is to
demonstrate that it has both the capacity and the will to
provide effective military assistance to these anti-
imperialist forces. [60]

Soviet strategic interests in Angola can be analyzed in
terms of two distinct levels[ global and regional ]. Viewed
in a global perspective, the availability of Angolan ports
enhances Soviet naval capabilities in the South Atlantic and
creates a potential for Soviet interdiction of Western oil
tankers and other commercial transport, for Angola possesses
several excellent ports which lie adjacent to the major oil
routes from the Persian Gulf to Western European states.
David Albright has argues that the Soviet Union   has
consistently sought forms of local support in Africa and
other Third World states aimed at acquiring port facilities
in these countries to ease the logistic problems associated
with the greatly expanding Soviet naval forces.

It is Albright's opinion that similar facilities in the
Angolan ports of Luanda and Lobito would be of immense
strategic interest to the Soviet Union, as these ports
command the Cape routes which are of vital importance to
Western shipping. [61] Again the concept of military
cooperation embodied in the 1976 Sovieto-Angola Treaty of
Friendship and Cooperation included Soviet access to Luandan
air fields for purposes of conducting reconnaissance flights
over the sea lanes of the Atlantic Ocean. The agreement was
also meant to facilitate visits of Soviet military vessels to
Angolan ports. [62]

Additionally, the growth of UNITA's strength and the
incessant intervention of South Africa in southern parts of
Angola has increased the need to maintain close political and
military ties between the Soviet Union and Angola.

President dos Santos said in 1978:

We are forced to maintain and devlop a strong army in order to defend ourselves
against attacks by our enemies. Hence it is absolutely logical and natural for us
to have the support and internationalist solidarity of the countries that helped us,
during the war for national liberation, namely, the Soviet Union and Cuba.  This
probably explains why in spite of he rising cost of maintaining the Cuban, Soviet
and East German military advisers, the Angolan authorities are hell benton retaining
them. [63]

However, others think that the Soviet intervention may
have some economic dimensions. There is evidence that the
Soviets were aware of the enormous economic potential of
Angola's oil and minerals. One Soviet analyst abserved that
`it has not been ruled out that Angola is the richest on the
African continent, not counting South Africa."[64]   Thus,
there was little doubt that a friendly Angola would be able
to contribute only marginally towards some of the Soviet
Union's mineral and agricultural needs.

7-6-2 Cuba Motives of Intervention

Officially, the Cuban intervention in Africa was for
ideological reasons. Cuba wanted to help the revolutionary
change in Africa throught an installation of Marxist-Lenenist
regimes in African states because his leader Fidel Castro
believed that there were in Africa some real possibility of
succes. Skeptical about prospects for revolutionary changes
in Latin America, Castro assessed as follows:

Conditions in Africa, in contrast to those in Latin America, are ripe for
revolutionary change.   Africa is the weakest link of imperialism today...
Imperialist domination is not as strong there as in Latin America.  Therefore, the
possibility for fundamental changes onthe African continent is real. [65]

However, some analysts think that it would be too
simplistic, and even misleading, to view the Cuban

intervention as solely motivated by ideology. Klinghoffer maintained that Castro was 'anxious to play a leadership role in the Third World " through his strong ideological commitment to furthering the cause of Socialism. [66] In the same vein, Valenta has argued:

Angola in 1975 provided Castro with a unique opportunity to refurbish his image as a revolutionary leader of the non-aligned world(perhaps replacing Tito), and to increase the prestige and influence of his regime in the Third World prior to a conference of non-aligned nations scheduled to take place in Havana in 1979. [67]

Beyond such a political consideration, it was held that economic interests played a role in making the Cuban decision to intervene. Valenta stated that 'the Angolan situation probably afforded Cuba an opportunity to make adjustments in Soviet-Cuban economic relations." Castro may have expected, according to Valenta, that his intervention would be rewarded by the Soviet Union with increased aid or a rescheduling of the repayment of the Cuban economic debt. In fact, since 1975 Soviet economic and military assistance to Cuba has expanded. [68]

7-6-3 South Africa Motives of Intervention

South Africa had also diverse reasons for increasing military assistance to UNITA.

First, South Africa was concerned about the implications of Angolan independence for South Africa's own security. With the MPLA favorably disposed toward black majority rule throughout southern Africa and the Angolan government providing support both to SWAPO and to the ANC, South African leaders saw nothing but trouble ahead. From Pretoria's perspective, policies had to be implemented against the MPLA government —and other states that might help SWAPO and the ANC —to forestall such a troubling future.

Second, because of its concern about Angolan support for SWAPO and the ANC, South Africa increased its resolve to maintain control over Namibia or, failing that, to determine the future directions of the policies of an independent Namibian government. In either case, South Africa believed that Namibia would be an effective buffer between Angola and South Africa.

The reason for the South African intervention was given later by Premier Vorster, couched in the standard anti-communist rhetoric of the Pretoria regime:

'It is obvious that South Africa is concerned over the blatant Russian and Cuban military support for the MPLA in Angola... We are concerned because we know that the aim is not simply the establishment of a Marxist state in Angola, but to endeavour to create a whole row of Marxist states from Angola to Dar es Salaam and if it is at all possible, to divide Africa into two... If they achieve their objective, not a single African country will be able to feel safe". [69]

As for Pretoria's concerns about the MPLA itself, South Africa believed it had legitimate cause for alarm. Shartly after acquiring power in 1975, the MPLA, seeking to find support in the south against UNITA, reached an agreement with SWAPO under which SWAPO established bases in Angola's south. By late 1976, SWAPO was infiltrating more than one hundred guerrillas at a time into Namibia from these bases.

In response, South Africa moved twenty thousand members of the SADF into Namibia. SADF also began training and arming UNITA forces in Namibia. It was this training and arming that helped UNITA achieve its military successes of 1977-79. Inexorably, then, Angola's two conflicts became increasingly linked. [70]

Economically, Angola's huge natural resources had always been conceived by the South Africans during the Portuguese era as vital in creating an economic constellation of

Southern African states. [71]    South Africa's role in the economic community would be to provide the technological support, while the rest of the member states would, of course, act as a guaranteed consumer market, in addition to providing cheap labor.    For South Africa, the unexpected fall of the Caetano regime in April 1974 was a shattering blow to these conceptions and interests. [72]

Another major sub-regional issue which was to get South Africa interested in the internal affairs of these countries was the creation, in 1980, of the Southern African Development and Coordinating Conferences(SADCC).    This union was created to coordinate regional resources against South Africa's economic domination. Pretoria saw this as a threat, and the desire to frustrate the activities of the union was to underline some of Pretoria's involvementin in the internal affairs of these countries. [73]

7-6-4 Zaire and Zambia Motives of Intervention

The governments of the neighbourign states of Zambia and Zaire identified themselves with these anti-communist sentiments to some extent.    We need to add at this point that President Mobutu felt very disappointed with the military superiority which the MPLA established over its rivals in Angola after the July 1975 breakdown of the Luanda provisional government.    Mobutu particularly felt that an MPLA-controlled Angola would be a threat to the Zairean use of the vital Benguela rail route to the Atlantic port of Lobito.

The Benguela railway was also a relevant subject in determining the Zambian position, considering that Lusaka had supported UNITA during the anti-colonial war.    With the closure of its borders with Rhodesia and the attendant

difficulties with the use of Mozambican ports, land-locked Zambia benefitted from the Benguela railway for the export of its copper to the Atlantic.    Just as Mobutu, President Kaunda feared that the MPLA might deny Zambia the use of this rail route, but the fact was that there were no indications whatsoever in MPLA political or military circles that such a measure was considered. [74]

While Kaunda openly supported US-Western arms support for the UNITA-FNLA, he has presistently denied complicity with the South African intervention.    Yet besides the CIA, South African sources have alleged that Kaunda cooperated with `Zulu'.

7-6-5 The USA Motives of Intervention

The US intervention had a very important impact on the Angola conflict and in Souther Africa's regional politics. This intervention begun soon after the breakdown of the Angola four-party provisional government in july 1975.

However, with American military assistance to any party in the conflict  was forbidden by the 1976 Clark Amendment, and with the Carter administration disinclined to intervene in other ways, the US active intervention was stopped.

This situation changed with the advent of the Reagan administration in January 1981. Reagan opined, more effective policies –namely, ˚linkage″ and ˚constructive engagement″ – would be put into place. [75]
The congressional repeal of the Clark Amendment in July 1985 enabled Washington to begin covert aid to UNITA.  [76]

U.S. strategic interests in the Azores played an important role in regard to the Portuguese colonial war.    In the view

of American military authorities, the Azores facility was important for at least three reasons: 1) it provided a staging base for air transport; 2) it had been a refueling base for the U.S. strategic air power; and 3) the naval mission there served both as a communications center and as the hub of submarine operations in the Eastern Atlantic. [77]

The US economic investisment in Angola was an important factor, too. For example, a U.S. mltinational, Gulf Oil corporation, had discovered extensive oil deposits in Cabinda area capable of producing 150 million tons of oil by the end of this century. The Gulf Oil corporation had invested more than $300 million by 1975, at which time the company produced 150,000 barrels a day. [78]

Political motivations, closely related to ideological ones, seemed to have had a significant role in U.S. decisions to become involved in Angola on the side of the FNLA-UNITA. A report of the U.S. Congress' House Select Committee on Inelligence from January 1976 had this to say:

Dr. Kissinger has indicated that U.S. military intervention in Angola is based on three factors: 1) Soviet suppor of the MPLA and the USSR's increased presence in Africa; 2) U.S. policy to encourage moderate independence groups in Southern Africa; and 3) the U.S. interest in promoting the stability of Mobutu and other leadership figures in the area. Post support to Mobutu... make(s) it egually likely that the paramount factor in the U.S. involvement is Dr. Kissinger's desire to reward and protect African leaders in the area. [79]

Even the US diplomatic recognition seemed to be conditioned on this political aspect. On Septermber 30, 1980, Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, Richard H. Moose stated that ˇthe U.S. has not established diplomatic relations with the People's Republic of Angola because of our concern about the presence of 15-21,000 Cuban troops in

Angola, the role they play, and our opposition in principle to Cuban intervention in regional conflicts for purposes that serve Soviet objectives. ˝[80]

7-6-6 The OAU

In Angola, OAU action was based on three perspectives. 1-to accelerate the process of decolonisation, 2-to negotiate the installation of national union government composed of the three factions and 3-to stop the intervention of foreign powers.

- The First Perspective .

In fact, through the use of UN, the OAU have played influential roles in urging the council and the assembly to regard the disorders as threats to peace or breaches of the peace. [81]. After the Security Council failed to calling for an inquiry into disturbances in Angola, the General Assemby, at the request of forty members, considered the matter and in April 1961 passed a resolution appointing an investigatory sub-commitee . [82]

-The second perspective .

Before the outbreak of the conflict in july 1975 based on a policy of neutrality and impartiality, the OAU had sought to effect reconcilation of disparate factions because no nationalist movement was dominant in Angola. After the war started, the OAU sought to secure a government of national unity.

Thus, various unilateral and multilateral initiatives were made by African Heads of State as well as by OAU officials.

It is in this perspective that the OAU organized a conference in Nakuru, Kenya, attended by the leaders of the FNLA, UNITA and the MPLA and after five days of negotiations, the Angolan leaders reiterated their support for the

provisional government in Luanda and cessation of all
hostilities. [83]

Therefore, after the Nakuru Agreement was violated and
the civil war broke out in july 1975, the OAU could no longer
present a commun approach.

 -The third perspective.

Based on the third world countries principe of non-
alignement and in the slogan of `Hands off Africa` [84] the
OAU, had been setting themselves two major foreign policy
objectives -`to stay out of the conflicts between the major
powers, and to prevent any furture foreign interference in
their continent's affairs.`

Being concerned by the danger of foreign power presence in
Angola, the OAU had tried to adopt a common position.  In
January 1976, the first extraordinary meeting of the AHG was
held to discuss the Angolan problem.  But by the end of this
two-day summit, member states could not find a solution to
the conflict. [85]

The Nigeria and the Angola conflict reaveals to us that,
based on the highly valued normative principle of African
solidarity and organizational continuity. [86]  The OAU had
shown an active commitment and involvement in the resolution
of ethnic conflict in Africa. But, despite this highly
expressed desire of peace the result have been very poor.

7-6-7 THE UN

In Angola, the UN has been involved since the early period
of decolonisation. This is so because the transition of
territories from colonialism to independence, a transition

effected since the end of World War II, has destabilized the
international system[87] The process of decolonization has
posed the general problem of peaceful change in a challenging
form. It has not been a peaceful process for the groups and
political entities involved directly.  Insurrectionary
violence in colonial areas has raised acute problems for the
United Nations. For , as Emerson points out, international law
and international organization are more suited to the
maintenance of an established status quo:"attractive as is
the conception of peaceful change, it has not been possible
to clothe it in acceptable institutional forms". Moreover, he
observes," independence, in prospect or achieved, cannot be
counted upon to weld disparate peoples into national
homogeneity and may in fact aggravate rather than allay
discord[88]

The UN before the broke-out of the war intervened in two
dimension. The first dimension has been to recognize the
legitimity of the decolonization combat from the
international aspect. The insurgents in Angola favored the UN
involvement because: first, as a means of publicizing
grievances against repressive regimes, thereby enlisting
broader sympathy for rebel goals;and second, as a means of
enhancing bargaining positions and compensating for military
weakness. [89]

The second aspect of the UN has been in  encouraging
parties to the colonial war to resolve their difference
without additional bloodshed. [90]

What we could say about these UN intervention is that it
was very active and positive during the process of
decolonization. However, once the conflict changed it
nature, and become related to the cold war, the UN could not
act positively. The international community has to wait until

the end of the cold war in order to see the UN reemerge as a mediating actor in the peace agreement process between the super powers and the Angolan local actors.

In short, these stated factors have provided not only the justification for the continuing UNITA's insurgent movement against the MPLA government but also Western vocal, monetary and military support for the continuing UNITA's insurgency.

As seen above, a distinct ethnic and territorial base, racial antagonism, ideological differences, and the hostility and deep mistrust among the leaders have continued to contribute to the post independence Angolan conflict.

Therefore, it can be concluded that the internal fragmentation of the national liberation movement along ethnic, racial, regional, and ideological lines, coupled with the hostility among the leaders and the issue of military weakness, has contributed to the generation of the internal conflict and eventually led to foreign intervention in the conflict.

However, the international organizations, moved by humanitarian concernes, had tried to intervene for a peaceful solution. But, their action was largely influenced by the cold .

Footnotes                                          Chapter 7

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## CHAPTER 8: COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS ON NIGERIA AND ANGOLA CASES AND REFLEXION ON THE CAUSES OF OAU HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION FAILURE

On the basis of this study, we want to make a comparative study on the two cases because we think that if some aspects of conflicts are similar, others are specific in each case and this need to be explained.

### 8-1 Comparison Finding

Our research on Nigeria and Angola has revealed some differences and similarities between these two cases.

### 8-1-1 The Historical Factor

By the historical factor, we mean the colonial factor which influenced the historical evolution of the two countries. In Angola as well as in Nigeria, colonial policies fashioned the structure of the conflict by dividing both these countries into ethno-linguistic groups and into regions, so that in both the countries we have some main dominant groups: the Yoruba, the Hausa-Fulani and the Ibos in Nigeria and the BaKongo, Ovimbundu and the Luanda- Mbundu in Angola, such group having the control of an administrative region. Also, in both the countries, the socio-economic development was inequal. But unlike the Portuguese, the British initiated the local people to democratic institutions at the end of the colonial period and transferred the political power of independence to Nigerian people peacefully.

This was very different in Angola or in most Portuguese colonies because the Portuguese until 1975 were the absolute ruler in Angola and never wanted to give any political independence to their colonies. [1] This distinction is very important because it explains us why the Angola conflict was an armed conflict since its beginning.

### 8-1-2 The Contending Power Groups

In this study, we may note that the contending power groups are of different types. In Nigeria, we have central government (Lagos) versus insurgent power group secessionist, namely Biafra. In Angola, we have contending groups, with absence of established (constitutional or de facto) central government.

The fundamental issues at stake in Nigeria concerned a national minority which wanted to set up an alternative autonomous political entity. Contrary to this, in Angola , the secessionist goal was absent, so discernible differences between the main contending power groups over the management and the reconstruction of the post-colonial state characterises the conflict.

### 8-1-3 The Ethnic and Regional Factors

In both cases the ethnic and regional factors played an important role. The examination of the political parties in Angola teaches us the undeniable fact that all the three parties were dominated by some ethnic groups. This situation is also the same in Nigeria where we find the NPN mainly composed by the Haussa, the NPA the Fulani and the Action Group by the Yoruba. In both cases we find that political leaders formulated their action in the name of their groups but also that some parties tried to present national programme cross-cutting the ethnic dimension.

### 8-1-4 The Ideological Factor

The ideological factor was not very important in Nigeria even if the program of Nigeria political parties were not based on the same political approach. What is notable in Nigeria is that in the factor leading to the Biafra war there was not an extreme division like the socialist versus the capitalist. Indeed, in Angola, this is a very important factor which should be considered with all the implications because as we have stated, the political parties in Angola were not only divided on ethno-regional line but also on ideological line because the MPLA was a Marxist-oriented and the UNITA and the FNLA capitalist oriented parties. This division had not only political implication but also a military one because it is through this distinction that the foreign powers oriented their assistance.

### 8-1-5 The Political Factor

In both Nigeria and Angola, the political factors played an important role in the evolution of the conflicts, but there is a big difference between the situation in Nigeria and that in Angola. In Nigeria, we have a country with some democratic institutions where the election was free, and the political parties were recognized by the central government. Here, the problem is about the rationality of this democratic institutions because, having been instituted by the British, some of the groups thought that this system did not satisfy their interests, so they wanted a kind of reform in important national issues, like the electoral system, the census system and the revenue allocation system. Thus in Nigeria, the power sharing, which is an important principle of multi-ethnic democracy, had already existed, but it was still unsatisfactory because the rationality and the logic of dealing with some issues and also the political practices

were very contradictory. [2] Thus what seemed to preoccupy Nigeria is the need of balance through compromise and consensus of political, social and national issues in order to ameliorate the already existing power sharing system.

Indeed, in Angola, the political issues were of different nature. What was specific in the Angola case is that there was nowhere the existence of democratic political institutions where all the political parties could get together and deal properly with their national issues through the principle of power sharing. This was so because the Portuguese had never installed such a system. Thus the issue of power sharing in Angola existed only for short time, that is, during the negotiation of San Salvador agreement. But as soon as this agreement failed, the main motivation of each political party became that of absolute control of the political power through the complete exclusion of other political parties. This motivation existed until the peace agrement of 1991 when the MPLA agreed for the first time to hold political election, legalize the other political parties and share power with other parties. [3]

This difference in the political motivations or factors between the Nigeria and the Angola case is very important because it helps us understand the evolution of the conflicts in both countries.

### 8-1-6 The International Factor

In Angola as well as in Nigeria, the international factor is a very important one. This is so because in both the countries, the belligerents received considerable amounts of direct or indirect military and financial assistances from foreign powers. But some distinctions should be made.

In Nigeria, the foreign powers intervention may be considered as a reaction to a conflict which had already started. Indeed in Angola foreign powers were already engaged even before the break-up of the peace agreement of San Salvador thus, if in Nigeria we may consider the foreign factor as a secondary factor in the case of Angola it should be considered as a primary factor because it had a direct impact on the peace process.

The second common aspect is that in both the countries, the foreign powers intervened to protect their own interest first. We mean by this the economic, strategic, political and military interests. But what should be stated here clearely is that in the case of Nigeria, the ideological factor did not play an important role in the motivation of foreign powers. This is so because the Biafran leaders did not have any ideological coloration. This is completly different from the Angola case because here we find two super powers which exept protecting their interests were also deeply involved in the promotion of their ideological orientations.

What deserves a special attention is also the role of neighboring states. Contiguous states were obviously deeply concerned with civil war developments in the crisis state. The following reasons explain their concern:
a) The fear that conflict may spill over to their territory;
b) Effects on their internal socio-economic situation in the case of refugees crossing the border from the disturbed state;
c) Possibilities of `hot-pursuit` of retreating forces by more dominant contenting power group (especially the central government).
d) Effects on their economy or disruption of essential communication facilities.

e) In addition to the above which are principally defensive factors, contiguous states may wish to actively inflence the politics in the crisis state.

In the Nigeria case, the contiguous states (Cameroon, Chad, Niger, and Benin) were all pro-central power faction. This is so because in Africa, contiguous states show a greater diplomatic sensitivity in conflits of this type with evident bias for the established central government. This is indicative of government intentions to conform with existing international regulations governing interstate relations. In Nigerian case, the support for the central power faction by the contiguous states was mainly political and diplomatic. There were no military interventions.

The Angola case shows a different pattern. Here, contiguous states played an active interventionist role by sending military advisors, combatants, military supplies, giving facilities in its own territory and firm diplomatic support. The support of these states were divided depending mostly on their ideological orientation. Zaire, Zambia and South Africa supported the FNLA-UNITA, Congo-Brazzaville supported the MPLA.

What should be noted here is that contiguous states played a great interventionist role because of the absence of central power authority, after the collapse of these three parties' transitional government in Luanda 1975. It follows that with the absence of central power authority in the crisis state, neighbouring states felt less restrained by the existing international law from intervening, especially if their behavior was construed as a move to restore law and order, or to maintain regional stability.

8-2 The Cause of the OAU Failure in the Resolution
   African Ethnic Conflicts

In both cases as in many other situations of ethnic conflict, the OAU which is the prime regional organization in charge of peace and stability maintenance in Africa has failed to play a determinant role despite its multiple tentatives. Based on a review of its action, we will try to determine the causes of its inability.

Many factors have contributed to the ineffectiveness of the OAU in its conflict resolution efforts and have eventually increased the likelihood of foreign intervention in African conflicts. We may separate these factors in two categories: the conceptual and the organizational.

8-2-1 Conceptual Ambuguity

The OAU is a regional international organization. As it is wanted by the logic of any international organization member states should adhere strictly to some principes and; in the case of OAU, all signatories were committed to: `safeguard the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of all member states'. [4]    Another principle stresses the sovereign equality of all member states, non-inviolability of existing national borders. [5]

However, an observation on the OAU members' attitude during the period of crisis shows us that not only did the member states disagree over the means to achieve peace in Africa, but there was also ambiguity in matters of principle and difference in their interpretation and this in turn, has constituted a major weakness of the organization.

The first major conceptual issue is that of the interpretation of the concept of territorial integrity(the inviolability of the frontiers) and that of self-determination in relation to the inalienable right to independence claimed by some ethnic groups like in Congo and Nigeria and supported by some OAU members states.

Territorial integrity exists side by side with national self-determination as an organizing norm of the system. African states, during the process of decolonization, emphasized demands for self-determination. However, once the state was created, the organizing principle shifted to territorial integrity and sovereign equality as a matter of survival. Once a state had evicted foreign rulers, the claim to self-determination was no longer seen as legitimate. [6]

The reason of this attitude is that most nationalist leaders felt that the only way to save these newly-acquired independent territories from distintegrating into their various ethno-national and pre-colonial state constituents, was to commit themselves to the concept of `inviolability' of existing borders.

That is why demands for self-determination by individual ethnic groups or nationalities as in Congo and Nigeria were seen  as disruptive and threatening to a sovereign state. Haile Selassie, the head of the Consultative Committee established by the OAU to consider the Nigerian war, stated

The Organization of African Unity is both in word and   deed committed to the principle of unity and territorial   integrity of its member states... The national unity and      territorial integrity of member states is not negotiable.

It must be fully respected and preserved.  It is our firm  belief that the national unity of individual African  states is an essential ingredient for the realization of  the larger and greater objective of African Unity. [7]

This was in effect the major argument that the Nigerian federal government pursued throughout the war in its diplomatic campaign against Biafra in Africa, and it was in the main successful.

Addressing the four-nation OAU mission when it called on him, General Gowon reminded the African leaders that they had not come to Nigeria to mediate in the civil war but to `call on the rebel leaders to abandon secession'[8] and accept the unity of the Nigerian federation. Gowon once again raised the official Nigerian argument of the consequences of a successful Biafran secession for the rest of Africa: `It was the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Tshombe yesterday, it is Nigeria and Ojukwu today. Who knows which African country will be the next victim of secessionist forces?"[9] As was expected, the mission reiterated its profederal position. In a statement issued the following day, before its departure, it said: `The secessionists should renounce secession and accept the present administrative structure of a federal 12-state structure". [10] As a matter of fact, this mediation was rejected by the Biafra side which found in them, a lack of neutrality and of objectivity because more interested in the reverse effects of the self-determination than in the interest of Biafra people.

However, exept for this political reason, the OAU didn't have a strong legal stand to support the claim of self-dermination by the Biafra people because, as we stated in the Chapter 4, this right, seen from the international law viewpoint, was reserved especially to the peoples of colonial territories as one entity but not as a group. And international law seems to be clear because it is stated that any attempt of territorial integrity was not allowed.

Of course, this OAU official position was not accepted by all the African states.

Those for whom territorial integrity was the primary concern supported Nigeria in its efforts to control disruption from within. Others saw an end to the fighting as a necessary prerequisite to any permanent settlement. Despite the dangerous precedent, four African states (Tanzania, Zambia, Gabon and Ivory Cost ) chose to support Biafra through recognition, believing that this would place the protagonists on equal footing and lead to a solution. They justified the move on the grounds of peace rather than support for the principle of national self-determination. [11]

Denouncing the behavior of the federal government, however, President Julius Nyerere of Tanzania, a highly respected pan-Africanist and a progressive politician, introduced a new element in the OAU attitude to secession in April 1968. He felt that in the final analysis, `unity can only be based on the general consent of the people involved... In Nigeria this consciousness of a common citizenship was destroyed by the events of 1966, and in particular by the pograms in which 30,000 Eastern Nigerians were murdered... It is these pograms, and the apparent inability or unwillingness of the authorities to protect the victims, which underlies the Easterners' conviction that they have been rejected by the Nigerians..."[12] Nyerere argued that Tanzania could not acquiesce in a situation, such as in Nigeria, where a war had to be fought to force an unwilling people to remain within a federation. He stated that if the people of Zanzibar(the offshore Indian Ocean Island which is part of Tanzania) wanted to leave the Tanzanian Union, `I could not advocate bombing them into submission'. [13]

Arguing in the same vain, on May 1968 the Ivorian President Houphouet-Boigny stressed: `We say no to unity in war....Unity is for the living and not for the dead."[14]

By considering the fact that the OAU mediation was done on behalf of all the African nations which unfortunately didn't have the same approach on the question of self determination, it gave the Biafrans moral force to continue their fight and to stand on their position in the hope that other countries may support their cause in the future.

What we could say about Nyerere's reconceptualization of the concept of self-determination is that to him it depended on the attitude and attachment of the minority groups toward the central government. If those groups interest and security are threatened by the majority groups, then they are free to leave and form their one state. To him, `self-determination' in the African context meant the following: that just as the principle of self determination was crucial in the decolonization movement against European colonial powers, this concept could still be relevant in solving problems of sovereignty(or `competing' nationalisms) in the new independent states. It also meant that in the context of Africa, the fundamental condition which should maintain the territorial integrity is the free consent of each group and the conflict resolution method should be based on pacific method.

This approach is influenced by the African political tradition. In fact, what used to happen in the pre-colonial time is, as we stated in Chapter 5 Section 1, that group were free to detache themselve from a leader when this one was a tyrant. So, as stated by Houfouet, unless territorial integrity could produce and maintain unity, the right of self -detemination in the African tradition was still available at any time. Thus, this right was a natural one which was inherent to any group for the purpose of its security and as a means to resolve a conflict.

As stated in Chapter 3 where the conceptual issues was studied, the concept of self determination is a very problematic one, especially in the African context because each group may constitute a nation in a literary meaning.

The second conceptual issue is illustrated by a clash between the principle of the OAU and international law through article 2(1e)and 3(2)

Article 2(1e) of the OAU Charter states that one of the purposes of the Organization shall be ˝ to promote international co-operation, having due regard to the Charter of the United Nations and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.˝ The emphasis, from the point of view of this thesis, it must clearly be stated, lies with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights component in this article. The implicit central notion in that article, in other words, is that of the respect for Human Rights as propounded in the above-mentioned document. Article 3(2) affirms the principle of ˝ non-interference in the internal affairs of States.˝ A most obvious example of where article 2(1e) and article 3(2) have come into clash in the history of the Organization is the Nigeria conflict. [15]

By probing further into the diplomatic aspects of the conflict, the Nigerian federal government had consistently been opposed to any form of involvement from the OAU. It considered its dispute with Biafra to be a purely internal matter and, consequently, did not expect any interference from the OAU. As Cervenka has most aptly summed up the Nigerian position, ˝ General Gowon [head of the federal government] held very firmly to the view that any intervention, even in the form of a discussion at the OAU level, would be in violation of Article III(2) of the OAU Charter, which prohibits any interference in the internal affairs of States.˝[16]

What must be pointed out at this stage, however, is that the OAU's interest to interfere in the dispute was aroused from the need to negotiate between the two sides, the Nigerian Federal Government and Biafra. The OAU was interested to mediate in the dispute mainly because of the extent of the human tragedy caused in it, on the side of the Biafran population in particular.[17] The OAU's reason for wanting to mediate in the dispute, in other words, was grounded on humanitarian considerations or, more appropriately, on the human rights aspects of the Nigerian civil war. It is in fact worth noting here that it is the view that human rights were posed with a serious threat which made the four African countries, Tanzania, Zambia, Ivory Coast and Gabon, recognize Biafra. In their statement of support to Biafra for example, the Tanzanians(in the person of their President Julius Nyerere) said:

The theme clearly raised in Nyerere's speech is that of granting to a people their basic human rights which inter alia include the right to personal safety.[18]

As further pressure, however, was put on the Federal Government, it eventually accepted ˚for humanitarian reasons˝[19] that an involvement on the part of the OAU would be allowed, but made the important caveat that its dispute remained nevertheless an internal matter.

The OAU, in other words, found itself again caught up as a victim of the clash between the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of States on the one hand, and that of the respect for Human Rights on the other hand. The extent to which this clash had a significant negative impact on the OAU, in terms of conflict resolution, could thus be seen from the point of view that it not only helped in hardening of positions on both sides, the Biafran side in particular, but also that it was such a hardening of

positions which led to a three-year protraction of the war.[20] That the war was eventually ended, not through diplomatic means, but by military victory of the Federal side over the Biafrans is a further shaky testimony of the throes which the OAU got caught due to the clash of the above two mentioned principles of its Charter.

8-2-2 The OAU Oganizational Aspect

In dealing with the OAU failure, its organizational ( operational mecanism deserves a special attention.

① The Limitations on the Powers of the Secretary General

The OAU Secretary-General is in no position to fill the need for an involved mediator. Neither the OAU Charter nor he Functions and Regulations of the General Secretariat grant the Secretary-General the constitutional prerogative for independent initiative in regional conflicts.[21]

However, since the creation of the OAU, it has not been clear whether the Secretary General should assume a more executive role as opposed to an administrative one as prescribed in the Charter. The way in which the debate -for or against an executive capacity for the OAU Secretary General -shows the limitations of the Pan-African body in resolving conflicts are apparent from a number of OAU-related crises or dilemmas.[22]

② The lack of Resource and Coercive Measures

David Meyers has emphasized that ˚the OAU was and has remained weak in terms of material resources.˝[23] The OAU has few material means or sources of pressure on its members.

Unlike such regional security organizations as the NATO, the Warsaw Pact and the Organization of American States(OAS), it does not include any of the major powers among its members on which it can depend to supply such items when necessary. Thus it cannot afford the military or financial force to run a real international peace keeping operation. It does not have sufficient trained personnel to coordinate its activities. As a result, much depends on the attitudes of its members towards the organization. There is no organ with disciplinary powers. Nowhere in the Charter is there a grant of authority to enforce decisions or to expel members for non-compliance with OAU decisions. These decisions are only recommendation to the completely sovereign member sates. No international force is provided for to intevene in the territories of member states if they do not fulfil the purposes of the Charter or comply with the resolutions of the Assembly or the Council of Ministers. [24] In such a situation, the OAU can hardly be effective in promoting the objectives of peace and security in Africa.

This OAU weakness to present an Pan-African peace keeping force manifested clearly in Nigeria and Angola. The organization could not afford a single soldier to save the Biafra people from genocide. In case of Angola, despite many years of figthing and foreign military presence, the OAU could do nothing militarily. However, the idea of establishing an Pan-African force has dominated the OAU debate. In 1978, an OAU multi-national force was send during the civil war in Chad. But this experience was counterde by its failure. [25]


③ The Inability of the OAU Mediation Organ

The OAU's primary mediatory organ, the ad hoc committee, is not operationally ideal for intensive and consistent

third-party intervention. The selection of member-state representatives for the ad hoc committees intensifies the dynamics of regional politics in the mediation process and also some members have overlooked the most fundamental norms of honorable behavior and impartiality. "[26] .

Mediation by plenary resolution is conceptually a zero-sum process whose outcome would favor the position of one party over the other. [27] Conflicting parties strive to influence the organizational consensus or the voting majority; the OAU thus becomes a battleground. This manifested well in the Nigeria and Angola cases when the Federal Government tried to influence the position of OAU mediation team.


④ The Politico -Ideological Aspect: Block Formation

The first factor was ideological differences. In the Congo crisis, the Nigerian conflict, and the Angolan conflict, the OAU was ideologically divided. In the Angolan conflict, African leaders were also divided into two ideological groups, the progressives and the conservatives. The progressives supported the MPLA, while the conservatives supported the FNLA-UNITA.
The significance of this division was well summed up by Olajide Aluko:

''The continental division between the progressives or radicals and the moderates has always existed within the OAU. It came to thefore over the recognition late in 1964 of the Governemnt of Tshombe as the then Premier of the Congo-Leopoldville (now Zaire)... After this, this division remained dormant... until the recognition or the non-recognition of the MPLA government in Angola during and immediately after the OAU Special Summit in Addis Ababa early in January 1976. [28]

This chapter has focused on two aspects :a comparison of the Angola and Nigeria conflicts and the analysis of OAU

failure in trying to solve the African ethnic conflicts in general.

What we should note is that the Nigeria and Angola conflicts present some similities and differences. The similitudes are related to the fact that they are both African states with almost the same socio-historical evolution patterns. However, the difference of colonial experience, the political status at the moment of the conflict and the situation of international politics and the regional factors had largely contributed to the difference in the evolution of these two conflicts.

Concerning the role of the OAU, we have to recognize that the organization has showed an interest in the resolution of the African ethnic conflicts. However, its action has been largely undermined by the conflicting norms of international law, the political and ideological divisions which followed the general patterns of international politics and the organizational weakness which illustrat well the real capacity of these African states in establishing stables and effective institutions.

1. For general study, see Gerald J. Bender, <u>Angola under the Portuguese</u>, (Los Angeles:University of Califorinia Press, 1978).

2. See LarryDiamond, "Nigeria:Pluralism, Statism, and the Struggle for Democracy", <u>Democracy in Developing Countries Africa</u>, (London:Rienner Publishers, 1988), p. 33-93.

3. Gerald J. Bender, op. cit.

4. For general study of OAU activities see, "Charter of the Organization of African Unity", especialy, C. O. C. Amate, <u>Inside the OAU:Pan-Africanism in Practice</u>, (London: Macmililan, 1986).

5. Ibid.

6. Most principles of the OAU have tried to presente the claim of self-determination in post-colonial Africa as illegitime see our case study on Nigeria. See also, I. Wiliam Zartman, <u>Ripe for Resolution:Conflict and Intervention in Africa</u> (New York:Oxford University Press, 1989).

7. Quoted in David A, Ijalaye, "Was Biafra at Time a state in- International Law ?" <u>American Journal of International Law</u>, 65:3 (july, 1971), p. 556.

8. Quoted in Okpaku, Joseph (ed), <u>Nigeria: Dilemma of Nation - hood</u> (New York: Third Press, 1972). p. 411.

9. Ibid. , p. 412.

10. Suzanne Cronge, The World and Nigeria: The Diplomatic History of the Biafra War(London:Sidgwick &Jackson, 1972), p. 293.

11. Herbert Ekwe-Ekwe, Conflict and Intervention in Africa, (London:Macmilian, 1990), pp. 14-22.

12. See A. H. M. Kirk-Greene, Crisis and Conflict in Nigeria, Vol. I (London:Oxford University Press, 1971), p. 211.

13. Ibid. , p. 212.

14. Cited in Cronge, op. cit. , pp. 297-8.

15. See OAU Charter. , For a useful treatment of the clash between art. 2(1) and art. 3(2). , also see Akinyemi, A. Bolaji The Organization of African Unity and the concept of non-interference in the internal affairs of Members-States in the British Yearbook of International Law, vol. 46. 1972-73. Published for the Royal Institute of International-Affairs by Oxford University Press, London, 1975.

16. Cervenka, Z, The Unfinished Quest for Unity-Africa and the OAU, (London:Friedman Ltd. , 1977), p. 98.

17. See our introduction on Nigeria Civil War, and Doc Bia.

18. For a Large documentation of the Ibos case, cf Kirk-Green op. cit. , especially document 132 entitled Biafra Memorandum circuled to the Heads of States at the OAU meeting, Kinshasa-Zaire, September 1967.

19. Kouassi, E. K. ˚The OAU and International Law″ in El-Ayouti and Zartman (eds) The Organization of African Unity after Twenty Years, (New York:Praeger, 1984), p. 51.

20. An illustration of the way in which the OAU's behaviour helped in prolonging the war could be seen in the resulting support which Biafra benefited not only from the African states but also in certain Western states. See also Kirk-Green, op. cit. , pp. 174-178.

21. In contrast, article 99 of the UN charter mandates the Secretary General to bring to the attention of Security Council any matter that in his opinion may threaten the - maintenance of international peace and security.

22. See doc OAU on the power of the secretariat.

23. David Meyers ˚Intraregional Conflict Management by the Organization of African Unity, ″ International Organization, Vol. 28 (1974), p. 350.

24. S. K. B. Asante, ˚The Birth of the OAU: The early Years″, Legon Observer, Vol. Viii, no. 10, 1973, pp. 218-23. and K. Mathews, ˚The organization of African Unity″, in Domenico Mazzeo (ed), African Regional Organizations, (Cambridge:Cambrige University Press, 1984), pp. 49-84.

25. See C. O. C. Amate, op. cit. , pp. 431-458.

26. UN Documentation A/AC. 109/621, August 8, 1980, 6.

27. Jeffroy Z. Rubin (ed. ), The dynamics of Third-Party Intervention(New York:Praeger, 1981), pp. 12-13. and William Zartman (ed. ), The Negociating Process: Theories and Applications ( Beverly Hills: Sage Publications 1987), p. 69.

28. Aluko, O. , ˚Alliances within the OAU″ in El-Ayouty and Zartman, po. cit. , p. 74.

## CHAPTER 9: SOME PERSPECTIVES OF ETHNIC CONFLICT RESOLUTION IN AFRICA

This study has revealed us the gravity of ethnic conflict in Africa and the need for urgent solutions. The aim of this Chapter is to see how the African states and the international community could deal with this alarming situation in the new international order. We considere that the end of the Cold War should provide the opportunity for African states to solve their differences and examine the priorities that Africa must now pursue. As Francis Deng noted:

In the past Africa was tied into global structures and processes, first by colonial intervention and then by Cold War ideological linkages into a chain of interdependent dependency. In order to cut off those ties, self-reliance, both in the resolution of management of conflicts and in development, is increasingly imperative. However, having been dislodged by their colonial past from the indigenous values and institutions that permit building from within, Africans are left hanging between the local and global systems. [1]

As this quotation indicates, African leaders also seem to understand the necessity of urgent measures. But, before formulating our prospects for resolution, let us reexamine the techniques which have been used until now in dealing with the ethnic problem.

## 9-1 Review of Policies Pursued by African States

When we analyze the solution that have been traditionally applied to the problem of ethnicity and the conflicts it generates, we notice that the remedies seem to present as many difficulties as the problem itself. The traditional responses have been either nation-building', which meant forging one nation out of diverse peoples, or, in rare cases, self-determination', which in many peoples' minds has been associated with separation and the formation of another state. [2]

## 9-1-1 Nation States Building

Most social scientists and African nationalist leaders are perhaps too much influenced by the Western examples that they know best, they saw ethnic diversity in the new states as a serious barrier to stable and effective government, which in their view could develop only in a politically integrated society. (b) Thus, they saw ethnic and cultural diversity as an automatic recipe for social conflict. The remedy, they thought would come from massive nation-building efforts to overcome `primordial" loyalties and to create a more homogeneous political culture. Social engineering on such a scale posed an enormous challenge. [3]

Attempt at building new nation states out of a multitude of ethnic groups has generally taken two forms:

## ① The Creation of Multi-Ethnic States

The creation of a multi-ethnic culture, which all groups identify with and voluntarily adopt as their own. This approach is complicated and normally takes a long time to develop.

## ② Assimilation

This approach has been widely used under the rubric of ` nation building" in developing countries after

decolonization. It has sometimes involved the encouragement or the requirement that ethnic minorities adopt the ways and customs, and especially the language, of another ethnic group, usually the majority or dominant ethnic group. But it sometimes involves the imposition of a lingua franca that is not the native language of any ethnic group, such as Swahili in East African. [4]

But, this approach has often been associated with manipulation and at times outright repression by those in power. [5]

Even though assimilation is desired by some minorities groups, still the objective of assimilation is generally proclaimed by the dominant ethnic group itself and frequently becomes official policy. However, assimilation is not always desired or accepted by the non-dominant ethnic groups. If such ethnic groups are not territorialy and historically identified communities with strong bonds and cultural and ethnic identity, then assimilationist policies may be perceived as aggression and they meet with passive or organized resistance. Under such circumstance, ethnic violence may arise. [6]

The 30 years of experience with this approach since the independence has shown that not many new nation states have been forged in Africa. In fact, it may be said that the efforts made in this direction seem to have backfired. More recently, animosity and violence along ethnic line has been on the increase in many African societies, especially as the highly centralized nature of these states is being challenged by the movement towards multi-party politics. [7]

9-1-2 Self-Determination or Separation.

As another response to ethnic conflict, people have proposed `self-determination' as an alternative to `nation-building'. But the concept of `self-determination', is so riddled with confusion that it does not provide a viable alternative. The term itself is composed of two concepts `self' and `determination', of which definition and operation raise a multitude of problems. [8] What constitutes the `self'? Is it a group that is connected by primordial ties like an ethnic group? Could any other group form the `self'? Can the `self' be engineered? And what is the meaning, implication, and scope of the term `determination' [9]

If self-determination means separation and creation of a state, how might it be possible to build a state around an ethnic group without provoking chauvinism, ethnic animosity, and the wrenching destruction of communities, given the cultural, linguistic, ancestral, and religious continuities between ethnic groups that have interacted with each other for long period? The search for the pure ethnic group as a foundation for building a state has led to fascism, Nazism, massive dislocations, and genocides in many parts of the world, including the African continent itself. [10]

Commenting on secession as prospect for resolution, Donald L. Horowitz noted: The only thing secession and partition are unlikely to produce is ethnically homogeneous or harmonious states. There are at least four reasons for this.

First, the vast majority of secessionist regions are ethnically heterogeneous. More than this, ethnic identity is not static; it changes with the environment and especially with territorial boundaries. Given the contextual character of group identity, the attainment of independence in such a

region is likely to increase the significance of ethnic divisions considerably.

Second, ethnic diversity within the secessionist region is what frequently triggers secession, after secession, and secessionist movements make this diversity a major political issue.

Third, in focusing on the secessionist region, it is necessary not to forget what the secessionists would leave behind. Would secession render the rump state homogeneous? There is practically no state facing a secessionist movement in Asia or Africa which would become homogeneous if it simply severed the secessionist region.

Fourth, if it comes to fighting, as it often will, secessionist warfare exacerbates ethnic tensions within the secessionist region. In some cases, the prospect of independence is so threatening that some groups within the secessionist region reject it outright and side with the central government.

There is a further question raised by partitionist measures. Is it not likely that, by placing an international boundary between former domestic antagonists, and creating two states and two armies where previously there was one, a domestic conflict will be transformed into a more dangerous international conflict? [11]

### 9-1-3 Genocide

This most brutal of all ethnic management devices also presents too many examples. While others could be cited, such as the deaths of Armenians in the course of the Turkish deportation policies of 1915, the most notorious is, of course, the extermination of millions of Jews during the Second World War, a policy that has left a permanent mark on the ethnic structure of Poland, Lithuania, and other states (see Dawidowicz, 1975). Though on a lesser scale, and not necessarily always under direct government control, the size of certain minorities in other states has also been reduced by similar means, especially during times of war. [12]

### 9-1-4 Army Intervention

Military intervention has been widely used by African states to face ethnic rebellion. In Nigeria, as the case study showed, as soon as the Biafra declared its independence, the Federal Government sent a military force to put down the rebellion; in Angola, the military option was continued by the MPLA government and officialized in 1982 by the degree; in Sierra Leone, the government signed a contract with a private South African mercenaries agency to face the rebels.

### 9-2 Review of Consociational Theory

"Consociational democracy," which is a rather technical term proposed by Arend Lijphart to denote a model of democracy and certain existing democratic systems that seek to resolve political differences by techniques of consensus rather than by majority rule. [13] Its distinguishing feature is the ability of the leaders of the contending subcultures to avoid the dangers of intergroup conflict through cooperation. [14] This theory of consociational democracy or power-sharing presents four characteristic dimensions.

9-2-1 The Participation of the Representatives of All
      Significant Ethnic Groups in Decision Making

The joint exercise of governmental, especially executive,
decision-making power may take a variety of institutional
forms.  The most straightforward and common form is that of a
grand coalition cabinet in a parliamentary system, as in
Belgium and Malaysia.  Even in presidential system, despite
the fact that presidentialism usually entails the
concentration of power in the hands of one person who in an
ethnically divided country , is almost inevitably a member of
one of the major ethnic group, a grand coalition is not
impossible. [15]

9-2-2  A High Degree of Autonomy

The group autonomy dimension means that on all issues of
common concern, the decisions are made jointly by the
representatives of the different ethnic groups. If the ethnic
groups are geographically concentrated, group autonomy can
take the form of a federal system in which federal boundaries
coincide with ethnic boundaries so as to create ethnically
homogeneos territorial units. If groups are geographically
intermixed, autonomy must assume a non territorial form.
Territorial and nonterritorial autonomy may be used in the
same system, as in the case of Belgium, which has experimented
with the delegation of political authority both to
geographically defined areas that are ethnically homogeneos
(Dutch-speaking Flanders and French-speaking Wallonia) and to
communities defined in nonterritorial terms(French-speakers
and Dutch speakers in bilingual Brussels). [16]

9-2-3  Proportionality

Proportionality, the third characteristic of power-sharing
democracy, serves as the basic standard of political
representation, civil service appointments, and the allocation
of public funds.  Proportionality is especially important as
a guarantee for the fair representation of minority groups.
The most common and straightforward method for achieving
proportionality of political representation is to use a
proportional representation electoral system, as in Belgium
and Switzerland. [17]

9-2-4 Minority Veto

The fourth characteristic of power-sharing democracy is
the minority veto. This device is usually restricted to the
most vital and fundamental matters, and it is usually based
on informal understanding rather than formal legal or
constitutional rules. Example of the latter, however are the
requirements of concurrent majorities (that is a majority not
only of the total legislature but also majority within each
of the ethnic groups represented in the legislature) for the
passage of legislation with regard to taxes, the
municipalities, and the electoral system in the 1960
constitution of Cyprus and for the adopion of laws on
cultural and educational matters in the Belgian constitution
[18] .

9-2-5 The Applicability of this Theory in Africa .

The quetion then is to know if this theory is applicable
in the context of Africa? Lijphart himself noted the
mistaken view" of some critics who have rejected a
consociational solution for South Africa because of the

concept's supposed Western origins. [19] Nevertheless, in his earlier Democracy in Plural Societies, there is an entire chapter that discusses the applicability of the consociational model to the developing world. In that chapter, he traced the mixed record of consociational democracy in Lebanon, Cyprus, and Malaysia, concluding with a "general appraisal" of conditions that increase or decrease the likelihood of success of consociationalism in the Third World. Some of these conditions are favorable -for example, precolonial traditions of collective decision making. However, among "unfavorable factors," he noted an additional " set of developmental factors" arising from the " developmental dynamics of Third World societies" -stagnant political development, loss of deference to elites, increasing cross-cultural contacts through urbanization, rising expectations, fading memories of the shared liberation struggle -factors that need not be elaborated here. The point is that in spite of repeated reminders that individual Third World countries differ greatly among themselves, Lijphart found some additional conditions linked to the processes of development that appear to make the Third World setting generally different from that of the developed world. [20] One must add that this did not dissuade him from his basic position that consociational model still offers the best hope for political stability and economic development for the plural societies of the Third World. [21]

As a matter of fact, this theory of consociationalism has lot of valid elements which constitute a fondamental condition neccesary to the installation of peace in any multi-ethnic states because it tend to satisfy the basic human needs of each group. However, other aspects presented in this theory are difficult to apply and need some serious modification or additional aspects in order to be applied in the African context.

The first problem is that, if the success of this theory has been assured in Europe, it is not evident that the chance of success are great in Africa. This is so because the backgrounds are completely different. In Europe, people have learned the gravity of minority problems after these had brough to two World Wars. Thus, the political elite know that peace can't come unless democratic process is dviced through consensus and compromise. Therefore, a great effort is made by the political leaders to go beyond their personal interests and find compromise for the interest of the whole community. This process is also facilitated by the degree of economic development, media and educaton. In Africa, people, until recently have not realized the gravity of minority problem. Frankly in their mind, many leaders saw that development and modernization could bring about the extinction of ethnic loyalities even if the benefit of this development was not distributed equally. To them, the class interests were seen as more important.

The second problem is that, having learned the importance of the minoriy problem, the multi-ethnic states in Europe, become more democratics. In Africa, as we have illustrated in Chapter 5, democracy in many countries was perceived as a "killer tiger" by many leaders. Thus, free political debate being absent, it was difficult to find proper solution through compromise and consensus.

The third difficulty is that, in European multi-ethnic states as Belgium, the economic level is already high. Thus, because of their economic level, status isn't so much related to the states. Peoples can attain a considerable status without being public servant or politician as in Africa, where the only way for educated peoples to assure their future is to be involved in politics or public office. In these conditions of under development, politic is not perceived as service which should be rendered to the mass but

to themselves. This situation aggravates the political competition which politicians perceive as a matter of death or life.

This practice undermines the success of this theory in Africa because as Lijphart stated:

The primary condition is in the capacity of the elites themselves to appreciate the dangers of social fragmentation, to transcend barriers of hostility, and to devise appropriate compromises on political issues. In addition to these political skills, he argued, elites must also be sufficiently positively motivated toward the political system. [22]

If the consociational process is to succeed, the elites of the groups in question must have some minimal level of commitment to dialogue and negotiation, on the one hand, and probably also to at least some shared objectives with other groups. This minimal shared outlook could arise from loyalty to the political system, from perceptions of group interest, from fear of violence, and from other factors.

The conditions of consociational success in Africa being still absent, an effort should be made to install them and to see how to apply this approach in the context of African states.

9-3 Review of the International Organization Policies

The case for international intervention is particularly obvious if the state is by itself unable to resolve such conflict. Further, the management of ethnic conflict becomes particularly urgent if there are no internal mechanisms for conflict resolution. Perhaps some countries in the Third World may also lack the necessary professional experience in dealing with ethnic demands. The need for conflict resolution and intervention by third parties is especially

urgent if systematic violations of human rights are to be averted. Particularly in the area of ethnic conflict, it seems legitimate to consider international mechanisms to create structures, rules and processes to avoid conflict, or channel it into acceptable(or less damaging) paths.

The most important international organization which has been involved in the resolution of ethnic conflicts in Africa is the UN and the OAU.

9-3-1 The  UN Policy

As we have seen, the state intervention in ethnic conflicts is not able to bring a good solution because state is often a part of the conflict rather than a neutral force.

The UN, however, as the guardian of international peace and security has no particular national interest to pursue and is therefore less likely to exploit ethnic conflict for its own ends. This is a point made by Beitz, who argues that the problem of partiality in intervention may be resolved by intervention under the auspices of an international organization (like the UN) which might not (I do not say will not) be subject to the partiality that characterizes the decisions of particular governments(1979, p. 85). [23]

Many of the key events in the UN's history have been linked to ethnic conflicts, even if the UN has been concerned not with the ethnic conflicts per se, but with their international implications. [24]

This overlapping interest is not difficult to explain. It suffices to refer to Article 1 of the UN Charter, which states that two of the purposes of the organization are to maintain international peace and security, and to promote and encourage respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms

for all. The recent past have clearly shown that ethnic conflicts threaten both ideals. Threats to international peace and security are an ever-present aspect of some of the most violent and protracted ethnic conflicts. This is because such conflicts threaten to spill over into the international arena. Stanley Hoffmann once stated that the world is full of Austria-Hungaries. [25]

For the promotion and encouragement of human rights, we should also remember that the victims of ethnic conflicts are not killed or maimed only in open inter-communal clashes. They can be murdered through the activities of death squads. They can be imprisoned for political activity.

The UN should, therefore, have an important role to play in ethnic conflicts -not just through conflict resolution measures, but also through its promotion of human rights activities, which are increasingly regarded as the legitimate concern of the international community. [26]

The UN, when faced with violent ethnic conflict situations that threaten international peace and security or which violate human rights standards, has been involved in all four of these activities(peace-keeping, peace-making, peace-building and the protection of ethnic minorities) with varying degrees of enthusiasm and commitment. [27]

① Peace-Keeping

The most visible and dramatic form of UN involvement in ethnic conflict is the installation of peacekeeping forces in states troubled by violent and protracted inter-communal conflict. [28]

Although the mandate of each force will change, in all cases military units has been placed between the warring groups. This is not to suggest that these forces do not undertake other valuable tasks. They can facilitate the withdrawal of the parties from direct confrontation (Skjelsbaek, 1989). [29] UN troops have to negotiate with local commanders of rival groups, and therefore, at the micro-level also perform an important peace-making role. They also engage in work that could be characterized as peace-building. [30]

② Peace-Making

This leads us to the next category of UN involvement in ethnic conflict. This is peace-making, which is the attempt to facilitate a resolution of the perceived incompatibility of interests that divide the parties. This can take several forms; a mediator might be appointed(as in Cyprus from 1964-65); the UN Secretary-General might use his unrivaled network of contacts to work behind the scene with the warring parties; the Security Council or the General Assembly might pass resolutions which address specific conflicts and which might help set an agenda for their resolution(e. g. Resolution 242 with its land-for-peace approach to the Jewish Palestinian conflict)[31]

③ Peace-Building

Peace Building process involve working with the `ordinary people ' from the parties to ethnic conflicts so to reduce mutual antagonisms, correct stereotypes and other destructive attitudes, and build a trust. The idea is that peace can be promoted from the bottom up as well as from the top down. Peace Building work usually involves the encouragement of contact between members of the opposed ethnic groups, usually

focused on one of the following areas: superordinate goals, economic development , confidence building, and education for mutual understanding. [32] A major role is played by the UN specialized agencies like the UNESCO in the field of education, the UNDPA, FAO and others in development, the UNEP and the WHO in meeting the superordinate goals in the areas of the environment and the health. [33]

## 9-3-2 The OAU Policy

The OAU has used a variety of techniques to control conflict among its members. For analytical convenience, these techniques can be grouped into two categories: formal and informal. Both categories are political rather than legal, economic, or coercive. Under the formal techniques of conflict control are the following subcategories: (a)conference or summit diplomacy; (b)ad hoc committees; and finally, (c)good offices committees. However, the only informal method of conflict control is ° presidential mediation." This is a unilateral initiative of particular African presidents which might later receive OAU approval; in some cases it might even be incorporated into formal institutional channels. [34]

## 9-3-3 The Subregional Organization

The question of peace keeping should be dealt at the sub-regional level as a continuation of national peace keeping. When the national peace keeping corp is too weak to contain the conflict, the option for an intervention of a regional corp should be envisage in order to assume the protection of civilians and refugees.

The existance of a regional force presents more strategical advantages by the fact that it could act more quickly.

Since 1990, African leaders have moved in this direction with the intervention of the Economic Community of West Africa(ECOWAS), Cease-Fire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) in the Liberian conflict on the initiative of Nigeria.

Nigerian President Ibrahim Babangida used the Standing Mediation Committee(SMC) of ECOWAS to launch an intervention in Liberia's civil war, a rather flimsy base upon which to erect an ambitious project. [35]        Explaining his move, he stated that `Lagos believed that it would have been morally reprehensible and politically indefensible to stand by and watch while citizens of Liberia decimated themselves.' [36]. Howover, despite this Nigerian humanitarian concerne, this operation has meet the opposition of the rebel groups and of some members of ECOMOG. Three raisons can explain this failure.

First, the domination of this force by Nigerian troops and the special relation of friendship between the Nigerian Federal Government and the Liberian embattled President created the fear that this intervention was a pretext to help him.

Second, the SMC did not really enjoy the political legitimacy necessary to launch such operation. The SMC had been set during the May 1990 ECOWAS summit meeting at the suggestion of Nigerian President. Its mandate was broad and general, namely to intervene presumably as mediator -whenever a conflict threatened the stability of the West African region. Because the resolution establishing the SMC referred to disputes between `two or more member states,' not to civil

wars, [37] it is cleare that the member could not have anticipated the use to which the committee was shortly put.

Third, the project of a multilateral force was convened by the SMC but its dispatch was forced by Nigeria without securing the political backing of the full ECOMOG membership. The support of the ECOMOG came only from the Anglophone countries, as SMC members, Togo and Mali declined to contribute troops to the operation and President Blaise Compaore of Burkina Faso roundly condamned it. [37] Boh Senegal and Ivory Coast expressed reservations about the operation.

Fourth, the fear of Nigeria's regional hegemony, has consitently plagued attempts at the region's political and economic integration.

So, despite it innovative aspect, this first tentative of regional organization met many difficulties.

9-3-4 Non Governmental Organization

Particularly in the area of conflict resolution, the NGO community has an important role to play. NGOs have developed their expertise in specialised fields of social action. They represent the `third system', potential forces of countervailing power. The NGO community in general can play a crucial role in early warnings, monitoring, providing immediate relief and finding creative ways of resolving conflicts. The coexistence of a broad range of NGOs, from humanitarian and development groups to human rights and social justice groups, provides a multiplicity of actors. Given sufficient training and resources, they can contribute local expertise and motivation, draw attention to the problems of particularly deprived sections of the community,

influence governments and domestic authorities in the respect for international standards and human rights, as well as provide a broad base to support for early reporting and mediation of conflicts.

This is not to suggest that no such organizations already exist in mediation and conflict resolution: several NGOs have developed competence relevant to conflict management. Highly significant here is the work of the International Red Cross and the Society of Friends, to mention only two groups. What is still needed is international and local NGOs to be trained as conflict managers. Several proposals have been made for international private organizations for precisely the purpose of mediation, along the model of Amnesty International. Here we may quote one source, the Refugee Policy Group:

The creation of a citizen based private organisation, for creating a strong network to receive the facts early, to verify them accurately, and initiate a range of strategies to put pressure on governments and international organisations to act. This type of organisation would work with NGOs and inter-governmental and governmental organisations so as to effect co-ordinated action. [39]

Such an organization would have to work closely with local organizations and mobilise the vast storehouse of knowledge which does exist with regard to ethnicity and conflict management. It is here that Development Agencies in the West, particularly the `like-minded donors', should consider providing more resources for competence building in peace-making. Today they are witnessing how neglecting investments in peace-making and not providng sufficient resources for peace have meant that even successful development projects have to be abandoned. There are strong arguments for the identification of local resources for competence-building in conflict resolution, and for strengthening the links between peace and development.

The UN and the OAU have manifested an interest in the process of conflict resolution in Africa. Unfortunatly as the reality has indicated in Chapter 6, their success have been very limited. Thus, some reforms should be done in order to enhance their humanitarian action.

1. Francis Deng, ˚Rethinking Colonial Borders, "Brookings Review, Spring 1993.

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## CHAPTER 10: ALTERNATIVE SOLUTIONS: A MULTI-DIMENSIONAL APPROACH

The examination of the previous state policies, international organization methods and consociational theory illustrate the limitations of these practices in dealing with ethnic conflicts. It is true that ethnic conflicts are difficult to solve but this should not make us become pessimist. Our assumption is that if the problem of ethnic conflicts is analyzed objectively, this could lead us at least to some solutions able to lower their intensity.

For analytical purpose, we have divided our methods in 4 dimensions. The national dimension, regional (sub-continental) dimension, continental dimension and international dimension.

### 10-1 Democratization Through Political Reform

The prime priority which should be given by the African political leaders is the organization of national forum, with the participation of all the categories of political forces in order to install democratic political, economic and socio-cultural institutions. We believe that it is only through national dialogue and concertation that response on the nature and form of institutions, which encourages the mass participation, could be found as stated by the former Congolese President Marien Ngouabi ° l'action creatrice des masses et le role determinant des cadres." [1]

However, if democracy seems to be the prime condition toward the resolution of African ethnic conflicts, it should reflect the African realities by including some aspects of universal values. Africa should not copy the Western model blindly, as it was the case in 1960s, but should develop its

own constitution or political system based upon its unique culture, history, and experience. [2]

In Western political culture, democracy mean the rule of the majority which in most case is a total of people taken individualy but which share the same political ideology. However, in the African contex it will means the domination of the ethnic majority and ipso-facto the political domination of the small group of the leaders of the majority group. This kind of democracy will produce the same effect of minority people's fear of domination and thus could not eliminate the ethnic tension. The democracy on which we are talking should include and protect the interest of all the groups by proceeding with different arrangements which we are going to illustrate.

In this process of democratization, the national dialogue should deal with the most important issues as the installation of multi-partism, decentralization, respect of minority identity, and human rights.

10-1-1 Establishment of Multi-Partism

As a matter of fact, multi-party system, in comparaison to one party system seems better to African states and presents more advantages. The opposition can make constructive criticisms of the performance of the party or parties in power, thereby helping to ensure good government. By contrast, in one-party states, where organized opposition does not exist, there is no opportunity for open discussion of the actions and measures of the government, so the government and the public do not benefit from responsible criticism. [3]

Another advantage of the multi-party system is that national differences can be compromised in parliament. In

one-party states, no such opportunity may exist, as the only and ruling party has the sole voice in national affairs. [4]

Government of coalision seems to be the best means of finding national unity especially in countries where ethnic groups relation are characterized with one majority group and one minority (Rwanda, Burundi).

However, installation of democratic institutions is not enough to assure political stability and good gouvernance. What is also important is the acceptance of democratic principles which should facilite good functioning of democracy.

Important polical decisions should be taken with the participation of all the parties through the application of political consensus, compromise and tolerence.

As the example of Nigeria shows to us, during the Second Republic, many constitutional devices have been installed in order to resolve the question of regionalism and ethnic conflict. The result of this process was very encouraging because we saw a change in party system and vote behavior. But, what has lacked in Nigeria was the democratic political culture. The political game the elites played was a zero-sum game, and political competition was perceveid as a do or die struggle. The democratic process of compromise and consensus was percieved as a weakness rather than a strength.

Arend Lijhart, in his book, Democraty in Plural Societies argues that elite's cooperation is a very crucial element in consociational democracy. He states:

"Consociational democracy entails the cooperation by segmented leaders in spite of the deep cleavages separating the segments...elites must therefore continually perform a difficult balancing act."[5]

However, in many African states, elites political culture is not based on balance and cooperation.

## 10-1-2 Decentralization

The second problem which should be dealt in the process of political reform is related to the decentralization. In fact, the fear and resentment which groups have of the current state system in Africa, as well as their tendency to view separation as a solution, can be tempered if the state is viewed as an intermediate institution rather than the institution of final resort to work out problems, as it has been to date. [6]

To facilitate the mass participation in the state affairs, the central governments should delegate some powers to the local goverments. This process of encouragment of local autonomy could develop the local initiative, and also relieve the central governments which in most cases in Africa are overburdened.

Concerning the cases where the minority peoples are asking for secession, assuming that secession is either undesirable or unattainable , the best solution in this context might be to adopt a very loose federal system of governance or a confederation.

The confederation type is the one which is rooted in indigenous African political culture. It guarantees a greater amount of autonomy, and it was this autonomy that allowed the various ethnic groups to cultivate and maintain their own distinct identities. [7] Therefore, these loose federal or confederation system of governance would allow for the expression of ethnic identity by promoting the concept of internal self-determination.

The content of this internal self-determination should be decided in conformity to the need of minority peoples with the concensus of their political leaders. The autonomy may be axed on political, cultural or economic matters.

## 10-1-3 Recognition of Ethnic Identities

The political reform should also address the problem of identity. First, it must be established that the question of identity is not and should not be a zero-sum issue in human relationships. All people have multiple identities which are expressed differently in different circumstances. The freedom of an individual or a group to choose its own separate identity should not, therefore, be a threat to others as long as that individual or group also recognizes that there is common identity at another level with those from whom it is distinguishing itself. Thus, as much as people endeavour to articulate and enhance what is unique about themselves, an equal amount of energy should be invested in articulating and enhancing what binds them with other people. [8]

A mechanism must be found to legitimize ethnic identity in Africa without making it incompatible with the formation of a larger unit of identity based on mutuality and beneficial collaboration. [9]

In conjunction with this, one should work at developing systems that could prevent the ethno-politicization of the society or the manipulation of ethnicity by politicians.

## 10-1-4 Respect of Human Rights

We think that there is an established relation between the ethnic conflict and the question of human rights respect. Human rights is an important dimension of democracy because it offers to the mass the possibility of creative participation in the process of nation state building and it is the only way to assume the maintenance of group identity.

This is so because we have defined ethnic group as a group of people who share a belief of a common origin, a specific cultural practice, a unique set of symbols and beliefs and a sense of belonging to each other as a group distinct from other groups. According to this definition, ethnic groups are not political entities, but they can be politicized for different reasons to serve different interests, including and excluding the interests of the ethnic group itself. While conflict between ethnic groups is not inevitable, given that different ethnic groups can live together in peace and share common interests, ethnic conflicts may arise out of uneven distribution of wealth and resources and unequal sharing of power, regardless of the kind of political system. [10]

However, only a democratic order which takes human rights seriously will be capable of avoiding or resolving ethnic conflicts. These rights include the rights of ethnic groups, both as groups and as individual citizens. Such rights have recently gained international recognition and support in the UN Declaration on the Rights of Persons belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities adopted by the General Assembly in 1992. The respect for universal human rights is one of the first measures to combat ethnic conflicts because individuals from different ethnic origines will be treated as equal citizens who have equal rights before the law. [11]

## 10-2 Economic Reform

In the Chapter 5, we noted some economical aspects which we said had contributed to the manifestation of ethnic conflicts in Africa. In the case studies, we tried to demonstrate it. Thus, African states are in need of profound economic reconstruction. The political reform need to be reinforced by an economic reform: otherwise, all the efforts of democratisation could be a loss of time and energy. Since 1980s, African states, under the international community pressure, have been engaged in the process of economic restructuration. However, the question, as in all revolutionary enterprise, remain to look for appropriate approach.

## 10-2-1 Policy of Development

The weakeness of the African states to satisfy the basic needs of the mass has created conditions favorable to conflict development. Thus, the prime question which shall be addressed by the African governments is the question of developmental policy. The developmental process which have been followed by the African states is taking place within the framework of dependence.

This extreme dependence of the continent as a whole on extenal forces has limited the possibility of developments from within, and also gives Africa a certain uniformity. So, nearly all states have failed to effect the developments which they promised would transform the lives of ordinary people. [12]

The most obvious option available after political independence was that of developing the export sector of agriculture. This option was, and continues to be, supported

by the arrangement that runs along the following lines:newly independent African countries are poor and need to earn their way in the world ( true ); one way of doing this is to increase production of agricultural products which are not grown in industrial countries, but which have large markets for consumption, and perhaps will mark the beginning of the transformation of  technological base of these economies.  So far, the last expectation has failed to materialize.

So, there is a need to change the orientation of African economic development policy.  What is important in this case is the developement of an integrated economy which is based on the development of local industry for the satisfaction of the basic human needs of the population.


10-2-2 Economic and Institutional Development

African states should try to develop local areas and give them real power in order to participate  effectively in the management  of  conflicts.  This  is  so  because  in  the distribution    of    budgetary    resource    sharing    and responsibilities, the economic policy of most African states has been largely urban-oriented, reflecting the polarization of economic and political power in the urban areas. At the same time, institutional capacity at the local government level has been allowed to remain extremely poor, with minimal attention  from  the  central  government  and  the  donor community. [13]

Similarly,  the renewed emphasis on efforts to bolster institutional  capacity  has  tended  to  focus  on  economic management  and  government  administration  at  the  central government level. [14] In contrast, local government finances in  most  African  countries  are  in  a  shamble,  and  local

administrative authorities have inadequate resources to carry out their assigned responsibilities. [15]

In  terms  of  conflict  management  this  economic  and institutional neglect of local areas has serious consequences because in reality African central governments doesn't have the capacity to deal with all the national requirements.

In this period of political reform which means a broad political participation, this situation is easily exploitable by the local politicians by generating the feeling of sub-nationalism.   Local   governments   without   a   resilient institutional capacity could not provide effective avenues for channeling resource claims vis-a-vis the center.  Without such avenues, democratic political participation could easily degenerate into zero-sum claims, with imminent danger of the fragmentation of the national political-economic system. [16]

Lasly, the effect of economic restructuring has brought back many peoples to their orignal local areas thus, inability to meet the basic needs of these politicized returnees  could  easily  turn  them  into  champions  of irreconcilable demands based on ethnic, tribal, and other forms  of  subnational  identity,  thereby  resulting  in  a substantial escalation of conflict. [17]

Logically speaking, if appropriate economic policies are adopted, services consumed at the grass-roots level -primary education, health, community roads, and local law and order - can be produced most efficiently at the local government levels.

The above considerations underscore the need to strengthen substantially  the  budgetary  processes  and  institutional capacity of local governments in Africa.  This would require decisive actions.  First, there should be a clearly defined

devolution of responsibilities to each level of government –
local, state, and central –based on ability to carry out
effectively the attendant functions. Second, such an
assignment of responsibilities, according to the so-called
principle of subsidiarity, should be supported by well-
defined and stable sources of funds. To the extent possible,
the lower levels of government should generate their own
resources from quasi-automatic or intragovernmental transfers
on stable and clearly identified bases. Third, the
management of local government affairs, including finances,
should be supported strongly, including personnel training
and the development of suitable system. [18]

## 10-2-3 Rational Integration and Resource Allocation

The economic reform should resolve the problem of
geographic unevenness of economic activities. The reality is
that the economies of most African states still suffer from
desintegration despite interest in the early years of
independence to promote intranational balance. Most
governments have generally tended to focus on the promotion
of employment and diversified economic growth in the urban
regions. The urban areas have thus become the hub of
administrative and economic activity. Subnational
distributive conflicts have therefore tended to take the form
of a contest between demand-bearing groups in the urban areas
and the state. [19] To solve this situation, the African states
should promote an integrated development of rural areas.

This uneven character is also present in the sharing of
depletaple natural resources, notably minerals. We have seen
that the policy of resource allocation has had profound
implications in the resolution of intranational conflicts.
Thus in Nigeria ongoing debates on the sharing of oil revenue
are rooted in underlying distributive conflicts between the

relatively poor North and the more affluent South. In the
Sudan the discovery of oil and the attendant distributive
concerns contributed significantly to the eventual collapse
of the National Reconciliation Government and renewed a
violent confrontation between the northern and the southern
parts of the country. [20]

To solve this conflict related to the sharing of resource,
an effective framework for handling the political and other
concerns of the principal demand-bearing should be
established [21]. Strict measures should be set-up in order
to avoid the mismanagement of the resource derived fund by
the political leaders because this fact gives a bad
perception to the demand-bearing group and complicate the
resolution of the conflict.

Likewise, the rapid depletion of a country's mineral
wealth without a matching improvement in the economic
situation is bound to complicate the management of
conflict. [22]

In other words, a prudent management of mineral wealth,
including transparency and good governance, is crucial to the
management of conflict. Together with this, any contrived
formula, stressing such aspects as basic economic needs,
rental" payments to the geographic area of origin for the
resources, and a balanced development of the different parts
of the country, must be sufficiently versatile to meet the
concerns of the contending demand-bearing groups. The
development of such formula often requires a compromise
between economic allocation efficiency and sociopolitical
stability. [23]

## 10-2-4 Privatization

In the preceding Chapter, we saw that the politics of state hegemony over economic activities had brought colapse and encouraged the ethno-politicization of African society.

Therefore, to remedy these situation, there is a need to privatization which is also urged by the IMF and other international financial institutions. We do recognize this necessity because we believe that as long as the economic sector is controled by the states, the African states can't develop themselves because these states will be overwhelmed by the mass demand for employment. Another fact is that a state controled economy does not face an internal competition which in the field of economy is an important factor to creativity and dynamism.

However, African states should pay attention to some problems related to this process which may in terms of conflict management, complicate the situation.

The first problem is that the common African people do not have such capacity to buy any parastatal enterprise. The most probable buyers are businessmen and foreigners. However, in some countries, the business community is mostly composed of people of the politically dominant group and foreigners (mostly Asian people in Kenya). The prospect of one ethnic group or national foreigners controling most of economic powers may create ethnic and racial tensions.

However, such a reversal could have profound implications for the management of conflict in Africa.    Second, the policy shift is in many cases occurring at a time when large numbers of politicized employees are being cut from the public enterprises, the civil service, and the military. These employees, who will have to find alternative employment in traditional agriculture and the informal sector, will probably provide a fertile breeding ground for organizers of zero-sum demands, exploiting ethnic, racial, and other forms of identity. [24]

The effective management of conflict in many African countries will thus need to be supported by policies that are specifically aimed at eliminating ethnic and racial economic imbalances like: creation of interethnic and interracial ventures; reinforced human development efforts for the hitherto underprivileged populations; and sound investment and fiscal policies aimed at creating an environment for private investment and at ensuring a more equitable sharing of benefits. [25] A transparent legal framework and code of behaviors should be established in order to deal with all forms of conflicting situations and corruption and to protect the rights of all.

However, in this process of privatization, attention should be paid to some social field such as education and welfare which, as a basic human need should be free because the great part of African mass are still poor and can't afford to pay the  school and welfare fee themselves.

The conrol of government power is still the primary source of accumulating wealth and of new class formation.  Therefore, control of state power becomes a violent and bitter struggle. Claude Ake states:

> A desperate struggle to win control of state power ensues since this control means for all practical purposes being all powerful and owning everything.  Politics becomes warfare—a matter of life and death. [26]

10-3 National Reform on Peace Making and Peace Keeping Policy

Process of conflict resolution at national level should be integrated with the socio-cultural aspect. The problem in Africa is that conflict resolution process at the national dimension do not reflect the cultural practice of African peoples.

10-3-1 Creation of National Elders Committee

The observation of traditional Afrian society shows us that the elder people were the most respected people. Through the use of their wiseness and knowlege, they came to deal with many conflicting situations. This role made them the natural winner of legitimacy. That was the natural peace making body in traditional Africa. Even at the present day, African people still have a high esteeme for the elders. When an elder dies in Africa, it is like burning of a library, which illustrates well the African people's special consideration of the elders.

So Joan Burke introduces her report on conflict among the Kongo people of lower Zaire, where conflicts are experienced as a group crisis rather than simply as an individual or interpersonal issue.

If the conflict is not resolved directly, either party may, in time, invite a mutually acceptable third party to serve as a mediator(not an arbitrator) to assist in reaching a resolution.

The weight of respect owed by the younger to the elder makes direct negotiation inappropriate. The younger is required to initiate the resolution process, no matter who has committed a socially recognized wrongdoing, but

eventually the concern of all those who are involved is the reestablishment of harmonious relationships.

If mediation in either horizontal or vertical conflicts fails to bring about resolution, the matter will be referred to the clan palaver, where the community as a body seeks to find a way to mend the broken relationship before it creates wider division. The palaver proceeds slowly toward consensus by well-practiced steps. The chief or his chosen representative acts as facilitator and postpones his own contribution until the time is ripe. The group formally assembles; there is ritual recognition of significant elders; then the two parties present their briefs; an open airing of views followed by all possessing an opinion expected to contribute it openly. Much time is allowed for group exploration of the conflict until finally the chief moves from being facilitator to articulator.

The chief sums up his judgment in eloquent proverbs and artful recommendations. ˚It is he who is as familiar with proverbs as he with the matter at hand who usually arbitrates,″ say the Yoruba. This is equally true across West Africa, where the chief may make recommendations, assign blame, apply sanctions, assess payments, and define the final settlement.

The palaver is an all-community hearing that is meant to ensure equal justice to all parties. As the Basa of Nigeria say, ˚The palaver drum is not beaten only on one side.″ It takes two hands two complementary beats —that is, resolution requires ritual involvement of the two sides. [27]

This African traditional mode of conflict resolution seems to possess a set of positive elements which are similar with

those used in peace building process in some Western scieties as: impartial third party, noncoercive force from the mediator; nonbinging, nonprescriptive, in that the primary goal of the mediator is to assist the parties in arriving at a mutually satisfactory agreement that they will fulfill because of mutual benefits; nonthreatening; conclusive, in that it provides a setting for decision, distribution, and termination. [28]

Looking at this reality, we will realize that African people have a very rich and effectitve tradition of conflict resolution and that their cultural orientation is more toward peaceful live than violence. However, the question remains to see if this rich tradition may be adapted in the context of the new nation states.

The modern realities in which the actual African states have been involved are different from the pre-colonial realities, and we think that, to be effective, the traditional approach needs to be reformed with some new dimension.

At the national level, an institution of conflict prevention, composed of elders from each region could be established.

The role of this institution could be to mediate conflicting situation related to ethnic group claims and discrimination based on ethnic belonging. We believe that because of the respect the elders carry and because of the large representativity this institution will have, it may be able to win the unanimous acceptance of political leaders. Conflicting issue could be examined in regular meetings or in an extraodinary meeting in case of urgency. This could give them possibility to ease tension peacefully before it turns to conflict.

That means that political leaders should address their claim to this committee during its regular meetings, and that this commity could examine all the conflicting issues, and, if necessary, summon the concerned parties and try to mediate the issue. (1) In case of tension between two different political groups, this comittee could summone the concerned parties, and use its influence in order to avoid the eruption of conflict.

This committee should be a non-political institution which simply bears an advisary or a symbolic role in the national parliament.

10-3-2 Creation of National Inter-Ethnic Peace Keeping Corp

In order to prevent the military confrontation, a peace keeping force may be established at national level. This corp which we may call inter-ethnic national peace corp should be constituted by soldiers recruited on ethnic or regional criteria to make it more national. Special training related to ethnic confrontation and peace building should be allowed to this force.

This corp can be a part of OAU peace keeping force on which we shall discuss in the coming paragraphs.

10-4 Constitutional Reform

After political reforms have been agreed upon through dialogue and peaceful negotiation between different groups, the agreement should be incorporated in a new constition. The role of the constitution should be to regularize structural and institutional relations in proper ways in order to avoid conflicts.

This is so because we consider that in any process of conflict resolution, constitutional reform is of great importance. In our view, constitution is an ensemble of principles and normes, translated into juridical terms and which serves to establich peaceful social relations.

## 10-4-1 The Relation between Different States Institutions

The relation between the centre and the regions. The responsibilities between the institutions of central government and regional one should be specified clearly.

## 10-4-2 The Norm of Distribution of National Resources

The reality indicates that in Africa resources are not distributed equally.

## 10-4-3 The Role of Traditional Leaders

It is neccessary for modern African states to legalize effectively the role and place of traditional leaders in order to have a well balanced society from the politico-cultural aspect.

## 10-4-4 The Criteria for Creation of New States

In many African states, minority peoples are less represented. This in our view does' not help to foster a feeling of national unity. What we propose is that ethnic criteria be introduced in the composition of national government or the presidential office be hold on rotative principle.

## 10-4-5 A Constitution which Check and Balance

In order to avoid the situation of political power concentration in the hands of one person as it was for nearly 30 years.

## 10-4-6 A Formula of Presidential Election.

We realize that the actual formula of presidential election which is based on the principle of majority rule doesn't foster a feeling of national unity. This is so because most of the presidents may come from the majority group and this fact may hurt the pride of minority groups especially in the case where they used to select a king.

To avoid this situation of frustration, we think that a process of presidential election based on rotative principle may be of great useful. It may be decided that candidates to a national leader be selected from one state or region. In this case, all the parties will be allowed to present their canditates. If such a process could success, it presents two positive elements. First, it could assure the minority groups that they are not excluded in the process of nation building. Second, it could develop the process of forming national parties because these parties could realize the need of promoting the regional branches.

## 10-5 Educational Reform

The African states education system should be reformed in order to respond to the real needs of their societies. The education programme should include the following aspects.

## 10-5-1 The Promotion of Ethnic Culture and Language Studies
## 10-5-2 Construction of Inter-Ethnic Cultural Exchange Center

10-5-3 Studies of Ethno-Development
10-5-4 Introduction of Compulsory Educational System

10-6 Reform at the Sub Continental Level

The realities have demonstrated that because of the nature
of African states system, ethnic conflicts have a serious
impact on the political stability of neighboring countries.
Therefore, it is important that at the regional level, proper
preventive measures be introduced. These measures could be in
the installation of regional institutions in which integrated
policies, to deal with regional problem could be formulated.

Regional groupings to foster political and economic
cooperation, including coordination of economic policies,
collective self-reliance for joint regional development and
mobilization to deal with peculiar regional problems created
and strengtened.

10-6-1 Political Aspect

From the political aspect, we think that the process of
democracy could be encouraged at the regional level through
creation of democratic forum where the political leaders may
cooperate in seach of peacefull solution.

It is important to supplement the loose federal system by
building infrastructure for regional integration. This is so
because by legitimazing the ethnicity, a tendency toward
fragmentation may arise. Therefore, it will be balanced and
tempered by providing incentives towards higher levels of
integration and identification with the entire region. As
the various ethnic groups become reassured of their identity
and security, they would also be provided with incentives for

a larger regional identity by highlighting the benefits that
could emerge from higher levels of association and
integration.

The creation of a supra-state regional structure, in which
the various groups in the region have a say but which is
capable of dealing with problems that cannot be dealt with at
the state level, could have a salutary effect on the
conflicts between the state and the various groupings within
it. [29]

This approach could enable the societies in Africa to work
at both ends of the identity problem. While people would be
reassured about being what they are, they would also be
encouraged to explore greater possibilities of meaningful
identity with greater entities, beyond the state. The
disintegration and exclusive orientation of ethnicity would
become more balanced by the synthesis and inclusiveness that
come from a sense of regional identity. Creating a regional
framework with a move towards regional integration could
permit the relaxation of strict boundary demarcations,
allowing freedom of movement and interaction between peoples.
It could reduce the pressure for the creation of new
independent states by disaffected groups, since there would
be a new regional forum to redress their grievances or
address their interests and rights without their being forced
to resort to secession. [30]

The concept of a regional identity arising from a vision
of regional integration could create a less threatening,
consociational process where all the actors in the region
could be engaged in building a more equitable and peaceful
social contract that could lead to mutually enriching
relationships. [31] Regional identity would not be an end in
itself, but a step in a transition to more inclusive
identities. It would challenge groups to recognize aspects

of themselves that they could share beyond the ethnic group and the state. [32]

10-6-2 Economic Aspect

Already, some encouraging initiatives have be made like the creation in 1975 of the ECOWAS (Economic Community of West African States) by the Treaty of Lagos as an integrative and cooperative venture among the member states which seeks to reduce the dependence of member-states on their former colonial metropoles and on other highly industrialized nations; to promote trade between member states; to create a free trade area, and a customs union, having a common external tariff; and to promote cooperation and development in the fields of transport, telecommunications, energy, agriculture, natural resources, monetary and financial questions, social and cultural matters. [33]

In 1980 there emerged the SADCC (Southern African Development Coordinating Conference). Among the specific aims of the organization are:
(i.)Economic liberation of member states through regional and coordinated efforts; (ii.)Reduction of economic dependence on the Republic of South Africa and on any single external state or group of states; (iii.)Promotion and insurance of the strength and survival of member-states as well as the basic needs of their citizens; (iv.)Coordination of the transport systems and industrial development of member-states; (V.)Part of the political aim of the organization is the termination of apartheid and white minority rule in South Africa.

Each of the member-states is assigned a specific field for research and action in the following manner: Angola--energy development; Botswana--crop research, livestock production, and animal disease control; Lesotho--soil and water

conservation, and land utilization; Malawi--forestry, fisheries and wildlife; Mozambique--transport and communications; Swaziland-manpower development; Tanzania--industrial and trade development; Zambia--development funding and mining; Zimbabwe--food security and security printing (bank notes). Members hold one annual mandated conference with invited guests to discuss SADCC's program, goals, achievements and problems and to seek mutual understanding and ways of improving the organization's performance. [34]

10-6-3 Peace Making and Peace Building

The humanitarian intervention at the sub-continental level should first focus on peaceful mediation. The process of the mediation should be the continuation of the national one. That means that, a parallel mediation institution composed of the elders regional head of states should be established and work in collaboration with the national one.

In case of aggravation of the situation, a peace keeping corp, composed of the peace keeping corps of each state could then intervene.

10-7 Reform at The Continental Level

Our assumption is that the future of Africa reside in the philosophy of Pan-Africanism. For that purpose, a reconside-tion of this concept should be initiated under the direction of the OAU.

It is obvious to note that at the time when other countries more developed than African states are commiting themselve to strong unity in the form of greater continental

organization like the EC and the APEC. African unity is sacrificed in the name of territorial nationalism.

At the Kampala Conference, the Secretary General of the OAU, Dr. Salim Ahmed Salim, noted what he termed the emergence of a new geo-political balance of forces, as well as a new international economic order that could further marginalize Africa.' Concern over marginalization have prompted the OAU, at the level of African Heads of States and governments, to issue a declaration that underlines a new determination that underlines a new determination to further democratize African society, resolve conflict situations, foster greater subregional cooperation, and accelerate socio-economic growth and development. The declaration states in part:

We realize at the same time that the possibilities of achieving the objectives we have set will be constrained as long as an atmosphere of lasting peace and stability does not prevail in Africa. We therefore renew our determination to work together towards the peaceful and speedy resolution of all conflicts in our continent.

The resolution of conflicts will be conductive to the creation of peace and stability thus releasing expenditures on defence and security and direct them as additional resources for socioeconomic development. We are equally determined to make renewed efforts to eradicate the root causes of the refugee problem. It is only through the creation of stable conditions that Africa can fully harness its human and material resources and direct them to development. [35]

Thus, the OAU should deal more systematically with the national quetion of African states by reexamining the African states system, their economic and conflict resolution approach.

10-7-1 Reconceptualization of State Sovereignty

Our assumption is that the OAU can't operate effectivly if the concept of sovereignty is not a subject of serious reconceptualization. In the actual situation, it will suffise for any state to claim this right in order to paralyze the action of the OAU. Therefore, by considering the serious threat the state action pose, it is time to think how to divide the state sovereignty in some fields.

We think that in the interest of African's unity and peace OAU should establish a kind of -souvereignty pact-in which matters concerning the treatment and the security of minority groups are directly under the juridiction of a OAU body which we may call the OAU Committee of Ethnic Problems. The role of this committee is to set-up a general guideline for the promotion of peaceful relation between the states and the diverse ethnic groups in the OAU member states and be the realization of minority groups self-determination within the limit of existing nation states.

What should be the nature of the minority group and the content or limitation of the self-determination should be decided by a special body composed of state representatives and some delegate of minority groups.

OAU states negotiated deliberately and in 1981 established the African Charter of People's and Human Rights, which provides for a court composed of eminent Africans to accept petitions and give ruling on abuses of human rights in member-states.

We realize that the OAU should deal also with the leaders of each state's political parties in establishing a continental code of behaviors and ethics of political parties.

As the examples in Angola and other countries indicated, political leaders have tended to use ethnic sentiment for their own purpose by putting peoples againt each other. Therefore, the OAU can't pretend to play an important role by not dealing with this problem. The practice hows that during the election, for example, political elite don't respect the election code even with the presence of the UN or OAU observers. Our view is that this happens because the political leaders aren't bound by any legal obligation with those observers and feel free to act as they want. Thus, what we propose in this thesis the installation of a kind of political pact between the OAU and all the political parties before the election. In this pact the OAU will establish a code of conduct in collaboration with all the registered political parties which will become the signatories of this code. So, during the election, in case of any violation, a jugement will be hammered by the OAU observers instead of by the national election committee which is often a subject of controversy as it was in Nigeria during the first Republic.

10-7-2 ReconceptualizationI of National Self-Determination

In the precedent section we stated the need for African states to device some new forms of self-determination within the limit of existing state structure. However, this process should take a lead in reformulating the concept of self-determination which can satisfy the need of social security and cultural maintenance and the need of states for unity maintenance. In Chapter 4, we saw that the OAU has restricted the application of the concept of self-determination within the limit of colonial territories for the purpose of states integrity and security in Africa. But, while this approach limit its scop of applicability, we think that, by encouraging and legalizing the principe of self-determination within the limits of the states. The OAU could device new

measures which ensure that internal self-determination is a right of necessity and should not be used by neighboring states to precipitate the desintegration of other states. This kind of measures could be of great importance because, the concern of most African states is the maintenance of their state integrity.

The UN should also be involved in the respect and maintenance of any agreement on internal self-determination reached between the state and region. This is so because many of the agreements reached between the minority peoples and the central government are often broken up because the central government sometimes fails to respect their engagement. The case of the Sudan agreement may be taken as an exemple. However, if the OUA is involved in the process, we think that concerned parties may feel some international pressure which may prevent them from making such a move.

10-7-3 The Socio-Economic Aspect

In our view, OAU should work in close cooperation with African governments in order to integrate socio-economic plan. Those plan should be implemented gradually.

Actually, some examples already exist, for example, in the critical area of, nutrition an economic summit in Lagos, Nigeria in 1980 the OAU adopted a Lagos Plan of Action which, among other things, endorsed a regional food plan for Africa drawn up by African agricultural ministers in 1978. The plan gave priority to the importance of producing more food for the continent so as to ensure food-self sufficiency and meet the nutritional needs of all inhabitants of the continent. [36]

These kind of initiatives necessitate from the African states not only a sens of initiative but also a considerable financial capacity and organizational. However, the reality is that African national government do not have enough money to support the process.

## 10-7-4 OAU Peace Making and Peace Building

In the preceeding paragraphes, we have elaborated some peaceful ways of intervention from national and sub-regional level. This was done in the prospect of an integrated Africa in which the OAU should play a coordinating role. In our vision, the institions we envisage at national and sub-regional level should also find their ultimate goal at the continental level under the auspice of the OAU.

It means that the OAU should review its peace making process. We mean its mediation approach. Its mediation should reflect the African culture and tradition remodeled in conformity to our modern time. An institutionalized organ of former or elder head of states or politicians should be installed in order to play a non politicized and dynamic role in conflict resolution. The OAU committee could then work in close collaboration with the national and sub-regional committees. The management of the conflict at their preliminary stage should be tackled at the national committee which regularly informs the sub-regional and the OAU committees on the evolution of their mediation. In conformity to this, a joint committee should request necessary assistance to the sub-regional or OAU committees. What is important in this process is, first, the active participation of the respected common African elders. The fact of their involvement will secure responsable conflict management with the African tradition and also with the common peoples. We

consider that the OAU can't have a strong legitimacy unless it does not cooperate with the common African peoples.

The second problem is the question of partiality. The problem is how to avoid claims of impartiality? In our logic, the best means is to have a political or social contract between all the political parties and all the mediator organs at all levels before the presidential election and during all the presidential mandate period. This pact should be signed and celebrated in traditional way including the sacred invocation and presence of African ancestors. The realization of such traditional practice will psychologically accommodates political leaders to African ancestors and thus remind them that their actions are judged not only by the common peoples but also by our ancestors which the actual African peoples consider as a god.

This mode of mediation would constitute a natural development and institutionalization of Africa's traditional and contemporary methods of conflict management, which emphasize the use of elders and statesman as mediators instead of adjudicators. While combining individual flexibility with organizational leverage, [37] it would also represent a proud application of the traditional African conception of a family, village, or clan elder intervening in a "palaver" -not to apportion blame, but to prevent bitter recriminations, soothe jarred sensitivities, and seek compromise, giving the disputants the benefit of his wise and perceptive statesmanship and the stable environment for negotiation derived largely from the respect accorded to him as an elder.

Further, this method of organizational intervention would facilitate continuous, consistent, and intensive mediation in regional conflicts. Most important, it could insulate the mediation process from the dynamics of regional politics by

functionally separating the role of mediator from the role of legitimatizer of any outcome of the mediation process. It would thus reduce the possibility of the OAU becoming an arena for the conflict or a stake in the dispute. The method would cut costs and make wider use of the region's high-caliber manpower instead of overtaxing the limited staff of the OAU Secretariat. [38]

Concerning the peace keeping process, the formula will be to form in each country 50 soldiers of different ethnic groups; if all the OAU member states submits to this formula, we will have 2750 soldiers formed for the same purpose. The second stage will be to continue their formation; at this stage we think that the cooperation of the UN or the great powers through this organization will be of great importance. Thus what we call pact of sovereignty will be in political and military field for the regional peace and security.

But, to give this force a real meaning, there is a need to promote a regional pact on sovereingnty. In this pact, states will delegate their sovereignty on security matters to a regional force.

10-8 Reform at the International Level

In the preceding sections, we have ellaborated some prospects of resolution from national, sub-regional and regional level. These prospects, when fully implemented, represent to us an important step toward the resolution of ethnic conflicts. However, it should be stated that at the present level of African states, it is difficult to see a stable prospect of conflict resolution if the reform envisaged by these states are not followed by any adjustment and assitance at international level because African states are still too weak.

The only efficient source of external assistance in waging peace in African would be the United Nations. It has the expertise in all aspects of conflict management. It has the global mandate, the legitimacy, the continuity or staying power, and the political strength to gain adherence to agreements. While the United Nations can insulate reluctant external powers from direct intervention in conflicts in remote corners of Africa, logistic and other material assistance from these powers such as air transportation for troops, supplies, and equipment could be channeled through the UN system and thereby made more acceptable to all shades of African opinion. [39]

However, despite this enormous possibility, the UN has still many weakness which may undermine its humanitarian action. Thus, to be effective some reforms need to be undergone.

10-8-1 Reformulation of the UN Approach

The UN is an international organization composed by sovereign states. As the principle of international law indicates, internal conflicts are under the jurisdiction of internal law. However, as the reality indicates, internal conflicts are becoming a major concern for international peace and security, thus, they could no longer be left to national government. We think that as well as the OAU, the UN should take a lead in the legal and political reconceptualization of the principle of state sovereignty. This reconceptualization should permit the international community to give the humanitarian assistance to the suffering peoples at the required moment.

The second reformulation should be related to the principle of self-determination. As together with the OAU,

the UN should encourage flexible application of the principle of internal self-determination. More precisely, it could give it legal expertise to define in proper way the institutional relations between different states or regions.

This process of conceptual approach should also include other substantive principles that may be used to govern various situations of conflicts; for instance, basic human needs of identity and recognition, popular choice and decision making through open and fair referenda and elections, popular participation in governance, and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms and foreign powers interventions. These principles can be useful in limiting the scope of conflicts and defining the formulas for managing and resolving them. Such principles have already been suggested by the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Africa, [40] largely in emulation of the standards set by the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. Standards and codes of conduct have been vital to whatever stability exists in the African regional system, but they will be crucial when the purpose is to stabilize and channel changes into legitimate and predictable directions. "[41]

10-8-2 Reformulation of the UN Peace Keeping

First, UN peace-keepers are not involved in enforcement operations. To be effective they rely on the consent and co-operation of the parties themselves. If one or more of these parties decides to escalate the violence, there is little that the UN can do to stop this from happening. [42]

We think that by considering the gravity of the situation in Africa, this principle needs to be reviewed. We agree that UN peace keeping force should be a pacific intervention through what Zartman succinctly calls a cooperative security

process. [43] A cooperative security process for Africa can be initiated within the UN system. However, the role of this force should be to separate conflicting parties, to protect the civilians and to secure the refugee camps. If these three roles are not properly assumed, the international peace keeping force will lose their legitimacy to African common people especially, when facing genocide, this force preferes to leave or to do nothing at all as it was in Rwanda.

This is so because the experience of Rwanda indicates that the UN had prefered to leave the country instead of assisting the people in face of the genocide. Denouncing this fact, Dr. Salim Salim the OAU secretary general stated:

I have learned with much regret the decision taken yeserday... at this moment when the people of that country critically need international solidarity and assistance.

This decision is all the more regrettable coming as it does at a time when efforts are also being made by the OAU and the leaders of the region to secure a ceasefire and bring an end to the massacres in the country...

I am particularly disappointed that this unfortunate decision to abandon the people of Rwanda had been taken in spite of the appeals from Africa to the Security Council to maintain an effective UNAMIR presence in the country. [44]

The statement continued, including an oblique reference to the UN's preoccupation with Bosnia:

[The UNAMIR withdrawal] will clearly not be understood by Africans who might interpret it as a sign of indifference or lack of sufficient concern for African tragic situations. This is particularly so when account is taken of the fact hat the United Nations is increasingly involved, and rightly so, in situations affecting peace and security in other regions. [45]

What is important to the UN is the way it could adapt the peace keeping force mandate in conformity to the situation faced by the people which it is supposed to protect. Thus,

flexibility, adaptability and efficacy shoud guide the action of UN force in Africa as well as in other continents.

Second, a reliable and efficient system of finance is needed. At the end of 1988 UNFICYP was over $164 million in deficit(UN Doc. S/20310) and UNIFIL was $304 million in deficit(UN Doc. S/20416). This can undermine the will of the contributing states to support UN operations.

Third, the UN offers no proper training for peacekeeping operations. [46] To solve this weakness, we suggest that in case of Africa, the UN should develop the formula we proposed in the preceding section. The UN could propose to each state to have a special unit of 50 members in its national army which regularly have a special training by UN military experts. So, in case of Africa, the UN could work closely with the OAU in assisting the training of an African force.

10-8-3 Increase of the UN Role

Being new comer and weak in the world political and economic system, the African states can't achieve a remarkable progress unless they are assisted by the international community and the UN specilized agencies for technical and financial assistance because they still face many difficulties which if not redressed, could undermine their action.
This point it clarified by... when he noted that:

Because of their powerlessness, African states have a lot of faith in the UN as the major force to serve to preserve international peace and security and to promote world-wide economic and social development. They have worked within and through the organization to promote such developments, preferring multilateral aid channelled through the organization to bilateral aid which often is a Trojan Horse.'' [47 ]

Advocates of a NIEO required that the international economy should be structured to help every nation to achieve its development plans whatever the principles suiting that plan might be; that the poor nations, as members of the world community, regarded as an organic whole, have a claim to assistance from the wealthier members; that there should be a fairer distribution of wealth; and that the prices of commodities should rise or fall proportionately with those of finished goods. [48]

As stated in Chapter 5, there is an unequality of trade condition between the African states and their European partner. However, there is an urgent need to reform that trend and to be replaced by a new economic order.

For that purpose, the UN should help the African states and the other Third World countries to reach of international agreements that might shield raw material producing countries from the consequences of adverse terms of trade due to inflation in industrialized countries. Such agreements would stabilize the prices of commodities and raw materials exported by these states and provide some mechanism which would restrain the rise of prices of their imports. [49]

10-8-4 Increasing the UN Role in Coordinating
        the Action of Super Powers.

The offer of diplomatic mediation of super power may also be a positive action in the process of conflict resolution specially when this initiative is also supported by the UN. Concerned external powers can wage peace in Africa by attenuating its weaknesses and accentuating its strength through a collaborative and coordinated security process within the UN system.

An exemple of positive mediation by super-powers is that of the mediation effort done by the Soviet Union and the US on behalf of the UN assistance in order to end the conflict in Angola. On December 13, 1990, representatives of the MPLA, the UNITA, Portugal, the Soviet Union, and the United States met at the State Department, agreed on a peace plan agreement that provided for the following:

A multiparty democracy in postwar Angola; International supervision of the cease-fire by the United Nations; International monitoring of the elections; Linkage between a cease-fire and the election date; Cessation of lethal aid from exernal sources after the cease-fire; Creation of a single national army after the start of the cease-fire and before elections. [50]

On May 1, 1991, the Estoril Accords, were initialed by MPLA and UNITA representatives. They provided for a cease-fire and a settlement to the civil war. [51] This positive mediation has been possible through the coordination of the UN Security Council.

10-8-4 The Peace Building Process

One of the most dramatic facts of ethnic conflicts in Africa is the recurrence of the conflict after their cesassion. The reason of this phenomen is the failure of peace building process.

In this field too, the first effort should come from the national government. In a country ravaged by the war, there is a terrible psychological wound, which is very difficult to treat and which may lead people toward the tendency of revenge.

One of the possible way is the establishment of the UN-OAU Nobel Prize for peace and friendship in Africa. The prize could be given each 1 or 2 years to an African leader who shows a best outstanding record on peace and friendship promotion at national, continental and international level. The prestige and honor given to him through the winning of this prize could boost his image, give him a continental legitimacy which could help him to become a respected and accepted mediator.

This, could also encourage other leaders to follow his example and therefore reinstall a culture of democracy and tolerance which used to caracterize the traditional African society.

In conclusion we may say that despite immense difficulties, there are still some possibilities which may help us to resolve the ethnic conflicts in Africa or at least to lower their intensity. However, if the prime effort should come from the concerned African states, the sub-regional, regional and international community have an important role to play.

Footnotes                                    Chapter 10

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   1969-1977.

2. Oliver Furley, Conflict in Africa, London, Tauris Academic
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3. Kumar Rupesinghe, Conflict Resolution in Uganda, London,
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6. As we stated in Chapter 4 the tendency of African states,
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   institutions.

7. George B. N. Ayittey, Africa Betrayed (St. Martin's Press, New
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8. Kumar Rupesinghe & Valery A. Tishkov, Ethnicity and Power in
   the Contemporary World (New York and Tokyo, United Nations
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9. Ibid.

10. David Beetham, Politics and Human Rights (London, Blackwell
    1995), p. 192.

11. Ibid.

12. Peter Anyang Nyongo, Popular Struggles for Democracy in
    in Africa, London, The United Nations University, pp. 40-41.

13. Francis M. Deng, Sadikiel Kimaro, Terrence Lyons, Donald
    Rothchild,  and I. William Zartman, Sovereignty as
    Responsibility:Conflict Management in Africa, Washington,
    D. C., The Brookings Institution, p. 104-110.

14. Ibid.

15. Ibid.

16. Ibid.

17. Ibid.

18. Ibid.

19. Ibid.

20. Peter Nyot kok, `adding fuel to the conflict, War and
    Peace in the Sudan ' in Martin Doornbos and Others,  Beyond
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    1992 ), pp. 104-12.

21. Francis M. Deng, op. cit., p. 106-110.

22. Ibid.

23. Ibid.

24. Ibid.

25. West Africa, May  25, 1981, pp. 1162-1163.

26. David W. Augsburger, Conflict Mediation Across Cultures,
    Kentucky, John Knox Press, 1992, pp. 211-212

27. Ibid.

28. This Commitee would only have a symbolic power.

29. Kumar Rupesinghe & Valery A. Tishkov, op. cit. p. 47.

30. Ibid.

31. Ibid.

32. Ibid.

33. Festus Ugboaja Ohaegbulam, Towards an Understanding of the
    African Experience from Historical and Contemporary Pers-
    pectives (New York, University Press of America 1990), p. 250.

34. Ibid. p. 251.

35. Declaration of the Assembly of Heads of State and Govern-
    ment of the Organization of African Unity on the Political
    and Socio-Economic Situation in Africa and the Fundamental
    Changes Taking Place in the World, July 1990.

36. Edmond J. Keller & Donald Rothchild, Africa in the New
    International Order (Londond, Lynne Rienner Publishers
    1996), p. 46.

37. Declaration of the Assembly of Heads of State and
    Government of the Organization of African Unity on the
    Political and Socio-Economic Situation in Africa and
    the Fundamental Changes Taking Place in the World,
    July 1990.

38. African States are in urgent need for food self
    sufficiency.

39. Edmond J. Keller and Donald Rothchild, Africa in the
    New International Order:Rethinking State Sovereignty
    and Regional Security, London, Lynne Rienner Publishers,
    1996, p. 48.
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41. Edmond J. Keller, op. cit., p. 252.

42. Ibid., p. 255.

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48. Ryan, S., op. cit.

49. John W. Harbeson & Donald Rothchild,

50. Festus Ugboaja Ohaegbulam, Towards an Understanding
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GENERAL CONCLUSION

This thesis has tried to analyze the factors which
contribute to the rise or intensification of ethnic conflicts
in Africa in order to formulate some prospects of resolution.

As the world situation indicates, this problem is a very
important and in need of urgent solutions because it
undermines the world peace and security.

However, in order to formulate workable solutions, the
problem should be approached objectively and multi-
dimentionally. This thesis has tried to demonstrate that
despite their cruelity which is inhuman, the ethnic conflicts
which have been taking place in the world can't be attributed
to irrational factors as some social scientists have tried to
assert.

What should be stated here is that for long time, ethnic
studies had been neglected by social scientists because they
saw that ethnic conflicts would be solved with the increase
of modernization .

With the increasing impact of ethnicity in the world peace
and security, objective studies have started to emerge. The
review of this literature has helped us to understand some
different aspects of the ethnic conflicts.

However, we have noted some weakness  in their efforts due
to the fact that some scholars have approached the problem in
focusing only on one aspect.

What they have failed to consider is the undeniable fact
that ethnicity is a dynamic problem which is influenced by

diverse factors. In trying to remedy this weakness, we have proposed multi-dimentional approach which consideres the colonial legacy, the post-colonial nation state-building process, and the international environment as the mainly contributing factors to ethnic conflicts in Africa.

We definitely consider the colonial legacy as the prime factor which influences the manifestation of ethnic conflicts in Africa because it is this system which created during the scramble for Africa in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries the foundations of actual African states with artificial political boundaries which did not reflecte any geographical and social realities of the African continent. The new boundaries not only divided existing political entities, but more significantly, compelled groups that frequently had no history of ongoing ties to relate to each other.

More dramatic was the fact that the colonialists for administrative purposes came to use this multi-culturalism of African society in a negative way by practicing a policy of divide and rule. In this context, some groups came to play a dominant role by becoming direct collaborator in the colonial administrative system. Acces to socio-economic development such as education and economic center came to be based on regional criteria. Thus, the African participation in socio-economic activities and acces to modernization being uneven and undemocratic , it was not surprizing that tension in group to group relation became high in the colonial and post-colonial period. The feeling of national unity which could facilitate a peaceful process of nation state-building and integration at the independence was almost absent in most ex-colonies. This explains why despite the process of decolonization which had mobilized the African mass, politicized regionalism and ethnicity were present in

the post-colonial Africa creating, therefore, the conditions favorable to the rise of conflicts.

The colonial powers also altered the African people's mode of production by introducing the economy of cash crop, ignoring indigenous economies. That means that despite their political independence, the African leaders inherited non-integrated nations with weak institutions unable to manage conflicts even at their primary stage and economy unable to satisfy African people basic human needs.

Whilst colonialism is the historical point of reference, the second element to be considered is the state and the role it has played in these newly created nation-states. Nationalist leaders who came to lead the destiny of post-independent Africa failed to integrate these societies in the changing conditions.

This is so because in their intention of nation state building, they came to adopt such policies and behaviours which had made them lose the legitimacy toward their peoples.

After many years of deprivation, African peoples hoped that the process of decolonization would bring back the lost human dignity through the creation of democratic institutions for mass participation in political and economical activities.

However, the reality, had showed that the state was not liberating and protective of its citizens, its gross effect was constricting and exploitative, or else it simply failed to operate in any social sense at all. [1] In the political field for example, the concentration of political power in the hands of the incumbent president was preferred to democratic institutions and mass participation. This closed the possiblity of national dialogue and concensus necessary for the establishment of peace and stability in multi-ethnic

states. As the consequence of these practices, violent means of political change and access to power came to be used. In his study of Nigeria politics, professor Ito Katsumi notes that:

When we think about the political difficulties in post-colonial Nigeria, we may say that there is a problem concerning the political values and principles. One of the problems existing in Nigeria's post-independence political development is the fact that the winner takes all. The winner, by taking every thing through election or polical competition, leaves the looser without any role to play in the country political life or the right to opposition. [2]

Concerning the economic policies, instead of creating real possibilities of sustained development able to satisfy the mass basic human needs, come to reflect a continuation of colonial economy which in most cases responds to the need of African petty bourgeoisie which enriched themselves through corruption and misuse of state fund.

By the considering the fact that all these practices were done by state authorities largely dominated by the major ethnic groups, this created the minority peoples' fear of being dominated as in colonial time. The political elites' disposition to manipulate this real fear and turn it into political ideology combined with the international environ-ment gave born to a post-colonial Africa highly marked by ethno-political conflicts.

However, this should not lead us to conclude that African peoples are only attached to ethnic identity. We think that a wider national identity could be accepted by these groups as it was in some pre-colonial multi-ethnic states. But, in the situation where the post-colonial states have failed to develop proper environment where all ethnic identities could

live in symbiose and harmony, without mutual fear, this possibility was seriously damaged.

The review of traditional policies devised by African states in trying to solve the ethnic conflicts shows that they were in most cases a failure. This is understandable by the fact that these solutions didn't seek from their very beginning to response to the real claim of ethnicity. To most African nationalist leaders, ethnicity was an atavistic phenomenon which should be absolutely eliminated or put in the `musee de l'histoire' . That is why, armed with modern Western political philosophy of nation states-building, they worked hard in the elimination of ethnicity.

Seriously concerned by the effects and the human suffering brought by the effects of these conflits on peace and security, the regional organizations [OAU] and the international community through the UN or non-governmental organizations, have been involved in the search of peaceful solution . However, despite their motivations and efforts, the result of their interventions were not so positive as the Nigerian and Angola cases indicate. Many factors may explain their failure for example: the contradiction between the norms of these organizations, international law and the demands of ethnic groups or the standpoint of states concerned and also some operational weakness.

Then, should the African peoples reconsider the African state legal system by going back to the traditional African states in order to avoid these ethno-political conflicts ? or should the international organizations and law sacrified the fundamental norms which guide the international states system as souvereignty, self-determination, state integrity in non intervention in the name of minority claims.

The choices have been very difficult because each of them has it reverse side and serious impact on African peace and security.

In chapter two, we saw that this option has been advanced by some leaders as Awolowo in Nigeria, Roberto in Angola etc... it has certainly the merit of questioning the legitimacy of actual African states' borders. But despite its attraction, we have to recognize that as a prospect of resolution, it presents a lot of difficulties. For intance, how can we situate the limits of these traditional African states? This question is very difficult to answer because in the pre-colonial period, the frontiers where not fixed. So, the simple fact of fixing them even for the matter of necessity will alienate the nature of some ethnic groups who consider the freedom of migration as an aspect of their tradition and a necessity to their economic activities.

Also, in the new international system, how can these small states face the competition from larger states constellation as EC, APEAC ... ?

In our logic, we think that at same time that peoples are trying to find urgent solutions to the ethnic conflicts, African peoples should devise long prospective political vision which could be responsives to their socio-historic and cultural environment

The `nation state' political framework which is widely us by most African states is simply not adapted to them and is becoming anachronic. This is so because it has found its manifestation in the historical socio-economic evolution of Europeen states. With the evolution of capitalism, the existence of colonies and the international war which had marked European history, circumstances favorable to a strong central government and , therefore, the rise of nationalism

was present. With a combination of forces towars their minority groups, European states came to realize the actual nation states.

Certainly, African nationalist leaders have been impressed with the realization done by European states through this process. However, more often, they forgot to look on the violence which Europe had faced in the name of this nationalism and on the completely different socio-historical circumstances. More telling is the fact that Europe with had initiated the nation state as a modern political formula, has recently moved to a new formulat based on transnational cooperation and continental integration. Also, at the same time we are witnessing in Europe th rise of ethno-nationalism which is asking for respect for groups rights.

Thus, if the nation state is subject of reconceptualization in Europe despite the fact that she was the initiator of this formula, why should then African states should remain attached to this formulat despite the fact that all the previous decates have been a failure ?

The history of humanity indicates that each time people have been subject to oppression they have came to use all the mean available to protect themselves. This meant that when social conditions work in favor of conflict, ethnicity may come to be used as the last means of survivance. To avoid this, it is time for the African leader to reconsider their political vision by including in the criteria of ethnicity.

This is due to the fact that we consider ethnicity as a political challenge initiated by `ethnic group' which constituts African most basic unit. The ethnic group is asking for a reconsideration of political and socio-economic vision of nation state-building process initiated by the African nationalist leaders. The ethnic groups demand that

their existence , interests and rights be protected by the state institutions in which their participation is assured.

Certainly, by questioning the legitimacy of the state policies and practices the ethnic group is also questioning the meaning of some Western values in the context of African society. However, these should not be understand as a refusal of African people to accept development or transformation as some modernist theories had stated. Any historical observation of traditional African societies will show us that African societies were since their beginning involved in continual process of development and transformation. It is this attachment to development and transformation which had led them to the diverse innovations. Thus, what is questioned here is the objective of this developmental process because not only it doesn't profite to all groups but also it does'nt give them a role to play in this process and sometimes put their existence in danger.

In his conclusion on Nigeria politics, professor Ito comments that the annuled presidential election of Abiola in Nigeria indicates a trend of a trans-ethnic possibility. [3] To us, it mean that ethnicity could be transcended when the policy proposed by the leaders to not put their existence in danger. The African philosophy of humanity doesn't excludes the existence and acceptence of other ethnic groups. The Kongo proverbe which states that ` bole bantu boukaka nsongo ' ( the humanity is in the acceptence of the other because the contrary means a refusal of life)illstre well our assumption. Guy Menga a congolese writer follows the same logic when answering to our question he argued : In the past, and even the present time, Africa peoples have a consideration and respect to the identities of other peoples. [4]

This enables us say that peaceful relations between different ethnic groups are not impossible. However, to realize it, mass particpation, respect of human rights in it individual and group capacity and consideration of the ethnic factor in the political framework should then become the polical keewords which should be keept in the mind of African political leaders.

As a matter of fact, the international organizations and law which play an important role in our modern society should also be responsive to the challenge of ethnicity without undermining the world peace and order. What should be kept in mind is the indeniable reality that principles such as souvereignty and self-determination can't continually be confined to the state alone, at the time when some of these states doesn't garanty and satisfy the fundamental rights of their population.

Lastly, we want to state that at the coming of the 21s century, there is no doubt that the future of Africa resides in a political framework based on the philosophy of Pan-Africanism. However, this could be possible only if the ethnic group which is the African most important socio-cultural unit is allowed to play a fundamental and positive role without any manipulation as it was in the colonial and the last three decades of post-colonial Africa.

1. Basil Davidson, The Black Man's Burden:Africa and the Curse
   of the Nation-State(London, James Curry 1992), p. 290.

2. Ito Katsumi, " ナイジェリア政治序説(二.完) " 近畿大学 法学 第44巻
   第2号、1997年 1月, pp. 31-32.

3. Ito Katsumi, Ibid. p. 33.

4. This quotation was noted during our interview with
   Guy-Menga, Congolese writer, Former Minister of
   information, (Paris, August 1995).

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